

THE BROWARD COUNTY LEAGUE OF CITIES'
SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY PUBLIC SAFETY
TASK FORCE

UPDATED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

August 13, 2019

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PREAMBLE

“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, the paramount duty of the State to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education”

Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution (emphasis added)

“People over Products.” No matter how much money or how many safety and security tools a facility can purchase, the most common failure to safety and security is human error. The term ‘People over Products’ stresses the important role of the individuals within a school in regard to safety. It is critical to ensure training opportunities are provided to employees and students, ensure awareness programs are taking place for the implemented safety and security measures, and employees and students are being empowered to be the most important line of defense.”

Indiana School Safety Guidelines for Emergency Response Systems, p.9

“When I look at this event, I see these dominos - each of them very specific that had to line up that way that morning for things to happen the way they did...here. And when I look at that, all I see are the spaces in between where somebody, somewhere along the way, could have stopped the next domino from falling.”

David Wheeler, father of Ben who was massacred at Sandy Hook Elementary

These words focus on education, safety in schools and the fundamental reality that we, as members of a community, must work together to provide a safe and secure environment for our students, teachers, staff and families.

The genesis of this Task Force was the horrific tragedy on February 14, 2018 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Yet, as we have seen time and again since the Task Force began its work, the robust, and at times difficult, discussions over school security, prevention of tragedies and post-trauma recovery translate to a broader community discussion locally, statewide and throughout the nation.

Words are important and dialogue is necessary. Action is what a community demands.

Executive Summary

Background on Task Force

The February 14, 2018 mass shooting at Parkland's Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School resulted in the deaths of 14 students and 3 teachers, another 17 students and teachers who were injured as a result of gunfire, and many more who were traumatized and continue to endure the mental and physical scars. This massacre motivated an urgent calling to address a number of school and community safety issues in Broward County, Florida.¹

The mission of the Task Force was to gather a broad array of representative stakeholders for potential changes and/or strategies intended to enhance school and community safety and resiliency in Broward County, Florida and provide sustained evaluation of the implementation of such recommendations based upon what was known generally.

An Initial Report and Recommendations was published on June 4, 2018, comprised of 93 pages with 102 specific recommendations. Since the June 4, 2018, Initial Report, the Task Force convened seven (7) additional times.²

Like the public at large, the Task Force continued to focus on issues important to residents of Broward County, such as access to school campuses; access to school buildings; safety and security policies, strategies and infrastructure before, during and after critical incidents; the disciplinary policies surrounding school and community interventions; deployment of School Resource Officers and school-based security personnel, including funding and challenges; newly available court and law enforcement interventions to remove firearms from dangerous individuals; and, access to and funding for mental health resources in the areas of child and adult prevention as well as post-crisis support. For this Updated Report, the Task Force again gathered information, performed research, and relied upon knowledgeable community members who participated.

Since February 14, 2018, there have been additional mass shootings, including at schools. The deadliest school shooting since MSD was at Santa Fe High School, where 8 students and 2 teachers were murdered, and 13 others were injured. Gun violence in the form of mass shootings and focal gun violence continue to plague communities across the United States. In the past two weeks, three mass shootings dominated the news – at a festival and at the locations of a popular shopping store and a venue for evening entertainment – resulting in 34 dead and 64 injured.

Communities recognize it is not possible to harden an entire community through any single, or even a collective of ideas and actions. Processes such as Risk Protection Orders (which, after a Court process, prohibit possession of firearms by those who are at risk of harming themselves or others), increased vigilance in identifying threats, increased capacity to report concerns, and focused training on prevention and interdiction have served to help protect the community and mitigate and sometimes prevent tragedies. Law enforcement's affirmative engagement involving

¹ The Task Force recognizes that at least two other bodies continue to examine school and public safety issues. The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, with subpoena power, continues to take evidence and develop recommendations. Their meeting information is available on line. <https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Home.aspx>. In addition, as discussed herein Broward County initiated its own After-Action Taskforce; the consultant, the National Police Foundation, has issued draft recommendations.

² In generating the June 4, 2018 Report, the Task Force convened ten (10) times between March 27, 2018 and June 4, 2018.

on-line threats of future acts of violence have increased dramatically, with a number of examples of legitimate threats being averted prior to an act of violence. Often we see the engagement of the law enforcement community is initiated by community members alert to the threats and risks, either through traditional means or with the introduction of new “apps” which facilitate reporting.

We are also getting a better understanding of our community deficits in addressing the after-math impacts of these acts of violence, both in the acute and long-term recovery phases. These deficits prevent us from fully meeting the needs of the families of those murdered, those wounded and their families who live with scars seen and unseen, those in proximity and first responders. The Task Force took in a large volume of information on both the efficacy of interventions post-MSD and how communities must better to respond to trauma.

The Task Force recognized that not all of the Initial Report recommendations could be implemented immediately. As a result, the Task Force characterized the recommendations as “Immediate”, “Near-Term”, “Mid-Term” and “Legislative”. The latter characterization acknowledged that so much of what was recommended would require advocacy, multi-partner community support and sustained oversight.

Broward County Public Schools: Facts and Figures

Some facts about Broward County Public Schools (BCPS):

- The sixth largest school district in the nation and the second largest in the state of Florida;
- More than 271,500 students and approximately 175,000 adult students;
- There are 234 schools, centers and technical colleges: 136 elementary, 37 middle, 33 high, 8 combination (multi-level), 17 centers, and 3 technical colleges;
- BCPS has 89 charter schools with 45,000 students;
- BCPS students represent 204 different countries and 191 different languages;
- There are approximately 2,381 buildings located on the District’s 234 school campuses;
- There are an additional 1,208 portable units located on its school campuses;
- This represents approximately 35,607,000 square footage of space on its school campuses;
- Not including common and extra-curricular rooms on school campuses, there are nearly 16,700 distinct classrooms and labs; and,
- The total amount of perimeter fencing surrounding BCPS schools is nearly 750,000 linear feet.

Safety and Security of Schools

The Task Force identified at the outset a number of key principles which remain true today:

- There is a constitutional requirement that the State provide adequate provision for safe and secure schools;
- People over Products: Even with the addition of new products and infrastructure, in the end, people involved in the process must “adhere to” and “be vigilant” in enforcing policies and procedures;
- In evaluating critical incidents, usually there are many different opportunities for prevention and intervention. The challenge is how to make sure intervention occurs timely and that layers of protection are woven such that the failure at one point may be caught at another;

- A number of new laws enacted through the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety (“MSDHSPS”) Act were welcomed and had an immediate impact on school and public safety; and,
- Other provisions of the MSDHSPS Act either did not provide adequate funding to initiate changes by the start of the 2018/19 school year or are requirements which are difficult or impossible to meet.

The MSDHSPS Act covered many different areas, including mandating school safety personnel; introduction of new and/or amendments to existing law to remove weapons from people who are imminent dangers to themselves or others; increased responsibility for school safety assessments and engagement of school safety teams; mental health reporting changes for schools; and some increased funding for hardening of schools, SROs, and mental health.

As it relates to school safety and security, the Task Force has updated the implementation and/or progress, or lack thereof, on specific recommendations from the Initial Report.

School Resource Officers and School Safety Officers

Significant background on School Resource Officers (“SRO”) and School Safety Officers (“SSO”) was contained in the Initial Report. The Task Force continued to analyze the current SRO program in Broward.

The BCPS and individual municipalities and/or agencies partner to deploy SROs who are considered part of the municipal community policing efforts. However, because a significant portion of the funding comes from municipalities, the types of SRO coverage are varied: (1) full time agency certified law enforcement officer for each school; (2) full time agency certified law enforcement officer shared amongst schools; (3) use of retired certified officers for each school who do not otherwise have responsibility in the agency; and, (4) no SRO for the school. At the start of the 2017/18 school year, aside from the days when a SRO was shared with other schools (meaning for at least one of the schools assigned to the SRO there was no SRO on campus), there were 35 schools with no SROs assigned whatsoever, of which 26 were elementary schools. Historically, BCPS took the position this was a municipal decision; municipalities without SROs assigned argued it was a financial decision based upon the lack of contribution from BCPS.

The MSDHSPS Act mandated a 1:1 Safe-School Officer (SSO) ratio for each school by the start of the school year (unless the school board hires a certified officer for the school or participates in the program which arms school personnel after training). However, it was not possible to comply with the MSDHSPS Act at the start of the 2018/19 school year by simply providing SROs in every school:

- To meet this requirement, municipalities would have had to hire many additional certified law enforcement officers when there was already a shortage of available certified law enforcement personnel. Broward County, like all major cities and counties across the nation, had and has a large number of vacancies as of this moment. To comply with the MSDHSPS Act, the agencies would have had to add 72 more officers within 3 months. The BCPS estimated the actual need to provide coverage to account for larger campuses and schools may be 80-100 additional SROs;
- Even if there were available certified officers to hire, municipalities and law enforcement agencies consider the funding of SROs as the responsibility of BCPS,

not the individual municipalities and there are insufficient funds provided by the State;

- Even if there were funding and available certified law enforcement officers, the time to hire, screen, train and deploy would not have been possible by the start of 2018/19 school year;
- If there was an effort to hire retired certified officers to fill the substantial gap, there were a number of challenges: pension plans prohibit re-hiring for a period of time post-separation and there are significant tax penalties for violating these prohibitions; there is still a need for background checks, screening and potentially training; and,
- There was a significant concern to the extent that the MSDHSPS Act could require SROs in charter schools, which have to fund their portion and, in some cases, have less than 300 students. This would, of course, put further strain the ability to hire an adequate number of SROs by the beginning of the next school year.

At the start of the 2018/19 school year, there were 197 SROs assigned to 179 schools. To comply the MSDHSPS Act ratio of 1:1 School Safety Officer, BCPS had to avail itself of other strategies to ensure an (SSO) was assigned to every school campus. The MSDHSPS Act defines three alternatives to meet the 1:1 mandate for SSOs. They are:

- establish school resource officer programs, through a cooperative agreement with law enforcement agencies;
- commission (hire) one or more school safety officers; or
- at the school district's discretion, participate in the Guardian Program.

In short, while the SRO Program in Broward was able to be leveraged to meet the new mandate in part, BCPS would not have been able to fully meet the requirement based upon SROs alone for reasons previously identified. As a result, while BCPS had initially opposed participating in the Guardian Program available under the MSDHSPS Act, there was no ability to comply with the law for the start of the 2018/19 school year without implementing this program.

BCPS also had to implement other strategies to fully comply with the 1:1 ratio. These included the utilization of overtime detail assignments of certified law enforcement officers within select jurisdictions, and the deployment of the limited number of certified law enforcement officers within the District's Special Investigative Unit to serve as SSOs on select days. These alternative strategies were also necessary to address the natural attrition of armed guardians that occurred during the year and backfill absenteeism of SROs and armed guardians.

As outlined in greater detail in the Updated Report, BCPS anticipates utilizing all of these strategies again in school year 2019/20, as it again does not appear the SRO Program will be adequate to provide full compliance. Additionally, for 2018/19, BCPS increased its reimbursement per SRO to \$52,000 and expects to systematically increase its reimbursement per SRO each of the three years to reach \$60,000 for school year 2021-2022. All agree that this does not represent the full cost of a SRO.

BCPS notes the Safe School Allocation provided by the Florida Department of Education to fund SSOs at each campus is inadequate to cover actual SRO costs.

With all the emphasis on SROs and SSOs, the Task Force reiterates that the current policy, with some exceptions, only deploys this type of protection during the hours surrounding classes.

There is no or limited coverage for pre-school, after-school, extra-curricular, camps over break, and summer camps. For some schools, the dismissal bell results in only a 30-40% reduction in the student population. Accordingly, emphasis on school safety personnel, adherence to existing and developing of new safety and security policies and procedures, and additional funding would be necessary to provide additional and adequate full-time safety and security.

In the end, all agree, without a permanent dedicated and stable funding source, the SRO program will continue to exist in Broward County as a patchwork of programs dependent on the municipality within which the school is sited, and the economic resilience of the individual municipalities to dedicate the significant portion unfunded by the BCPS. Friction will continue to exist regarding the sufficiency of funding to offset municipal costs resulting in varying levels of SRO coverage in the school system.

School Discipline and Community Intervention Programs

The Task Force previously took a great deal of time examining information related to the complex interaction of Federal and State laws, as well BCPS policies, related to discipline and the engagement of students with behavioral challenges. Interventions are defined by a uniform system of discipline, intended to prevent unequal treatment. Threat assessments related to students also have an intricate process, which must be followed.

For the roughly 32,000 students with disabilities, Federal and State law mandate how those students are disciplined and addressed through Individual Education Plans ("IEPs"). While there is certainly a defined process for discipline, the Initial Report raised concerns that some individual participants in BCPS system may have a real or perceived incentive to underreport or not impose consequences. The Task Force was unanimous that such incentives need to be eliminated and audits need to be performed to make sure the discipline process is being followed with fidelity, and the BCPS agreed.

The PROMISE Program (Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Supports & Education) was implemented by BCPS to address the increasing numbers of students who were entering the Juvenile Justice System as a result of arrests for misdemeanor offenses occurring during the school day. The BCPS outlined asserts that PROMISE is meant to address socially unacceptable or illegal behavior, targeting both short and long term academic success, aligning best practice models and Restorative Justice principles, and developing pro-social and resiliency skills. PROMISE, while addressing the behavior specific to the youth, is committed to addressing family and community circumstances that serve as both strengths and challenges for the youth's resiliency.

The Juvenile Civil Citation Program is an alternative to arresting youth who commit misdemeanor acts outside of school and is intended to ensure that these youth are expeditiously held accountable, supervised, and receive appropriate intervention services.

The Initial Report raised issues related to the scope and operation of the PROMISE program as well as the lack of communication between the PROMISE program and the Civil Citation Program.

In May 2019, the School Board of Broward County made changes to the governing policies involving PROMISE program:

- The PROMISE eligible incidents have been revised to align with incidents that are classified as misdemeanors.
- The PROMISE program is now only eligible to students of at least 11 years of age and/or enrolled in a District 6-12 school program. Students in grades K-5 will

receive age appropriate disciplinary consequences as outlined in the primary Discipline Matrices.

- PROMISE incidents for said students shall accrue through 12th grade with a maximum of three (3) referral assignments to the program.
- Pursuant to F.S. 1006.13, Zero Tolerance for Crime and Victimization, any student committing more than one misdemeanor must be referred to the Threat Assessment Team, which includes law enforcement, to determine if the act should be reported to law enforcement for further action.
- PROMISE incidents have always been recorded in the District's Discipline Management System.
- Additionally, a student who has accrued three cumulative PROMISE eligible incidents shall be referred to a community youth support diversion program, and to the District's Behavior Intervention Committee, as appropriate.
- Lastly, the PROMISE program is and was never intended to limit the discretion of law enforcement as clearly outlined in the Collaborative Agreement on School Discipline, and the District has provided and continues to provide notification to the State Attorney's Office when a student refuses to engage in the PROMISE program or does not comply with the program requirements.

BCPS and the Civil Citation Program initiated efforts intersect the database sharing. These efforts required refinement and it is anticipated BCPS will be able to recommence entering student PROMISE participation into the DJJ Prevention Web for the 2019/20 school year. Improved sharing of information between public agencies to promote public safety has been an explicit outcome of work undertaken since June 2018.

Mental Health and Trauma Recovery/Resiliency

In the area of mental health, the mental health professionals on the Task Force, supported by data and studies, emphasized previously that having a mental illness does not translate as a predictor for violent behavior. There are resources for mental health in Broward County for children and adults. However, the ability of families and individuals to locate the providers and to ensure stability and continuity, over time, are some of the challenges. Additional case managers and mental health liaisons for schools and community, at large, continue to be highly recommended. The Task Force reiterates in this Updated Report that the current staffing for school psychologists, counselors and social workers remains woefully unacceptable. This is, however, not just a school problem. The Task Force also spotlights again in this Updated Report that Florida's ranking for access and youth mental health is unacceptably low in large part due to the lack of sustainable funding.

The Task Force also focused on post-crisis intervention and suggestions to provide meaningful and rapid resources in times of mass shootings, but also for the purposes of other needs related to violence in the home. In this Updated Report, significant attention is given to the need to respond to the mental health trauma first responders experience in daily and in mass events to ensure best recovery and resiliency; their unique experiences require dedicated professionals well-acquainted with what first responders experience.

Additionally, as in the Initial Report, the Task Force continued to identify examples of well-meaning organizations lacking optimal connectivity and communications between themselves and amongst the various stakeholders, some of whom may not work within the traditional mental health community. This resulted in uncoordinated deployment of resources in the immediate after-math of MSD tragedy. Providing acute and long term services in the aftermath of trauma

requires a more comprehensive interaction and better sustained deployment of resources. Recommendations include generating a “Mental Health Incident Commander” as recommended by the National Police Foundation and improving the community participation in planning and response to trauma. In addition, the Task Force strongly believes the efforts to coordinate trauma recovery must be institutionalized such that the continuity going forward is not solely dependent upon the ability of the current personalities to collaborate.

Community Based Protections

While the Task Force has focused heavily on the school environment, as we have seen repeatedly since February 14, 2018, the community safety, recovery and resiliency issues are important.

One of the most important aspects of the enactment of the MSDHSPS Act was providing additional potential tools for law enforcement involving mental health, threats and firearms. In addition to powers to seize firearms from those who are in crisis and temporarily committed to a facility, under the Risk Protection Order (“RPO”) law enacted after MSD, when an individual is a significant danger to themselves or others by possessing a firearm or ammunition, law enforcement is empowered to petition the court for a temporary and/or long term RPO. The temporary RPO allows for immediate surrender and to prohibit future purchase, possession, custody or control of firearms and ammunition. The long term RPO will prohibit for up to 12 months the purchase, possession, custody or control any firearm or ammunition.

The RPO law provides for due process, including strict requirements for filing a petition and timely hearings. Broward County leads the state with the number of filed petitions for RPOs. Since April 2018, there have been over 300 petitions filed and BSO alone has seized over 300 firearms from individuals a Court has determined were a threat to themselves or others. The process of seeking and obtaining a RPO is labor intensive for law enforcement, the courts and Clerk’s office. The process of serving these RPOs can be dangerous, often requiring SWAT type response for serving the RPOs.

There are a number of clarifications to the statute which should be considered by the Florida Legislature.

The Task Force spotlights a glaring and dangerous loophole in Florida law as it relates to the RPO process. RPOs are entered into the FDLE database as a prohibition against the purchase of firearms within 24 hours of execution by a court. Florida law requires a FDLE background check involving the purchase of firearms if being purchased from a licensed firearm dealer. The FDLE background check is intended to capture those individuals who are prohibited from purchasing a firearm, for among reasons, because of the entry of a RPO. However, for private sales there is no legal requirement that the seller conduct a FDLE background check prior to the sale.

As a result, even where law enforcement has initiated a detailed investigation, petitioned a court for entry of a RPO, a receiving court conducts a full hearing and subsequently orders that a respondent should be barred from possessing, including the purchase of a firearm, the person prohibited by court order can still evade detection if attempting to purchase the firearm through a private sale.

Given the glaring loophole, particularly as it relates to individuals who a court has determined is a danger to themselves or others (perhaps based upon specific threats or being in crisis) and should be prohibited from possessing a firearm, the Task Force members who participated in the drafting of this Updated Report and Recommendation recommend the Florida Legislature adopt

universal and mandatory background checks on all firearm sales. There is no other method to ensure that those who have been adjudicated as prohibited from possessing a firearm are barred from purchasing through an otherwise legal process for sale and purchase

Since the Initial Report, the introduction of “stop the bleed” kits in schools and in the community-at-large have increased substantially. Now, “stop the bleed” training is included when providing training for bystander CPR and AED usage in schools and for the community. Kits have begun to be deployed in AED boxes or in self-contained kit boxes.

The Task Force noted in the Initial Report that there was significant attention being dedicated to Broward County’s Regional E911 and radio systems. Concerns regarding performance were being addressed by separate oversight bodies and consultants. However, the delay in deploying an upgraded radio system, which has reached beyond end-of-life, was and remains a deep concern. The Task Force strongly recommended, and dedicated advocacy efforts since the Initial Report to implement immediate stop-gap measures. One of the strong recommendations was to remove the BCPS busses from the public safety radio system. Since the Initial Report, through the commitment of the BCPS and Broward County, this has been accomplished for the start of the 2019/20 school year. However, as of the date of this report, the County still has not secured the last site necessary for the predicate radio towers to be fully constructed, though it would appear a resolution is possible in the coming months.

Conclusion

In this Updated Report, the Task Force provides an update on implementation of the initial 102 Recommendations; in some instances, these Recommendations have been refined or even implemented. At some level they will require continued vigilance. The Task Force also provides 17 additional Recommendations. Some of the Recommendations remain far beyond the available resources and require continued advocacy at the state and federal legislative levels.

Continued engagement of this Task Force to evaluate an evolving body of work related to the MSD massacre, school and mass shootings, and best practices for protecting schools and the community is highly recommended. Such continued engagement must include the many stakeholders, because, as was identified in this process, the steps necessary to protect schools and the community-at-large are often inter-related, complex and requiring a funding and/or policy commitments from policy makers and the public.³

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND ON TASKFORCE

The February 14, 2018 mass shooting at Parkland’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School resulted in the deaths of 17 students and teachers, and another 17 students and teachers who were shot. This massacre spotlighted an urgent need to address a number of school and community safety issues in Broward County, Florida.

³ The recommendations and opinions set forth in this Updated Report represent the findings and analysis of the Broward League of Cities’ School and Community Public Safety Task Force. The Updated Report and Recommendations has not been independently reviewed by the League’s Board of Directors and, therefore, does not represent a formal position of the League as of the date of this Updated Report.

Beginning in March 2018, the Task Force met to examine the issues of school and community public safety. On June 4, 2018, the Task Force issued an Initial Report and Recommendation ("Initial Report").⁴ The Initial Report contained 102 discrete recommendations.

As contemplated by the Task Force at the time of the Initial Report, because of the compressed timeframe set by the Task Force, further analysis and discussion of many of these initial Recommendations would be necessary. Many of the Recommendations required advocacy efforts, strategies and funding for implementation, and a mechanism for sustained oversight.

As a result, through the support of the Broward League of Cities, the Task Force continued to meet to examine the issues, both existing recommendations and additional matters of concern identified since the June 2018 Report. The Task Force met on July 17, 2018; December 5, 2018; March 7, 2019; April 10, 2019; June 10, 2019; July 25, 2019; and August 8, 2019.

As with the development of the Initial Report, the Task Force gathered data and requested presentations from various interested and/or knowledgeable sources. The materials gathered and/or circulated amongst the Task Force are contained in the Appendix.

⁴ Because this is an Updated Report, while some materials were carried forward so as to provide context, the reader is encouraged to review the June 4, 2018, Report and Recommendation which can be found at on the Broward League of Cities website "Quick Links".

http://browardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BLOC_PUBLICSAFETY_TASKFORCE_FINAL_RR_6_2_18_PM1.pdf.

CHAPTER 2: THE MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL PUBLIC SAFETY ACT (2018)

Seven days after the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, SB 7026 was proposed in the Florida legislature. On March 5, 2018, SB 7026 passed the Senate. On March 7, 2018, the identical companion House Bill passed the House. On March 9, 2018, Governor Rick Scott signed into law the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (2018) (“MSDHSPS Act”).

As outlined by the Task Force in the Initial 2018 Report, the pace of debate, passage and enactment was extraordinarily rapid and the expanse of the areas covered made communication of the full impact of the new law, particularly as to the funding features, challenging. Moreover, there were some matters which may not have been fully considered during the rapid passage, such as availability of financial and human resources to fully implement and comply.

A. Outline of the Act.

The Task Force provided a summary of the MSDHSPS Act in the Initial Report. After the enactment, the Task Force continued to examine the impact of the Act.

B. Mental Health and Firearms: Risk Protection Orders and Criminalization of Threats.

Risk Protection Orders: Broward County, Florida Facts, Data and Implementation

With the enactment of the MSDHSPS Act, Florida law now provides additional potential tools for law enforcement involving mental health, threats and firearms.

For instance, Florida law now permits a law enforcement officer who is taking a person into custody for an involuntary examination under the Baker Act to seize and hold firearms and ammunition from the person to extend to 24 hours after the person is released; the individual can establish he/she is no longer subject to involuntary examination; the individual has been released or discharged from inpatient or outpatient treatment and does not have a risk protection order against them or is not the subject of a firearm disability. Fla. Stat. 394.463(2)(d) et seq.⁵ Additionally, the MSDHSPS Act prohibits a person who has been adjudicated mentally defective or who has been committed to a mental institution from owning or possessing a firearm until a court orders otherwise. Fla. Stat. 790.065(2)(a)(4).

Under the Risk Protection Order (“RPO”) provision of Florida Statute Section 790.401 et seq., when an individual is a significant danger to themselves or others by possessing a firearm or ammunition, law enforcement is empowered to petition the court for a temporary and/or long term RPO. The temporary RPO allows for immediate surrender and to prohibit future purchase,

⁵ Prior to the passage of the MSDHSPS Act, when someone was involuntarily committed for a maximum of 72 hours as an immediate danger to themselves or others, firearms, if identified, were seized and held at police department evidence rooms. Upon discharge, when the individual requested the return of their firearms, police departments were legally required to return the firearms; if they failed to return the firearm, the police department could be sued civilly. *Dougan v. Bradshaw*, 198 So. 3d 878 (4th DCA 2016). In addition, outside of the Baker Act situation, there was no method to seize firearms (unless seized as part of a criminal investigation). Finally, it is important to emphasize that it was a debatable legal point as to whether or not law enforcement could intervene when someone published words expressing an intent or desire to hurt others or commit a mass shooting.

possession, custody or control of firearms and ammunition. The long term RPO will prohibit for up to 12 months the purchase, possession, custody or control any firearm or ammunition.

The law provides for due process, including strict requirements for filing a petition and timely hearings. Once ordered, the individual must surrender to local law enforcement all firearms and ammunition owned by the respondent in the respondent's custody, control, or possession, and any license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm held by the respondent. If the individual does not cooperate, law enforcement may seek a search warrant. Possessing or purchasing a firearm or ammunition while subject to the RPO is a third degree felony.

Upon enactment, the 17th Judicial Circuit, under the leadership of Chief Judge Jack Tuter, and the Broward Sheriff's Office (and other law enforcement agencies within Broward as well) immediately began utilizing the RPO process, when appropriate, to address threats of violence with weapons with an emphasis on firearms. At the outset, the court and clerk's office had to establish procedures and processes for filing, hearings, entry and enforcement.

The 17th Judicial Circuit continues to lead the state with the number of filed petitions for RPOs. According to the 17th Judicial Circuit, the Florida circuit closest in terms of the number of petitions filed had half the number of the 17th Judicial Circuit.

Below is data from the 17th Judicial Circuit, the Broward Clerk of Courts and BSO, as to the number of filed petitions for RPOs since June 2018:

<u>Calendar Year 2018</u>	<u>Calendar Year 2019</u>
	Jan: 23
	Feb: 20
	Mar: 20
	Apr: 15
	May: 16
Jun: 84 ⁶	Jun: 12
Jul: 25	Jul: 9
Aug: 30	
Sep: 16	
Oct: 13	
Nov: 19	
Dec: 20	
2018 Totals: 207	2019 Totals: 115
Total RPOs filed through July 31, 2019 in Broward County: 322	

⁶ June 2018 totals combine April, May and June 2018.

According to BSO, the following statistics have been gleaned to date:⁷

- During 2018, of the RPOs served on respondents by BSO, 88% were for BSO and 12% were for municipal agencies that did not do RPO's in 2018 but now do serve their own RPOs;
- Total number of RPO's served to date by BSO for 2019 were 41 and all were for BSO;
- For those RPOs BSO served during 2018, respondents were 83 males and 7 females; 86 adults and 4 juveniles; average age was 38 with the oldest being 78 and the youngest being 16;
- For those RPOs BSO served during 2019 to date, respondents were 36 males and 5 females; 37 adults and 4 juveniles; average age was 39 with the oldest being 83 and the youngest being 13.

The data in the preceding paragraph reflects only those RPOs served by BSO and do not reflect the RPO's served by any other law enforcement agency. There is presently no central repository to track data and trends. However, all the agencies in Broward County are serving their own as is evident from the fact that BSO has not served any for other agencies this year.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) held a number of fact finding meetings around the state with law enforcement agencies to discuss the RPO process and how it can be streamlined and standardized state-wide. According to BSO, this meeting was quite productive. FDLE confirmed that Broward County leads the state in RPO's issued and the new process will make it more effective to procure and serve RPO's as well as track who is serving them and the results of same.

As to the effectiveness of RPO's, there are number of observations from the stakeholders:

- As outlined in the Initial Report, the process is very labor intensive for law enforcement and the courts. Obtaining an RPO requires detectives to investigate, take statements and prepare affidavits for the Court. Then, there is a hearing requirement to obtain a Temporary RPO. As a result, agencies are finding, particularly given the risks of failing to obtain an RPO in an appropriate circumstance, that resources are being dedicated that were not expected;
- As outlined in the Initial Report, because of the need to prepare the RPO in great detail, in contrast to a restraining order in other contexts, there is often a delay between recognizing someone who may be subject to the RPO process and actually obtaining the RPO. When the allegation does not involve an individual who would otherwise qualify for temporary involuntary commitment pursuant to the Baker Act or has committed a crime subject to arrest, there are risks associated with leaving the individual in possession of the weapons and ammunition during this gap. As a result, law enforcement must weigh risks of delay and consider strategies to protect the community, including intensive surveillance;
- BSO alone has seized in excess of 300 firearms via this process which undoubtedly makes our community safer. There is no central repository of information for data on how many weapons were seized through this RPO process by non-BSO law enforcement agencies;

⁷ Data was not available from the individual non-BSO municipal agencies which filed and served RPO petitions. Going forward, it may be helpful to maintain database of service statistic across all agencies in Broward County.

- RPO statute has had a substantial impact on law enforcement. The 17th Judicial Circuit entered an Administrative Order permitting all law enforcement agencies to serve RPO's;
- Due to the potential for danger to law enforcement and the community associated with serving a RPO on a respondent, many agencies utilize the SWAT teams to serve the original RPO which results in the dedication of personnel, planning staff and taxpayer dollars;
- To lessen the overtime burden on law enforcement agencies, some have officers on standby awaiting the service packet from the clerk. The 17th Judicial Circuit established a procedure to get the packets to law enforcement two times a day, mid-morning and mid-afternoon.
- According to the 17th Judicial Circuit, the burden on the courts has been minimal. Every circuit handles these differently. In the 17th Judicial Circuit each of the 90 judges are put on a monthly rotation (except the first appearance judge). Each judge handles all newly filed RPO's for the month they are assigned and are obligated to handle all matters attached to any RPO they approved for the life of the RPO such that each judge will handle requests to vacate or extend the RPO throughout the life of the RPO;
- According to the 17th Judicial Circuit, it is unaware of any instances where a respondent has used a weapon while under an RPO. It is possible but it has not been reported to the 17th Judicial Circuit. Going forward, tracking use and attempts to purchase weapons should be maintained in a central database so that effectiveness can be tracked as well as analyzing any changes to the process to continue to prevent such from happening;
- The statute seems to have accomplished its purpose in that it works well to take weapons from persons experiencing a mental health crisis or those who have threatened themselves or others;
- According to the 17th Judicial Circuit, in many cases the respondent has agreed to the entry of the RPO, either because they do not actually own weapons (and the RPO was a preventative act for a person in crisis) or do not wish to challenge the petition in court;
- The creation of the RPO came with no additional funding for the Clerk's Office, law enforcement agencies or the Courts;
- For the 2018/19 BSO budget, BSO has submitted a request to Broward County for additional law enforcement positions in order to meet the demands of the RPO process. According to BSO, no additional resources are being sought for the 2019/20. Individual non-BSO agencies continue to utilize significant resources, but have also sought the assistance of BSO.

It has been noted that there are some clarifications to the RPO statute which would be helpful and which were not addressed this past legislative session:

- The RPO statute requires a mental health exam/alcohol/drug exam at the final hearing. However, by then it is too late to order such an examination and perform prior to entry. Further, the statute is silent on who is to pay for the exam;
- The RPO statute provides no confidentiality safeguards as it pertains to juveniles. The statute is silent as to whether or not the legislature intended that juveniles can or cannot be identified by name and whether or not they lose privacy protections they would otherwise have in the juvenile and family court. Additionally, the RPO statute is silent on whether or not the Court ordered mental health exam for a

juvenile should be filed of record and made public. There is no provision for how a juvenile can or should represent him/her self after they are served; juveniles cannot meaningfully represent themselves at the final hearing and a parent cannot represent them if they are not an attorney;

- It has been suggested that the Legislature should consider amending the law to permit family members to seek Risk Protection Orders. Presently, there is no opportunity for a family member to petition the Court for similar protections; they must rely upon the willingness of law enforcement to initiate the process and appreciate the concerns of the family.⁸

As further outlined in Chapter 7(D), the Task Force members who participated in the drafting of this Updated Report and Recommendation recommend the Florida Legislature adopt universal and mandatory background checks on all firearm sales to close the loophole which now allows those who have been adjudicated as prohibited from possessing a firearm to evade the order through a private sale, which does not presently require a FDLE background check.

Criminalization of Threats

Florida Statute Section 836.10 was amended to make it a second degree felony for any person “who makes, posts, transmits a threat in writing or other record, including electronic record, to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism, in any manner that would allow a person to view the threat”. Prior to passage of this Act, law enforcement from time to time would attempt to utilize other provisions to intervene to protect the community; those strategies had not been fully tested by the Courts and were subject to concerns related to First Amendment rights. Since the amendment, in Broward County and throughout the State there have been numerous examples of law enforcement making arrests of individuals, including juveniles, for such threats. Additional community sensitivity to reporting these threats has increased the ability of law enforcement and others to intervene at a much earlier stage.

Amendments or Updates to the MSDHSPS Act Provisions.

The Initial Report outlined in detail the various provisions of the MSDHSPS Act.

Based upon a published summary, the statewide funding (not for Broward County alone) for school year 2018/19 is as follows. Changes to select allocations for the 2019/20 school year are indicated below each respective line item:

- \$69,237,286 recurring to DOE for Mental Health Assistance Allocation;
 - \$75,000,000 (increase of \$5,762,714 for 2019/20)
- \$500,000 recurring and \$6,200,000 nonrecurring to DOE to implement youth mental health awareness and assistance training;
- \$1,000,000 nonrecurring to DOE for MSDHS memorial;
 - No new allocation for 2019/20

⁸ In the aftermath of additional mass shootings, it has been reported that family members or members of the community had reasons to be concerned regarding potential violence by the shooters. According to press reports, proposed Florida legislation (SB 114) would expand who may seek RPOs to include mother, father, grandparent, step-parent, sibling, spouse or legal guardian.

- \$25,262,714 nonrecurring to DOE to rebuild MSDHS Building 12;
 - No new allocation for 2019/20
- \$500,000 recurring and \$67,000,000 nonrecurring to DOE reimbursing screening and training-related costs and providing a one-time stipend of \$500 to school guardians who participate in the program;
- \$344,393 recurring and 3 \$150,000 salaries to the DOE for the Office of Safe Schools;
- \$97,500,000 recurring to DOE to increase the Safe Schools allocation, to use exclusively to hire or contract school resource officers;
 - Another \$18,043,981 increase for 2019/20
- \$100,000 recurring to DOE for active shooter training component for the school safety specialist;
- \$98,962,286 nonrecurring to DOE for a grant program for school site hardening;
 - \$50,000,000 (decrease of \$48,962,286 for 2019/20)
- \$300,000 non-recurring and \$100,000 recurring to FDLE for mobile suspicious activity reporting tool;
- 5 full-time equivalent positions, with associated salary rate of \$345,000 and \$600,000 recurring and, \$50,000 nonrecurring to FDLE for the Marjory Stoneman Douglas HS Public Safety Commission;
- \$9,800,000 recurring to DCF for additional community action teams to ensure statewide coverage;
- \$18,300,000 recurring to DCF for additional mobile crisis teams to ensure statewide coverage; and,
- \$18,321 recurring and \$225,000 nonrecurring to DOE for death benefits for three staff members who died at MSDHS.

It is important to understand what this funding covers and what it does not. Areas of clarification noted by the Task Force, as well as financial impact, will be outlined further below.

C. Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program

The MSDHSPS Act permits a sheriff to establish a voluntary Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program, but leaves the decision to participate or not with the county school districts.

As noted in the Initial Report, while \$67,000,000 non-recurring and \$500,000 recurring funding was provided, these funds were dedicated to training. There was a one-time \$500 stipend in the Act for those who participate.⁹

BCPS had assigned 49 guardians to schools at the peak during the 2018/19 school year. The assignments fluctuated based on when the guardian completed the legislatively required training, natural attrition, and daily absenteeism. To accommodate this, the District utilized detail assignments and deployment of its detectives to schools.

⁹ Under the voluntary program participants complete 132 hours of comprehensive firearm safety and proficiency training, pass psychological evaluation, submit to and pass drug tests; and complete certified diversity training. There does not appear that there was any provision for annual re-training or certification; however, discussions with law enforcement believe this is advisable and may ultimately be required. Those with only classroom duties were excluded from participation.

Three municipalities provided detail officers on a daily basis while awaiting the assignment of a guardian. The three municipalities were Ft. Lauderdale, Hollywood, and Lauderhill.

The District has deployed its limited number of SIU detectives (certified law enforcement officers) to cover schools where detail officers were not available on any given day or the guardian was out.

Implementation Challenges

National organizations such as National Association of School Resource Officers opposed the concept of arming school personnel who are not certified law enforcement officers.¹⁰ Broward County Teachers Union opposed participation as well. The School Board of Broward County, in an effort to comply with the mandates of the new law as it relates to the mandatory ratio of “School Safety Officers” (“SSO”), was left no choice but to participate in the Guardian Program.

As noted in the Initial Report, the other two methods of complying with the MSDHSPS Act requirement to have a “safe school” officer at each school facility are (1) deployment of a SRO; (2) deployment of a certified law officer known as a “school safety officer.” Both of these options require a certified law enforcement officer. Additionally as noted in the Initial Report, current vacancies in municipal and county law enforcement agencies is approximately 300 county wide, and as many as 500 tri-county area. High level of vacancies and challenges in hiring remain true today. Securing additional certified law enforcement officers to achieve compliance by the start of the 2018/19 school year was impossible under traditional methods of hiring and filling necessary vacancies.

For the 2018/19 school year, minimally one Safe School Officer (SSO) was assigned to each school. As noted above, this entailed a number of strategies to provide coverage including; School Resource Officers, guardians, details provided by certified law enforcement officers, and the deployment of detectives from the District’s Special Investigative Unit.

Although BCPS has indicated it employed every strategy to fully comply with the legislative mandate to have an SSO assigned to every campus during the operational hours of school, there are a multitude of challenges that must be overcome to be successful. These include funding, sourcing, and retaining issues related to SSOs. Outlined below are a number of specific challenges that have an impact on the ability for school districts to comply with the legislative mandate:

- As previously stated, the current SRO Program is a partnership with BCPS, the Broward Sheriff’s Office, and local municipalities. Since its inception, the cost associated with the SRO Program has been shared between the District and participating municipalities. Although the District’s fixed reimbursement per SRO has periodically increased over the years, it remains well short of the actual full costs (compensation, benefits, equipment, training, etc.). Participation in the SRO Program has always been voluntary, and a municipality’s participation has largely been based on its individual perceived value of having law enforcement present in a school environment, its ability to offset the costs above the District’s reimbursement, and ability to hire certified law enforcement officers for the Program. While it is BCPS’s preference to expand the SRO Program to comply

¹⁰ See <https://nasro.org/news/press-releases/nasro-opposes-arming-teachers/>; <https://nasro.org/news/press-releases/nasro-expands-upon-recommendation-arming-teachers/>.

with the MSDHSPS Act, many municipalities have been unable to expand their participation for the reasons stated above.

- Recently, the Governor empaneled the Twentieth Statewide Grand Jury in the Supreme Court of the State of Florida to review implementation compliance with the MSDHSPS Act. In its First Interim Report, the Grand Jury stated, “Protecting and securing our schools and every life within them is everyone's responsibility and it is of utmost importance.” Many municipalities believe the responsibility to comply with the requirement to assign, and more importantly fully fund, an SSO at every school campus rest squarely on school districts. As has been noted in multiple BLOC reports involving SRO funding, municipalities did not choose the site of schools and schools often educate large numbers of students who do not live within the municipal boundaries; as a result, those families do not contribute to the tax base to support municipal funding. The Safe Schools Allocation which is specifically provided to fund SSOs is inadequate to cover the actual full costs of providing an SRO at every campus.
- Although the MSDHSPS Act permits an existing staff member (including teachers in the newest legislation) to serve as armed guardians, many school districts (including BCPS) have chosen to source a position solely dedicated to serving as an armed guardian as opposed to arming teachers. Originally, BCPS included minimum qualifications that an individual serving in the capacity of an armed guardian have a minimum of two (2) years within the last ten (10) years of experience as a sworn law enforcement officer or similar military experience. Ultimately, these qualifications posed challenges to qualifying a sufficient number of guardians to meet the District's need. In May 2019, BCPS expanded the minimum experience qualifications to include experience as a correction's officer or armed security guard with class D and G licensure in an effort to source additional qualified candidates. Law enforcement participants and other stakeholders on the Task Force took exception to this, characterizing it as a relaxation of the standards.
- BCPS has experienced a significant attrition rate of its armed guardian positions for a number of reasons. Once the guardians complete the 144 hours of mandatory training, they become attractive candidates for law enforcement agencies to address vacancies. As noted in the Initial Report and herein, there remains a critical shortage of certified law enforcement officers in the state and nationwide. Some have suggested this shortage has been further exacerbated by the new requirement of the MSDHSPS Act. Additionally, BCPS has lost armed guardians who were trained for BCPS schools to charter schools. As the accountability associated with new mandate ramps up, charter schools have offered higher compensated positions to BCPS guardians to avoid potential ramifications of noncompliance.
- Daily absenteeism also impacts the number of SSOs a school district must employ. A district must have ample SROs or guardians to deploy to address natural attrition or absenteeism. Recognizing it takes four weeks to minimally complete the guardian training, it is not feasible to wait until an armed guardian separates employment before identifying their replacement.

D. Senate Bill 7030 and Florida Department of Education Guidance/Directives

During the 2019 Legislative Session SB 7030 was passed. The bill builds upon the school safety and security foundation established in the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety

Act (Chapter 2018-03, Laws of Florida) by addressing the school safety and security recommendations of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission and by strengthening accountability and compliance oversight authority.

Outlined below is guidance received by the Department of Education regarding the requirements of SB 7030.

Bill Sections:

Section 1.

Amends s. 30.15(1)(k), F.S., Powers, duties, and obligations, to:

- Require a sheriff to assist district school boards and charter school governing boards in complying with s. 1006.12, F.S., “Safe-school officers at each public school,” by providing access to a Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program either by providing the training directly or through a contract with another sheriff’s office that has established a guardian program.
- Allow a charter school governing board in a school district that has not voted, or has declined to implement the guardian program, to request that the sheriff in the county establish the program for the purpose of training the charter school employees or contract with another sheriff that has established a guardian program to provide the training. The charter school governing board must notify the district school superintendent and the sheriff in the charter school’s county prior to the contract’s execution.
- Require a sheriff who establishes a guardian program to consult with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) on programmatic guiding principles, practices, and resources, and to certify school guardians
- Reimburse a sheriff conducting a guardian program training for screening-related and training-related costs, and for providing a one-time stipend of \$500 to each school guardian.
- Remove the prohibition against full-time classroom teachers participating in the guardian program.
- Authorize only applicable district school superintendents or charter school principals to appoint certified school guardians to serve.

Section 2. (Effective October 1, 2019)

Amends s. 843.08, F.S., False personation, to:

- commission (hire) one or more school safety officers;
- Include language that prohibits false personation of a school guardian as described in s. 30.15(1)(k), F.S., or a security officer licensed under chapter 493, F.S.

Section 3.

Amends s. 943.03, F.S., Department of Law Enforcement, to:

- Require the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), upon request, to consult with sheriffs to provide input regarding programmatic guiding principles, practices, and resources in order to assist in the development and implementation of the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program established pursuant to s. 30.15, F.S. Such input and guidance may include, but need not be limited to, standards, curriculum, instructional strategies, evaluation, certification, records retention, equipment, and other resource needs.

Section 4.

Amends s. 943.082, F.S., School Safety Awareness Program, to:

- Require district school boards to promote the use of the mobile suspicious activity reporting tool (FortifyFL) by advertising it on the school district website, in newsletters, on school campuses, and in school publications; by installing it on all mobile devices issued to students; and by bookmarking its website on all computer devices issued to students.

Section 5.

Amends s. 1001.10, F.S., Commissioner of Education; general powers and duties, to:

- Require the Commissioner to review the report of the School Hardening and Harm Mitigation Workgroup regarding school hardening and harm mitigation strategies and recommendations submitted by the Office of Safe Schools (OSS), and submit a summary of such recommendations to the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker by September 1, 2020.

Section 6.

Amends s. 1001.11, F.S., Commissioner of Education; other duties, to:

- Require the Commissioner to oversee compliance with the safety and security requirements of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (MSDHSPSA) by school districts; district school superintendents; and public schools, including charter schools.
- Require the Commissioner to facilitate compliance with the MSDHSPSA to the maximum extent provided under law, identify incidents of noncompliance, and impose or recommend to the State Board of Education, the Governor, or the Legislature enforcement and sanctioning actions pursuant to s. 1008.32, F.S., and other authority granted under law.

Section 7.

Amends s. 1001.212, F.S., Office of Safe Schools, to:

- Require the OSS to provide annual training to appropriate school district and charter school personnel on physical site security assessments and completion of the school security risk assessment tool.
- Require the OSS to coordinate with the FDLE by August 1, 2019, to provide a centralized integrated data repository and data analytics resources (data repository) from a number of data sources to improve access to school safety information.
- Clarify that data incorporated in the data repository retains its exempt or confidential status, and that agencies shall ensure compliance with all applicable state and federal data privacy requirements. Access to data in the data repository is governed by rules of the respective source agencies, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information Services security policy.
- Require the OSS to provide data to support the evaluation of mental health services conducted by the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute within the University of South Florida.
- Require the OSS to provide technical assistance to school districts and charter school governing boards for school environmental safety incident reporting (SESIR) as required by s. 1006.07(9), F.S.
- Require the OSS to review and evaluate school districts' SESIR data to ensure compliance with reporting requirements. A district school board shall withhold further salary payment to a district school superintendent who fails to comply with

SESIR requirements, and shall impose other appropriate sanctions that the Commissioner or State Board of Education by law may impose.

- Require the OSS to convene a School Hardening and Harm Mitigation Workgroup to meet as necessary to review school hardening and harm mitigation policies and submit a report to the OSS by August 1, 2020, which includes a prioritized list for the implementation of school campus hardening and harm mitigation strategies, and the estimated costs of and timeframes for implementation of the strategies by school districts and charter schools. The OSS must also submit the workgroup's report to the Commissioner with recommendations on procedures the OSS can implement to monitor and enforce compliance by the school districts and charter schools with the report recommendations.
- Require the OSS to develop a statewide behavioral threat assessment instrument by August 1, 2019, for use by all public schools, which addresses early identification, evaluation, early intervention, student support, and training for school administrators and school threat assessment team members.
- Require the OSS to evaluate each school district's and charter school governing board's behavioral threat assessment instrument procedures for compliance by August 1, 2020, notify the district school superintendent or charter school governing board of noncompliance, and report ongoing noncompliance to the district school superintendent, governing board, and Commissioner as applicable.
- Require the OSS to establish the Statewide Threat Assessment Database Workgroup (Workgroup) to complement the data repository work, and to make recommendations to develop a statewide threat assessment database. The Workgroup shall provide a report to the OSS by December 31, 2019, with recommendations including threat assessment data that should be entered into the database; school personnel who should be allowed to input and view student records; database design, functionality, and security; information sharing guidelines and restrictions; database costs and maintenance; and an implementation plan and timeline.
- Require the OSS to monitor school safety requirement compliance by public schools and report noncompliance to the Commissioner and State Board of Education.
- Require the OSS to publish an annual list of the total number of safe-school officers, including the number of officers disciplined or relieved of duty due to misconduct, the number of officers' disciplinary actions, and the number of incidents in which an officer discharged a firearm outside of a training or response situation.

Section 8.

Amends s. 1002.33, F.S., Charter schools, to:

- Require charter schools to comply with school safety statutes, including safe-school officers, threat assessment teams, SESIR, Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT), adopting an active assailant response plan, FortifyFL, and youth mental health awareness and assistance training.

Section 9.

Amends s. 1003.25, F.S., Procedures for maintenance and transfer of student records, to:

- Require that the transfer of records of students who transfer from school to school must occur within 3 school days.
- Require student records to include verified reports of serious or recurrent behavior patterns, including threat assessment evaluations and intervention services, and psychological evaluations, including therapeutic treatment plans and therapy or progress notes created or maintained by district or charter school staff.

Section 10.

Amends s. 1006.07, F.S., District school board duties relating to student discipline and school safety, to:

- Require a student to disclose at initial registration for school any school district referral for mental health services associated with a school expulsion, arrest resulting in a charge, or juvenile justice action.
- Require drills for active shooter and hostage situations to be developmentally appropriate and age-appropriate.
- Expand the school safety specialist position qualifications to include a law enforcement officer employed by the sheriff's office located in the school district, who is authorized and approved by the sheriff. The school safety specialist approved by the sheriff remains an employee of the sheriff's office for the purposes of compensation and other benefits. The sheriff and district school superintendent may agree to share costs to compensate the school safety specialist employed by the sheriff.
- Require the school safety specialist to review school district policies and procedures for compliance with state law and rules, including the timely and accurate submission of SESIR reports.
- Require the school safety specialist to collaborate with public safety agencies to conduct an annual school security risk assessment using FSSAT at each public school by October 1 and provide recommendations to the district school superintendent and school board to address the assessment findings.
- Require district school boards and charter school governing boards to adopt an active assailant response plan. By October 1, 2019, and annually thereafter, each district school superintendent and charter school principal shall certify that all school personnel have received annual training on the procedures in the plan.
- Require district school board policies for threat assessment teams comply with the procedures for behavioral threat assessments and the use of the behavioral threat assessment instrument developed by the OSS.
- Allow authorized threat assessment team members to obtain certain criminal history information.
- Require the school threat assessment team to verify behavioral health intervention services remain in place for a student who transfers to a different school until the receiving school's threat assessment team determines the student's need for intervention services.
- Require each school threat assessment team to use the statewide threat assessment database developed by the OSS.
- Require district school boards to adopt policies to ensure the accurate and timely reporting of SESIR incidents, for which the district school superintendent is responsible and subject to the penalties specified in law for noncompliance. The State Board of Education shall adopt rules governing SESIR requirements.

Section 11.

Amends s. 1006.12, F.S., Safe-school officers at each public school, to:

- Expand the school district's partnership options to include security agencies and specify that the safe-school officer requirement extends to charter schools. District school boards are required to collaborate with charter school governing boards to facilitate charter school access to all safe-school officer options.
- Provide definitions, qualifications, and duties for the four safe-school officer designations: School Resource Officer, School Safety Officer, School Guardian, and School Security Guard.
- Authorize charter school governing boards to participate in the guardian program.
- Expand eligibility to serve as a school guardian to school district or charter school employees/personnel who volunteer to participate in addition to his or her official job duties, and to school district or charter school employees hired specifically as a school guardian.
- Authorize school districts and charter school governing boards to contract with a security agency as defined in s. 493.6101(18), F.S., to employ school security guards to meet the safe-school officer requirement. School security guards must complete the same initial background and training requirements, and ongoing training requirements, as the school guardians. The contract between a security agency and a school district or a charter school governing board must define the entity responsible for training and maintaining records relating to training, inspection, and firearm qualification.
- Require school districts to notify the county sheriff and the OSS within 72 hours of any safe-school officer disciplined or dismissed for misconduct, or of any incident where a safe-school officer discharges his/her firearm other than for training purposes.
- Require a district school board that denies a charter school access to any safe-school officer option to assign a school resource officer or school safety officer to the charter school at a cost that does not exceed the charter school's safe school allocation funds.

Section 12.

Amends s. 1006.13, F.S., Policy of zero tolerance for crime and victimization, to:

- Replace the phrase "serious threat to school safety," with "threat to school safety."
- Remove the exclusion that zero-tolerance policies may not be rigorously applied to misdemeanors, including but not limited to, minor fights or disturbances.
- Require district school boards to adopt a zero-tolerance policy that defines acts that pose a threat to school safety, criteria for reporting such acts to a law enforcement agency, and petty acts of misconduct which are not a threat to school safety and do not require consultation with law enforcement.
- Require district school boards to amend their agreements with the county sheriff's office and local police department to ensure that acts that pose a threat to school safety are reported to a law enforcement agency and to include a procedure requiring school personnel to consult with school resource officers concerning delinquent acts and crimes.
- Require school principals to notify all school personnel of their responsibilities to report any incident that poses a threat to school safety to the principal or to his or her designee, and that the disposition of each such incident is properly documented.

Section 13.

Amends s. 1006.1493, F.S., Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool, to:

- Specify that the FSSAT must be the primary physical site security assessment tool, as revised and required by the OSS, that is used by school officials at each school district and public school site in the state in conducting security assessments.
- Require that the security consulting firm contracted by the department to develop, update, and implement the FSSAT, review the recommendations of the School Hardening and Harm Mitigation Workgroup to address physical security measures identified by the FSSAT.
- Require that the OSS make the FSSAT available to school districts and schools no later than May 1 of each year, and provide annual training to each district's school safety specialist and other school district personnel on site security assessments and completion of the FSSAT.
- Require the department to report by December 1 of each year to the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker on the status of the implementation of the FSSAT across school districts and schools.

Section 14.

Amends s. 1011.62, F.S., Funds for operation of schools, to:

- Replace the term "school resource officer" with "safe-school officers."
- Expand the scope of safe schools allocation funds to uses defined in ss. 1006.07 through 1006.12, F.S., with priority for funding given to safe-school officers.
- Require any additional safe school allocation funds appropriated in fiscal year 2018/19 to be used exclusively for employing or contracting for safe-school officers, retroactive to July 1, 2018.

Section 15. (Effective July 1, 2019)

Amends s. 1011.62, F.S., Funds for operation of schools, to:

- Expand the list of categorical appropriations that can be transferred by a district school board to address urgent needs, including improving school safety, and require each district school board to include in its annual financial report to the department the amount of funds transferred from a fund for the specific school safety need. The department must submit a report to the Legislature that identifies by district the fund, the amount transferred, and the specific school safety need.
- Revise the funding formula for the safe schools allocation by requiring one-third (instead of two-thirds) be allocated to school districts based on the official Florida Crime Index, and two-thirds (instead of one-third) be allocated based on each school district's proportionate share of the state's total unweighted full-time equivalent student enrollment.
- Require that each school district report to the department by October 15 each year that all public schools within the district have completed the FSSAT.
- Require that if the district must provide a safe-school officer to a charter school, the cost cannot exceed the charter school's safe schools allocation amount.
- Expand the mental health assistance allocation allowable expenditures to include training educators and other school staff in detecting and responding to mental health issues, and to connecting children, youth, and families who may experience behavioral health issues with appropriate services.

- Specify that charter schools that submit a student mental health plan separate from the school district are entitled to a proportionate share of district mental health assistance allocation funding.
- Remove the requirement that 90 percent of a district's mental health assistance allocation funds must be spent on direct mental health services or the coordination of such services.
- Require the district plan outlining the local program and planned expenditures to include all of the district schools, including charter schools, unless a charter school elects to submit a plan independently from the school district.
- Require the district plan to be focused on a multi-tiered system of supports to deliver evidence-based mental health care assessment, diagnosis, intervention, treatment, and recovery services to students with one or more co-occurring substance abuse diagnoses and to students at high risk of such diagnoses. The provision of these services must be coordinated with a student's primary mental health care provider and with other mental health providers involved in the student's care.
- Require the district plan, at a minimum, to include the following elements:
 - Direct employment of school-based mental health services providers to expand and enhance school-based student services and to reduce the ratio of students to staff in order to better align with nationally recommended ratio models. These providers include, but are not limited to, certified school counselors, school psychologists, school social workers, and other licensed mental health professionals. The plan also must identify strategies to increase the amount of time that school-based student services personnel spend providing direct services to students, which may include the review and revision of district staffing resource allocations based on school or student mental health assistance needs.
 - Contracts or interagency agreements with one or more local community behavioral health providers or providers of Community Action Team services to provide a behavioral health staff presence and services at district schools. Services may include, but are not limited to, mental health screenings and assessments, individual counseling, family counseling, group counseling, psychiatric or psychological services, trauma-informed care, mobile crisis services, and behavior modification. These behavioral health services may be provided on or off the school campus and may be supplemented by telehealth.
 - Policies and procedures, including contracts with service providers, that will ensure that students who are referred to a school-based or community-based mental health service provider for mental health screening for the identification of mental health concerns and ensure that the assessment of students at risk for mental health disorders occurs within 15 days of referral. School-based mental health services must be initiated within 15 days after identification and assessment, and support by community-based mental health service providers for students who are referred for community-based mental health services must be initiated within 30 days after the school or district makes a referral.
 - Strategies or programs to reduce the likelihood of at risk students developing social, emotional, or behavioral health problems; depression; anxiety disorders; suicidal tendencies; or substance use disorders.
 - Strategies to improve the early identification of social, emotional, or behavioral problems or substance use disorders; to improve the provision of early intervention services; and to assist students in dealing with trauma and violence.

- Amend the school district's annual report to the department, due September 30, on program outcomes and expenditures to include at least the number of each of the following:
 - Students who receive screenings or assessments.
 - Students who are referred to either school-based or community-based providers for services or assistance.
 - Students who receive either school-based or community-based interventions, services, or assistance.
 - School-based and community-based mental health providers, including licensure type, paid for from funds provided through the allocation.
 - Contract-based collaborative efforts or partnerships with community mental health programs, agencies, or providers.

Section 16.

Reenacts s. 921.0022, F.S., Criminal Punishment Code; offense severity ranking chart, to:

- Incorporate the amendment made by this act to s. 843.08, F.S. (False Personation)

Section 17.

- Declares the Legislature's intent that a proper and legitimate state purpose is served when district school boards have options to provide safe-school officers for the protection and safety of school personnel, property, students, and visitors, and that school guardians must be available for every district school board that chooses such an option.

Section 18.

- Provides an effective date of upon becoming law (May 8, 2019), except as otherwise expressly provided.

CHAPTER 3: SAFETY OF SCHOOLS BASED UPON INFRASTRUCTURE, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES

A. Background and Data Regarding BCPS

The Initial Report provided a comprehensive background on BCPS. That remains largely unchanged.

B. School Board Security Personnel

As outlined in this Report, BCPS participates in partnership with 13 municipalities and the Broward Sheriff's Office to place School Resource Officers (SROs) in schools.

BCPS augments the SRO presence in schools with the placement of additional security positions. BCPS has several job descriptions that are specifically focused on the safety and security of District schools and ancillary facilities. These positions are assigned at both the District and individual school levels. Outlined in the table below are the five primary positions with a safety and security focus and a summary of their position goal.

	Title	Assignment	Position Focus/Goal
1	Building Security Person	District	Make routine patrol of assigned facilities including buildings, parking lots, and equipment; check for security, vandalism, or casualty losses, and report all incidences to the appropriate Police or Fire Department
2	Campus Monitor	District/ School	Visually observe student behavior during campus hours on school property; Physically patrol and monitor all campus buildings and grounds; Report any safety or security problems to the administration
3	Console Viewer	District	To observe the alarm systems for security, fire or electrical problems, dispatching the police or fire departments when required, and assisting until the facilities are secure
4	Detective/SIU	District	Maintain the safety and security of District sites, students, staff, and vehicles, for The School Board of Broward County, Florida and ensure the integrity of District staff by reviewing, coordinating, investigating, and reporting current conditions and problems relating to the safety, security, and soundness of staff, students and facilities of the District
5	Security Specialist	District/ School	Investigate all incidents of negative conduct occurring on school property and coordinate investigative and prevention efforts with the Special Investigative Unit, School Resource Officer, Law Enforcement Departments, City Police Departments and other agencies, as appropriate, to maximize prevention and cessation of illegal and destructive activities

As of April 2018, BCPS employed 423 of these security positions throughout the District. The cost of these security personnel is \$12.6 million. The table below breaks down these 423 positions by position type and by school level.

Title	District	Elem	Middle	High	Center	Comb	Total	Cost
Building Security Person	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	\$282,465
Campus Monitor	3	8	69	132	21	18	251	\$4,828,239
Console Viewer	6	0	0	0	0	0	6	\$314,657
Detective/SIU	17	0	0	0	0	0	17	\$1,174,028
Security Specialist	4	0	39	47	43	8	141	\$6,046,247
Totals:	38	8	108	179	64	26	423	\$12,645,636

In September 2018, the School Board approved \$3.2 million to staff a new Safety, Security, & Emergency Preparedness division to implement an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework across the entire organization. The sourcing of the new division began in February 2019, with the appointment of a new Chief, Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness. The new division aligns existing safety and security staffing and resources within the District, and provides new resources to add new staff and functionality. In addition to the new Chief, the new positions (with their respective position goal) identified below have been incorporated within the new division.

- **Executive Director, Enterprise Risk & Emergency Preparedness** - The Executive Director, Enterprise Risk & Emergency Preparedness, is a senior manager in the Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness (SSEP) Division and serves as a member of the professional multi-disciplinary team that works collaboratively to protect students, employees, volunteers and visitors to more than 234 schools, and the District's administrative and support facilities, from acts of violence or other harm. At the direction of the Chief - Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness Officer, the Executive Director, Enterprise Risk & Emergency Preparedness, will implement the District's Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs in accordance with all applicable laws, policies and practices. The Executive Director, Enterprise Risk & Emergency Preparedness, oversees the mitigation of safety, insurance and other risks that may expose the District to harm, litigation or claims by providing a comprehensive risk and emergency preparedness strategy for the school system.
- **Coordinator, Enterprise Risk** - To coordinate the implementation of the District's Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program in accordance with all applicable laws, policies and practices. The ERM Coordinator will work closely with the ERM committees to help set timelines, provide relevant guidance and materials to educate. The ERM Coordinator must be prepared to serve as a member of a professional multi-disciplinary team that works collaboratively to protect students, employees, volunteers and visitors to more than 234 schools and the District's support facilities from acts of violence.
- **Specialist, Enterprise Risk management Communications** - The Specialist, Enterprise Risk Management Communications is responsible for internal and external communications related to the District's Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program. This role serves as a communications liaison and strategist

between the Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness Division, District departments, the community, and the news media, to provide timely, accurate and useful education and information about significant safety and security-related programs and incidents. The primary focus is to organize and implement a well-coordinated communications plan in close partnership with the District's Public Information Office.

- **Director, Safety & Security Operations** - Manage, coordinate, and enhance District-wide safety and security operations to provide enhanced levels of safety and security for learning and working environments for students, employees, volunteers and visitors. Develop and maintain positive working relationships across the Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness Division, District personnel, site-based security and law enforcement agencies. The Director, Safety & Security Operations must be prepared to serve as a member of the professional multi-disciplinary team that works collaboratively to protect students, employees, volunteers and visitors to more than 234 schools and the District's support facilities from acts of violence.
- **Area Manager, Security** (14 positions) - To provide day-to-day supervision of assigned school and administrative building security teams including Campus Monitors, Security Specialists and Armed Safe School Officers in the implementation of the Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness Division's procedures. Working with other District stakeholders, supervise the planning, organizing, and implementation of Broward County Public School's emergency preparedness plans and procedures, exercises, after-action-reviews, training, education, and emergency support functions related to assigned staff. Serve as a member of the professional multi-disciplinary team that works collaboratively to protect students, employees, volunteers and visitors to more than 234 school sites and the District's support facilities from acts of violence.
- **Lieutenant, Special Investigative Unit** (2 positions) - To assist and support the Chief, Special Investigative Unit (SIU) in handling all matters pertaining to administrative and criminal investigations, law enforcement, training, response, safety and security, and all other operations conducted by SIU personnel.
- **Manager, District Security Operations Center (DSOC)** – The Manager, District Security Operations Center (DSOC) will lead and set the strategic vision for Broward County Public Schools' centralized, 24 hour District Security Operations Center. The role will provide day-to-day staff direction and leadership for sensitive, real-time safety and security incident and emergency response. The DSOC Manager is responsible for monitoring the safety and security of students, employees, visitors and all District properties using technology and other means. This position will help support the establishment of DSOC operations as the incident management and communications hub for the school District.
- **Protective Research Analyst** (3 positions) - To perform thorough analysis and research related to the evaluation of information and intelligence that could indicate a potential threat of violence affecting students, staff and District facilities. This position is responsible for the collection (open and sensitive source research), analysis and reporting of crime, security, student discipline and related data in support of the department's safety and security objectives. The Protective Research Analyst must be prepared to serve as a member of the professional multi-disciplinary team that works collaboratively to protect students, employees, volunteers and visitors to more than 234 schools and District support facilities from acts of violence.

- **Data Analyst, Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness** - The Data Analyst - Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness will organize and analyze data relevant to all Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness programs to assist the Director, Risk Management in making data driven security recommendations and conclusions. The Data Analyst – Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness establishes, maintains and operates a system of data analytics that aims to turn data into actionable information to assist with resource allocation, tactical response and organizational strategy.

Additionally, the District has modified its management structure for school-based security positions. There are primarily three school-based security positions: armed guardians, security specialists, and campus monitors. Last year, these positions reported to the principal of their respective school and received direction from him/her. In school year 2019/20, these positions now report centrally through the Area Security Managers within the Division of Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness. Additionally, the job descriptions for these positions have been amended to provide additional days within their work calendar to provide ongoing and consistent professional development before the start of each school year. Now, the school-based security positions and the District-based positions are integrated within a single, matrixed security organization, with career progression. As outlined within Section J., the District has allocated the additional Safe Schools Allocation funding for 2019/20 and the new millage gained through the Secure the Next Generation referendum to source 521 new positions. When combined with existing resources, there will be 1,273 security positions deployed throughout the District for the 2019/20 school year. This represents approximately \$53 million of personnel resources dedicated to enhancing the safety and security at all schools. The chart below outlines the total safety and security positions proposed for the 2019/20 school year.

Safety & Security Proposed Staffing Levels			
Item	Current Headcount	Estimated Additional Headcount	Total Headcount
School-based Staff: Armed Safe School Officer	47	21	68
School-based Staff: Campus Monitors	328	363	691
School-based Staff: Security Specialists	148	30	178
School-based Staff: School Resource Officers	197	-	197
TOTAL - School-based Staff	720	414	1,134
Floater Pool: Armed Safe School Officer	-	25	25
Floater Pool: Campus Monitors	-	50	50
Floater Pool: Security Specialists	-	25	25
TOTAL - Floater Pools		100	100
Additional Area Managers - coverage	7	7	14
District-based Staff: Campus Monitors	19	-	19
District-based Staff: Security Specialists	6	-	6
TOTAL - District/Other	32	7	39
Total Staffing Levels	752	521	1,273



It is important to note, all BCPS schools provide open campus supervision 30 minutes before the official start of the school day until 30 minutes after the end of the official school day. The majority

of BCPS schools offer programs to students before and after regular school hours. Most elementary schools provide after school care programs until 6:00 pm, while middle and high schools offer clubs, activities and/or athletics throughout the evening hours. As noted, even after dismissal time there is a substantial student, staff and teacher population on the campuses of most schools.


Currently, school security personnel and school resource officers/deputies workdays end prior to the commencement of most after school activities. Schools are permitted to stagger the hours of their security personnel or extend their hours if funds are available in their operating budgets. However, law enforcement services for evening programs and activities are rendered by a hired detail officer.

To address after school events BCPS has reported it has taken several measures since the Initial Report to reduce this risk. The District extended SRO agreements with select municipalities or assigned armed guardians to cover all District-run academic programs during the summer. All before and aftercare programs are also required to develop a security plan, provide for an unarmed security position, and adhere to similar safety and security protocols during operation (e.g., maintaining locked perimeter fencing unless a gate is staffed). Additionally, law enforcement details are secured for select sporting events throughout the District. BCPS also directed the development of new procedures at the school level. A plan for securing and monitoring perimeter gates after hours while students and staff are still on campus must be developed by principals, implemented, and communicated to all stakeholders and routinely inspected. However, it must still be recognized that events held on campus after regular school hours continue to be a risk. There is inadequate funding to extend the full security matrix at schools beyond regular school hours.

C. SMART Progress

The Initial Report outlined the \$800 million bond referendum to address much needed deferred maintenance with BCPS schools. The **SMART** program combines the bond proceeds with capital millage to implement capital projects in six categories: **S**afety, **M**usic, **A**thletics, **R**enovations, and **T**echnology. Since its inception, the District set a goal to complete the implementation of the SMART program within seven years.


The Safety component of the SMART program represents an investment of approximately \$132.2 million. It includes four primary classifications of projects: single point of entry, emergency signage and lighting, fire alarm improvements, and fire sprinkler improvements. The chart to the right shows the breakdown of this investment among the four classifications.



Single Point Entry

The Initial Report outlined the Single Point of Entry (SPE) projects that are a component of the District's SMART bond program. Again, SPE is a set of measures intended to augment and enhance existing safeguards at each campus by limiting access to one entrance through which visitors can enter the administration building during school hours. This is achieved through two phases: fencing the perimeter of the campus to control site access and direct visitors to the administrative suite; and providing one entrance at the administrative suite where visitors can check in with the administrative staff.

BCPS had approved the acceleration of funding to complete these projects in 2017, and anticipated all such projects would be completed no later than the first quarter of 2019. At the onset of calendar year 2019, forty-three (43) projects remained open in a variety of stages. Twelve (12) projects were in the process of competitive bidding and award; nine (9) projects were in the design phase, and twenty-two (22) projects were in active construction. Additionally, 195 projects (locations) had already been completed or met BCPS's design standards for SPE.



At the time of this updated report, only eleven (11) projects remain open, and all are in active construction. All eleven projects are anticipated to be substantially complete and functional by August 14, 2019, the first day of school for 2019/20.

D. Camera Surveillance Program

As the Initial Report outlined, for approximately two decades, BCPS has been installing video surveillance systems as a component of new construction; as well as retro-fitting existing school buildings. However, the patchwork of various capabilities limited integration of all cameras into a singular system for remote access.

On July 24, 2018, the School Board authorized the expansion of the District's video surveillance system. In July 2018, the District completed Phase I of the video surveillance project. According to BCPS, all school video surveillance systems were upgraded to a standard digital platform, which now provides the ability to centrally monitor the District's complete inventory of approximately 10,000 cameras.

The video surveillance expansion project provided \$6.2 million to install approximately 2,500 new analytic and digital cameras throughout all schools in priority areas on campuses identified by Safe Havens, the District's independent security consultant.








BSO has established a Threat Management Division focused on improving how to gather intelligence and respond to potential threats. BSO has implemented a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), which allows for real-time monitoring and analysis of important investigative information during a critical incident. With the collaboration and cooperation of BCPS, BSO has gained direct access to video surveillance systems that monitor nearly 10,000 cameras in all Broward County schools. Significant resources were and are being dedicated to implementing a standard naming convention for the cameras which can provide real-time observation during incidents. The effort has been extended to municipal agencies.

E. Emergency Code Training and Drills

As outlined in the Initial Report, BCPS has an active training and drill program, focused on preparing its students and staff to respond in an emergency situation. This program is structured around several emergency codes that are color-coded to distinguish the nature of a potential threat and inform the appropriate response by staff and students.

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act now requires “drills for active shooter and hostage situations shall be conducted at least as often as other emergency drills.”

The District’s response to an active assailant on campus is to initiate a Code Red lockdown. Recognizing the Fire Code requires two fire drills in the first month of school, and one fire drill each month thereafter, the District has adopted this same frequency to conduct Code Red drills at schools. BCPS schools conducted 2,350 Code Red drills last school year. Additionally, there were 106 actual Code Reds initiated during the year.

Emergency Codes	
	Code Red - Threat/Incident to the facility - Lockdown
	Code Yellow - Threat/Activate SAFE Team - Lockdown
	Code Blue - Medical Emergency Activate SAFE Team
	Code Black - Bomb Threat
	Code Orange - Evacuate
	Code Green - All Clear
	Code Brown - Threat/Incident with the facility - Shelter-in-Place

F. Active Killer Program and Training

As outlined in the Initial Report, in 2014, the District enhanced its training at the elementary level to initiate Active Killer training. The Active Killer Program (AKP) was developed and is delivered in collaboration with SIU, municipal law enforcement agencies and the Broward Sheriff’s Office. These agencies volunteer individuals to serve as instructors through the program, and are subsequently provided professional development in an effort to informally certify them as a program instructor.

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act now requires “***drills for active shooter and hostage situations shall be conducted at least as often as other emergency drills.***” Further, “***the active shooter situation training for each school must engage the participation of the district school safety specialist, threat assessment team members, faculty, staff, and students and must be conducted by the law enforcement agency or agencies that are designated as first responders to the school’s campus.***” (emphasis added).

The structure of the District’s AKP training, being a collaborative with local law enforcement and the Broward Sheriff’s Office, aligns with the new legislative requirements. The District introduced the enhanced AKP training to the secondary schools beginning in 2018/19. AKP is a 4-hour enhanced active shooter training that was developed and is delivered in collaboration with local law enforcement on teacher planning days. Last year, this training was provided to 55 middle and high schools; however, a critical mass of certified instructors from each agency will be necessary in order to effectively and efficiently deliver this training to the District’s 234 schools on multiple occasions during each school year.

G. Charter Schools

As outlined in the Initial Report, the state-mandated charter application requires the applicant to outline the plan for safety and security for students, staff, facility and property. The applicant’s safety and security plan should describe the types of security personnel, technology, equipment, and policies that the school will employ. The sponsor is required to review the plan outline to determine if the applicant has a reasonable understanding of what might be necessary, while noting that a full safety and security plan is not required until after the application is approved.

However, because charter schools have their own governing board and the BCPS are prohibited from enforcing safety standards, there are a number of issues noted by the Task Force.

- The charter school applicant is not required to provide specific information regarding a location or facility at the time of application;
- The charter school applicant is not required by statute to provide a certificate of occupancy or a temporary certificate of occupancy earlier than 15 calendar days prior to the first day of classes. Therefore, the applicant provides general information regarding a safety plan that is theoretical and not operational;
- According to BCPS, it shares its emergency plans and best practices with charter schools; however, the District is not able to mandate charter schools utilize these plans or implement similar training during the year;
- Charter schools are independently managed and only required to implement emergency practices as outlined in statute for charter schools.

This year, the Department of Education has mandated greater accountability of charter schools in relation to compliance with the MSDHSPS Act, particularly regarding the requirement to assign an SSO to every school. On August 1, 2019, the Commissioner of Education issued correspondence to all school superintendents stating in part,

In the letter to school district superintendents dated May 31, 2019, I outlined several critical policies and procedures to enhance safety and security of Florida's public school campuses and keep students safe. One of which was the implementation of a Safe-School Officer (SSO) physically present on each campus while school is in session. An SSO is a police officer, deputy sheriff or Guardian. Another letter was sent to all Charter School Directors dated July 9, 2019 outlining the opportunity for charter schools that are in need of SSO coverage, in a school district in which the Guardian Program is not offered by the local sheriff's office, to contact staff in our Office of Safe Schools to obtain additional information...There is absolutely no flexibility with regard to this provision because a gap in coverage could have catastrophic results for our schools' children and staff. Therefore, charter schools must expeditiously secure local law enforcement to meet the requirement for having an SSO on every campus.


The correspondence further provided a mechanism for school districts to document and certify the districts' (including charter schools) level of SSO coverage. This information was requested by the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission in anticipation of the upcoming meeting in August 2019. The BCPS indicates that non-compliant charter schools may have their charters revoked.

H. Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT)

As outlined in the Initial Report, the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) has established the Florida Safe School Assessment Tool (FSSAT) to provide annual data reflecting the comprehensive supports for safe and healthy schools so that district and school leadership teams can make data-informed decisions as they engage in strategic planning and problem-solving for continual system-wide improvements. The online tool is a survey of school facilities, physical buildings, programs and resources focused to support safe and healthy schools. Each year, BCPS is required to complete the FSSAT through a cross-functional team, have the survey approved by the School Board, and submit it to the FDOE.

This past school year, school districts were required to complete an extensive facility risk assessment for each of their schools, in addition to the district-based survey typically completed. BCPS developed a plan to execute the new FSSAT prior to August 1, 2018. The FDOE has notified school districts that completion of the FSSAT by August 1, 2018 served to qualify them for the competitive, non-recurring funding that was designated within the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act to support school building physical security enhancements.

BCPS submitted all school assessments at the end of July 2018 to the DOE. Outlined below is timeline associated with the District's effort to complete the individual school assessments, as well as the Districtwide survey for 2018/19 school year.



The results of the assessments yielded four primary recommendations for investment: advance Phase II of the video surveillance camera project, purchase and distribute additional portable radios to schools, upgrade intercom systems, and create an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework. The projects are discussed in various sections of this updated report.

I. SAFE School Teams

As outlined in the Initial Report, under BCPS protocol, each school maintains an active SAFE Team. Its primary responsibility is to maintain the school's safety and security plan, and serve as the school's leadership team in responding to any emergency. There are six key roles on each SAFE Team, although the SAFE Team frequently includes additional people.

One of the recommendations included in the Initial Report was to accelerate the completion of the school safety plans by the SAFE Teams. Accordingly, the District amended its process to require schools have all plans updated by the end of August. BCPS is also in the process of procuring a new software platform for the purpose of developing school safety plans, risk assessments and emergency drills. The new platform will provide "best practice" templates for developing safety plans and centralize monitoring of these documents/processes for accountability purposes.

J. BCPS Millage Proposal


As outlined in the Initial Report, according to the BCPS, the Florida Legislature continues to fund education at one of the lowest levels in the nation.

A Safe Schools Allocation is incorporated within the funding provided to school districts by the Florida Department of Education. This funding is provided specifically for the purpose of implementing safety and security initiatives in schools, including school resource officer programs and the hiring of security personnel at schools. Prior to the MSD tragedy, BCPS had not experienced any significant increase in the Safe Schools Allocation for more than a decade.

The table to the right illustrates the Safe School Allocation provided to Broward over a ten-year period slightly decreased because of the proliferation of charter schools; and it was not until the passage of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act that the Allocation for school year 2018/19 was increased. The net increase to BCPS, after the distribution of the pro-rata share to charter schools, was approximately \$7 million. These additional funds were exhausted by the expansion of the SRO Program, implementation of the guardian program, and to pay for detail certified law enforcement officers to comply with the new legislative mandate that each school campus be assigned a safe-school officer. The state is further increasing the Safe School Allocation for the 2019/20 school year by approximately \$1.4 million.



Recognizing state funding was insufficient to address multiple priorities, including the enhancement of safety and security, BCPS authorized the placement of the Secure the Next Generation referendum on the primary ballot in August 2018. On August 28, 2018, Broward County residents voted to approve this initiative. The Secure the Next Generation referendum provides a ½ mill in additional local funding that is being used to secure school resource officers, recruit and retain high-quality teachers and staff, secure important programs in District schools, and expand educational opportunities for our students. This referendum supports BCPS's continued commitment to secure a high-quality education and safe learning environment for our students, teachers and staff. The additional funding is being allocated as follows:



- 72 percent or more of all available funds for compensation of teachers and school related staff (including all education professionals, educational support professionals, bus drivers, assistants, and food service workers).
- Up to 20 percent for security (school resource officers and security staff). This will allow for a 1:1,000 ratio of Safe School Officers to students.
- Up to 8 percent for essential programs in our schools, such as additional guidance counselors, social workers, and behavioral staff.

The additional funding from the referendum and the Safe School Allocation for the 2019/20 school year is being utilized to provide additional security resources throughout all schools. This includes additional funding contribution for School Resource Officers and guardians to achieve for a 1:1,000 ratio of safe school officers to students, an increase in the District's reimbursement figure to municipalities and BSO for School Resource Officers, the hiring of additional security specialists and campus monitors for schools, and additional oversight of these new positions. In total, the additional Safe School Allocation and referendum funding will provide for an additional 521 security personnel throughout the District. The table to the right illustrates the estimated headcount and cost for the 521 new positions. When combined with existing resources, there will be 1,273 security positions deployed throughout the District for the 2019/20 school year. This represents approximately \$53 million of personnel resources dedicated to enhancing the safety and security at all schools.

Safety & Security Plan		
Item	Estimated Headcount	Cost
School-based staff: Armed Safe School Officer	21	\$ 829,458
School-based staff: Campus Monitors	363	\$ 11,365,071
School-based staff: Security Specialists	30	\$ 1,830,647
TOTAL - School-based Staff	414	\$ 14,045,176
Floater Pool: Armed Safe School Officer	25	\$ 987,450
Floater Pool: Campus Monitors	50	\$ 1,583,650
Floater Pool: Security Specialists	25	\$ 1,533,000
TOTAL - Floater Pools	100	\$ 4,104,100
School Resource Officer (SRO) - 5% pay increase	-	\$ 514,800
Additional Arms Managers - Coverage	7	\$ 735,924
Remainder to allocate based on school-based risk	-	-
Payments to Charter Schools	-	\$ 1,300,000
Available Funds (\$19.3M Referendum + \$1.4M Safe Schools Allocation)	521	\$ 20,780,000

K. Expected Funding from the MSDHSPS Act

The Initial Report outlined the expected funding during 2018/19 as a result of the MSDHSPS Act.

Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program

As outlined in the Initial Report, the MSDHSPS Act provides the opportunity for school districts, in coordination with their County Sheriff, to establish a school marshal program to aid in the prevention or abatement of active assailant incidents on school premises. This is also known as the Guardian Program.

As indicated above, \$500,000 recurring and \$67,000,000 nonrecurring funds were allocated to the Department of Education (DOE) under the MSDHSPS Act to reimburse screening and training-related costs associated with the Guardian Program, and to provide a one-time stipend of \$500 to school guardians who participate in the Program. This year, the unexpended balance of funds provided to the DOE for the Guardian Program in section 40 of chapter 2018-3, Laws of Florida, is reverted and appropriated for Fiscal Year 2019/20 to the DOE for the same purpose.

School Resource Officers

Last year, the District's share of the Safe School Allocation funding was \$14,319,135. This includes the increase provided to the Safe Schools Allocation within the MSDHSPS Act. Charter schools received \$2,370,394 - their proportionate share of the funds based on enrollment. The remaining funds were utilized to comply with legislative mandate to assign a Safe-School Officer (SSO) to every school. This included employing a number of strategies as previously outlined in the report.

The increase in the Safe Schools Allocation allowed the District to increase its fixed reimbursement per School Resource Officer (SRO) to \$52,000 per year and increase the number of SROs in the Program. In school year 2018/19, there were 197 SROs assigned to 179 schools. The total cost to BCPS for the SRO Program last year was \$10,264,800. The remaining Safe

Schools Allocation funds were utilized to compensate the armed guardians and fund detail officer costs to provide an SSO at schools without an SRO.

For 2019/20, the District is currently working with the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association in an effort to develop a standard three-year SRO agreement. The BCCPA representative noted there is strong opposition to a three-year contract, particularly given the funding levels currently contributed by BCPS. The District is again proposing to increase its fixed reimbursement per SRO systematically over the three-year period. Specifically, BCPS is proposing the reimbursement be \$54,600 for 2019/20 \$57,333 for 2020/21, and \$60,000 for school year 2021/22. The District is hopeful these increases will continue to yield increased participation within the SRO Program. Municipalities and law enforcement continue to take the position that the funding contribution by BCPS is insufficient.

Mental Health Assistance

Florida Senate Bill 7030, Implementation of Legislative Recommendations of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission was signed into law on May 8, 2019. This legislation builds on the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Act, SB 7026, from the previous session. The Mental Health Assistance Allocation is distributed to school districts proportionally based on enrollment. Charter Schools receive a proportional allocation to enrollment from the District allocation.

Florida Department of Education Guidance on the bill was issued on June 21, 2019 and can be found at <https://info.fldoe.org/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-8576/dps-2019-78.pdf>. Broward County Public Schools submitted Mental Health Plan Checklist, District Plan and Plan certification form. The 2019/20 submissions are awaiting approval of the Florida DOE for funding. The submitted 2019/20 plans build from the plan created with the initial allocation from 2018/19. Broward County Public Schools held a public workshop on mental health services provided in the District on October 8, 2018. Extensive detail on mental health services can be found at <https://www.browardschools.com/Page/44263>.

The 2019/20 plan submitted by BCPS to the Florida Department of Education can be found at <https://www.browardschools.com/Page/48523>. The total proposed request is \$ 5.1 Million. The plan will directly fund the positions: Nurses (5), Family Therapists (10), School Counselors (10), School Psychologists (10), School Social Workers (10), Behavior Analysts (10), and Employee Assistance Program Counselors (5). An additional budget line for training and materials for mental health training is 7.6% of the requested amount.

The School Board of Broward County will hold a public hearing on the integrated mental health services provided by the Mental Health Assistance Allocation, general fund mental health and comprehensive wellness services, funds provided by the School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV) grant, assistance provided by Office of Victims of Crime, and the 2019 District referendum on August 27, 2019.

DCF Mobile Crisis Teams and Community Action Teams

In July 2017, the Broward Behavioral Health Coalition (BBHC) received \$750,000 from DCF for a Community Action Team (CAT) that was procured and awarded to Smith Community Mental Health. This funding had been requested prior to the tragedy at MSD. Despite requests for funding for a second team to respond to the increased number of referrals from MSD, the increase in threats being made on schools and the increase in suicide prevention calls, the Legislature did

not provide the \$750,000 necessary to stand up a second team. Instead, Broward received a modest, non-recurring increase of \$200,000 which is sufficient to treat 7 more children and families this year. Woefully short of the need.

School Hardening Grant

Last year, the MSDHSPS Act allocated nearly \$99 million to fund competitive grants for school hardening. Ultimately, the DOE decided to allocate these funds on the basis of student enrollment in school districts. Accordingly, BCPS received approximately \$9.5 million of these hardening funds. The District also was required to provide charter school with their proportionate share of these funds, based on their enrollment. This resulted in approximately \$8 million dollars to invest in security enhancement priorities that were identified through the FSSAT and the recommendations from Safe Havens, the District's independent security consultant.


Although these funds were identified as "one-time" allocations, the legislature authorized \$50 million of additional hardening funds for the 2019/20 school year. It is assumed these funds will be dispersed in similar fashion to last year, and BCPS's share will be approximately \$4.8 million.

L. Fencing

The Initial Report outlined that BCPS has nearly 750,000 linear feet of fencing surrounding its school campuses. The District's current criteria for perimeter fencing calls it to be a minimum height of six feet with "double knuckle" construction at the top and bottom of the fencing. In addition, all perimeter fencing must comply with Florida Building Code requirements.

Following the tragedy at Stoneman Douglas High School, questions have been raised regarding the height of perimeter fencing at schools and whether there are any restrictions from raising the fence height and including a sloped "rake" at the top of the fencing.

In 2018, the District retained the services of an independent security consultant, Safe Havens, to conduct individual risk assessments at all schools and administrative buildings, review the District's safety and security procedures and policies, and review all related training materials and documents. The scope of work was conducted in two phases and yielded a strategic report providing recommendations to improve the safety and security at all schools. Outlined below is a timeline associated with this engagement.



One aspect of the consultant's review specifically included the District's design criteria for perimeter fencing. Ultimately, the consultant did not recommend any immediate action regarding perimeter fencing. The strategic report points out that any action to retrofit existing fencing across the entire District would be extremely expensive and yield minimal enhancement to a school's security. Rather, the consultant strongly felt investments to enhance security could be better spent in other areas and deliver a better return on investment. One example is the analytic cameras that were included in Phase II of the video surveillance camera project and outlined in section D. above.

M. First Responder Entry to Schools

As outlined in the Initial Report both fire rescue and law enforcement identified an issue related to first responder access to schools. Methods for access to all schools by emergency responders takes into consideration a number of factors: (1) preservation of security for methods; (2) access to tools; (3) cost; (4) training; (5) deployment; (7) level of severity of the event.

The Initial Report identified a number of different strategies for permitting access: (1) Knox Blue Box with Manual Key; (b) Knox Blue Box with Electronic Keys; (3) Keyless/Card Access Systems

The Initial Report concluded, the Knox "Blue Box" system is the best option at this point when it comes to accessibility, ease of deployment and cost. The Knox system could contain the school specific accesses keys/cards.

While there has yet to be a Knox Box solution implemented Districtwide, the District's Special Investigative Unit (SIU) has communicated with local law enforcement to extend the opportunity to be provided duplicate keys to access the gates at schools within their jurisdiction. This process is still ongoing.

N. SaferWatch: Technology to Improve Reporting of Threats

BSO indicates it has partnered with SaferWatch, a mobile app that allows users to report non-emergency incidents and crime tips in real time directly to BSO. The app covers more than 440 public, charter and private schools in Broward County and gives students, parents and teachers the ability to submit photos, videos, audio files or text messages anonymously. The information is immediately sent to BSO for appropriate action. It also provides our law enforcement districts with the ability to communicate important real-time information directly with residents. BSO encourages all residents to download the free SaferWatch app and subscribe to the BSO district closest to them. Download the app at BrowardAlerts.com.

The District also entered into an agreement with SaferWatch, LLC on February 5, 2019. On May 28, 2019, the District held a joint press conference with SaferWatch to announce the SaferWatch app had been enhanced to communicate “tips” directly to the District’s Special Investigative Unit in addition to law enforcement agencies and receive real-time safety alerts directly from Broward County Public Schools and local law enforcement. This provides another opportunity, in addition to FortifyFL and the District’s Silence Hurts anonymous tip line, to report suspicious activities. Awareness campaigns have been launched to promote all three reporting mechanisms, including prominently displaying on the District’s website.

O. Safer Spaces

On January 2, 2019, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission (Commission) issued its Initial Report to the Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Senate President. The Commission was legislatively formed through the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act to specifically analyze information from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting and other mass violence incidents and provide recommendations and system improvements to help mitigate the impacts from and prevent future school shootings. One of the recommendations included in the report was that “Classrooms should establish safety measures, such as hard corners or other safe areas, and teachers should have the ability to cover door windows quickly.”

On February 20, 2019, the School Board of Broward County adopted Policy 2150, Safer Spaces. (Ex. 43). A Safer Space (also referred to as a Hard Corner) is a designated general location where students and staff can more effectively position themselves in a manner where they are not visible from a hallway or outside door or window, in an effort to reduce the risk associated with an active shooter. Safer Spaces are NOT intended to suggest a specific level of security or absolute safety of students, staff and visitors in all emergency situations and are closely associated with the construction of the building. Additionally, Safer Spaces are NOT intended to convey specific levels of ballistic or blast protection. The Policy stipulates the manner with which Safer Spaces will be identified (when permissible) in classrooms, marked with standardized visual designators, mandates the designated spaces will remain free from objects interfering with their use in emergencies, and requires periodic inspections of the spaces to ensure compliance with the policy.

BCPS is implementing the Safer Spaces policy in two phases. The first phase was to have school-based staff identify and mark the Safer Space within all classrooms where there is a single entry point and the absence of windows on the first floor. This phase yielded the identification of nearly 3,000 Safer Spaces within classrooms throughout the District. The second phase involves teams

of Special Investigative Unit (SIU) detectives and District fire inspectors visiting each school to assess the remaining classrooms and identifying any additional Safer Spaces within classrooms. This two-phased approach became necessary because additional expertise was needed to evaluate more “complex” classrooms, where there are multiple entry points or first floor windows to determine whether there is an opportunity to identify a Safer Space. At the time of this updated report, these teams had assessed 219 schools, and identified an additional 4,628 classrooms where Safer Spaces could be designated. By August 14, 2019, all schools and classrooms will have been assessed for the purpose of identifying and designating Safer Spaces.

CHAPTER 4: BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM

A. Historical Overview in Broward County

The Initial Report contains a comprehensive overview and analysis of the School Resource Officer Program in Broward County.

Presently, each High School and Middle School has at least one full-time SRO assigned to those schools. However, the circumstances in elementary schools are different. Some municipalities have the financial ability to deploy a full-time SRO to each elementary school in their jurisdiction.¹¹ Some municipalities have chosen not to deploy any SROs to elementary schools, either as a matter of finances or philosophy. Other municipalities deploy a single SRO amongst multiple elementary schools in a shared fashion.

B. Funding of the Broward County School Resource Officer Program

As outlined in the Initial Report and in other sections in this Updated Report, throughout the years, the issue of funding has been a substantial factor in either expanding or reducing the SRO program. The two primary sources of funding are from the School Board and the municipality within which a particular school is sited.

C. Potential for BCPS Police Department to Staff SROs: Funding, Timing

It was noted by the Task Force that the current organizational structure of the Broward District Schools Police does not presently have the supervisory staff or structure to support a School Police. There has been no change in this regard.

D. Summary of Principles and Facts Regarding Existing SRO Program

The historic and current principles of the Broward County School Resource Officer program were outlined in the Initial Report and remain largely unchanged today. The only difference is the much higher expectation that SROs may be the primary intervention in active shooter threats and is expected to be well-acquainted with the Behavioral Threat Assessment model of the BCPS.

E. Funding Challenges and Issues Regarding the SRO Program:

For the past school year, there were a total of 201 SROs at 179 schools last school year. The reason there are fewer schools listed is because last year SROs were assigned to multiple schools at the elementary level. Given the new legislative requirement to have an SSO assigned to every school, it was no longer feasible to have one SRO assigned to multiple schools.

BCPS approved SRO Agreements with 13 municipalities and BSO to provide SRO services to an additional 10 municipalities (total of 14 Agreements). BCPS increased its fixed reimbursement per SRO from \$46,250 to \$52,000 for the 2018/19 school year. BCPS reimbursed for 197 SROs for the 2018/19 school year, totaling \$10,264,800. Assuming the previously reported SRO cost presented by BLOC is still accurate, the municipal portion of the SRO expense for the 201 SROs was approximately \$17.8 million for the 2018/19 year. The increase is a function of the increase in total number of SROs. The percentage cost per SRO reduced slightly because of the District's

¹¹ Between 2006 and 2012-2013 school years, there were 10 fewer traditional public schools, but 30 fewer SROs; the reduction of SROs was in elementary schools.

increase in its fixed reimbursement. The District continues its efforts to increase SROs for the upcoming school year. Until all Agreements are finalized, updated numbers for the 2019/20 school year are not available. BCPS is again proposing an increase in its fixed reimbursement from \$52,000 to \$54,600. Ultimately, the District is proposing increasing the fixed reimbursement to \$60,000 over a three-year period (\$54,600 for 2019/20, \$57,330 for 2020/21, and \$60,000 in 2021/22). As noted herein, the BCCPA and municipalities have objected to a three-year contract and continue to believe the financial contribution of the BCPS to the SRO program is insufficient.

Because of the varying municipal financial ability and the number of schools sited in any particular municipality, there remains in essence four scenarios in our traditional public schools for SROs: (1) Full time permanently assigned to one school and who is employed year round in the community; (2) Shared SRO amongst one or more schools; (3) a seasonal law enforcement officer (who may be retired); (4) no SRO assigned to any particular school.

Overwhelmingly, students, teachers, parents, residents, administrators, law enforcement, and elected officials have expressed the need for SRO's in our schools. Municipalities have traditionally paid the cost above the BCPS funding. These revenues come from various sources within municipal budgets but none through a continuing dedicated source. The revenue sources are finite and the SRO program is consistently at the risk of revenue availability.

However, school boundaries do not follow municipal boundaries. Students living in one city may attend school in another city. This creates the circumstance whereby taxpayers from one city provide a service to families who do not contribute toward the service they receive.

Some municipalities are a net "provider" of students to public schools in surrounding municipalities; some municipalities are a net "receiver" of students to the schools in their municipality.

The Task Force continues to highlight two significant deficiencies in the current program. The first is the lack of a permanent, predictable and fully funded revenue source to deploy one SRO in every BCPS and charter school district wide. The second is the inequity caused by some taxpayers paying the additional municipal cost of SRO's without contribution from taxpayers located outside municipal boundaries. The previous inability to address these known funding inequities and a stable source of funding has led to reduction in SRO coverage, particularly in elementary schools. In some circumstances, SROs in elementary schools have been eliminated entirely; in other circumstances, municipalities have been chosen to have SROs shared amongst multiple schools rather than being permanently and consistently assigned to an individual school.

F. Areas of Concern:

The Task Force noted the following area of concerns:

MSDHSPS Act: Compliance with School Safety Officer Requirement:

As noted, there are methods of complying with the MSDHSPS Act requirement to have a "safe school" officer at each school facility are: (1) deployment of a SRO; (2) deployment of a certified law officer known as a "school safety officer"; (3) participation in the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program. The BCPS Board initially declined to participate in Guardian Program.¹²

¹² The issue of providing firearms to school staff is a topic of debate across the nation. One concern raised, aside from quality of training and oversight, is whether or not insurance companies would provide insurance coverage. According

As noted earlier, current vacancies in municipal and county law enforcement agencies is approximately 300 county wide, and as many as 500 in the tri-county area.¹³ Securing additional certified law enforcement officers to cover non-charter public schools would require hiring or deployment of 72 more certified officers, assuming additional SROs are not recommended in much larger schools. As a result, the BCPS estimates the actual need to provide coverage to account for larger campuses and schools may be 80-100 additional SROs (without the charter school consideration).

Achieving compliance by the start of the 2018/19 school year was assessed as virtually impossible:

- There is an insufficient pool of certified officers.
- Hiring of retired officers requires the officers to have maintained their certification to expedite hiring.
- Even if retired officers maintained certification, certain pension and hiring rules require that the retirees be out of the law enforcement for certain period of time (e.g., Florida Retirement System (BSO) requires 1 year separation; other pensions require 6 month separation);¹⁴
- Retired officers will still need to undergo a form of screening. Generally, if being hired by the agency from which they retired, the background check is only covering the period since separation. If retired from another agency, then a full background check is necessary;
- If hiring a retiree separated from a different agency, there would be an abbreviated version of the agency's field training officer program (4-8 weeks) where the person would have to learn all the agency policies, practices and procedures before than transitioning into the SRO role which would require even more training;
- There would be insufficient time to take a recruit through the academy, background check, Field Training Officer oversight, probationary period and SRO training.

As has been noted, if the District attempts to hire a certified law enforcement officer, they face the same challenges.

The Addition of Charter Schools Further Strains the Hiring Process

There are 89 charter schools county wide. Also as noted earlier, the charter schools are independently funded and governed.

to a recent article, much of the insurance industry has declined to extend coverage both as a matter or risk and an apparent analysis as to the actual benefits in comparison to those risks. This is an evolving topic nationwide. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/one-roadblock-to-arming-teachers-insurance-companies/2018/05/26/59d6c704-5f7e-11e8-8c93-8cf33c21da8d_story.html?utm_term=.10f04199850a

¹³ The challenges of filling certified law enforcement personnel vacancies in the normal course, no less having to increase the number of certified law enforcement personnel, is a nationwide challenge, some even call a crisis. See, e.g., <https://www.policione.com/recruitment-retention-crisis/articles/430499006-4-reasons-why-police-departments-are-struggling-to-fill-their-ranks/>; <http://www.dailyadvance.com/News/2018/05/02/Olson-Police-vacancies-becoming-crisis.html>; <http://www.policiechiefmagazine.org/a-crisis-facing-law-enforcement-recruiting-in-the-21st-century/>.

¹⁴ In fact, there are potential tax penalties for the retiree for re-joining their employer too soon. <http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-lauderdale-employees-owe-irs-20160717-story.html>

The MSDHSPS Act contemplates deployment of a SRO on 1:1 ratio even in charter schools. However, as noted in the Initial Report, there are a large number of charter schools with only a few hundred students. While the charter schools receive a per student allocation to fund safety and security, that allocation with a low student population would be insufficient to even cover the \$46,252 contributed by the BCPS. Moreover, it would have required the hiring and deployment of approximately 177 more certified law enforcement officers. Even if “nested” charter reduce the number of SROs required, the number of required certified law enforcement officers that had to be hired by the start of the 2018/19 school was not conceivably possible. The Florida DOE has indicated charter schools must achieve compliance or risk losing the charter to operate.

Responsibility for Compliance with the MSDHSPS Act Safe School Officer

From the literal language of the MSDHSPS Act, responsibility for compliance with the deployment of a “safe school” officer in every public school is entirely the responsibility of the school districts. With respect to the funding of a School Resource Officer, as noted in the Initial Report, the Florida Sheriffs Association has issued an Opinion Letter that funding is the responsibility of the school districts, not the agencies or the municipalities.

Current SRO Program Limited Coverage During Times Students On Campus

The Task Force reiterates that the current Broward SRO program has agency officers on campus just prior to the start of school and just after dismissal. There is generally no SRO coverage for pre-school programs, after-care programs, school year extracurricular activities, summer programs and summer and break camps. Law enforcement coverage for sports programs are handled through hiring “detail” officers and not part of the SRO program. Adding SROs for pre-school and after-care would increase the need for human resources, infrastructure and funding.

No Permanent, Dedicated And Stable Funding Source for Full Time SROs.

As noted in the Initial Report and reiterated by the Task Force, the SRO program is presently subject to the vagaries of funding involving the different municipalities. There is no dedicated and stable funding stream to ensure that every school has a SRO. While the BCPS is proposing a millage increase, (1) that initiative must pass; (2) if it passes, funding will not be available until the 2019/20 school year.

In this environment of ongoing budgetary challenges and the unfunded mandate of increasing school security, it is more important than ever that dwindling resources be managed as efficaciously as possible. Implementing a regional approach, one that expands upon inter-agency collaborations, would both maximize existing resources while at the same time providing a more equitable service delivery.

The following funding scenarios are potential considerations:

- Increased BCPS Funding through the proposed levy;
- Increased State Funding Initiatives consistent with the Florida Constitutional Obligation to make adequate provision for funding safe and Secure schools, per Article IX, Section 1(a); and,
- Special Taxing District established to provide a stable funding source for SROs throughout Broward County, but will require legislative and voter approval and is not a near term solution.

CHAPTER 5: BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL DISCIPLINE¹⁵ AND MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS AND PROCEDURES¹⁶

A. Threat Assessment Teams

The Initial Report outlined how BCPS conducts threat assessments.

According to BCPS, whenever a student is determined to present a threat to themselves or others a formal Behavioral Threat Assessment must be conducted by a Behavioral Threat Assessment team at the school. BCPS reports that it has had a Behavioral Threat Assessment process developed by recommendations from the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and professional organizations since 2002. While each incident is unique, all Behavioral Threat Assessment teams that conduct the assessment consist of a school based licensed administrator, a mental health professional, a sworn law enforcement officer, and those adults in the school community who best know the student. Additional consultation with broader community members occurs when appropriate. The purpose of the threat assessment is to determine the severity of the threat, to ensure the safety and security of the individual and the community, and to establish a follow-up plan for support and monitoring.

The current BCPS threat assessment manual can be found at https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/13477/2019_BTA_Procedure_Manual.pdf.

According to BCPS, as part of its response to the tragedy at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018, BCPS commenced reviews of safety, security, emergency preparedness and student services. These efforts included internal process and implementation reviews, and the contracting of external expertise for further review. BCPS initiated external reviews on safety and security by Safe Havens International, on the Exceptional Student Services by Collaborative Education Network, and on threat assessment implementation by RSM International.

Additionally, BCPS presented on Threat Assessments to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission on July 10, 2018 (<http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/July-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/July-10-100pm-BCPS-Threat-Assessment-Mary-Mucenic.aspx>) and June 4, 2019, (<http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/2019/June/June-4-2019-230-Threat-Assessmetn-Dan-Gohl-BCPS.aspx>).

In determining areas for continuous improvement, BCPS was informed by additional external reviews of School Board policies, procedures and implementation by the Broward League of Cities initial report and the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission. Additionally, BCPS undertook a review of policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety

¹⁵ During the MSD Commission process, it was reported that the shooter in the MSD tragedy had 125 past disciplinary infractions. Additional disciplinary analysis was requested by a Broward County School Board member to determine the number of students who have cumulative disciplinary incidents from 0-100+. The Task Force only recently received this Report and has not analyzed the import of the findings. It is expected that the MSD Commission will be addressing this report and analysis. (Ex. 51).

¹⁶ See Initial Report for sections explaining the following topics: “Student with Disabilities”; “Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) Transition; “Alternative Schools”; “Disciplinary Centers”; “Alternative High Schools”.

Act (SB 7026: 2018). All of these efforts have assisted in the adoption of new policies, and modifications to existing policies and procedures to improve safety, security and student services throughout the District. As a result of these efforts, three significant initiatives focused on training, policy, and documentation system have been completed.

According to BCPS, the first initiative was intensive and on-going training for all school-level administrators on behavioral threat assessment procedures. This training consisted of training prior to the 2018/19 school year, a three-hour training using a behavioral threat assessment case study during the school year guided by the new School Board Policy, and training on the new digital, centralized Behavioral Threat Assessment tool in August 2019.

The second initiative was the elevation of threat assessment accountability from the level of operational procedure to School Board Policy. School Board of Broward County Policy 2130 (<http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/sbbcpolicies/docs/Threat%20Assessment%20Policy.pdf>) was finalized through the statutorily defined rulemaking process on March 5, 2019. This policy establishes definitions of threat levels, roles and responsibilities for people, teams and departments, and establishes an auditing calendar for ensuring fidelity of implementation and compliance. (Ex. 45)

The third initiative was the selection, procurement, and implementation of a digital, centralized threat assessment system to replace the previous paper, school site documentation system. In February 20, 2019, the SBBC approved a contract with Public Consulting Group, Inc. to develop and implement the system. Background documents can be found here: [http://bcpsagenda.browardschools.com/agenda/01612/Item%20EE-1%20\(57886\)/index.html](http://bcpsagenda.browardschools.com/agenda/01612/Item%20EE-1%20(57886)/index.html).

According to the BCPS, the design of the system was informed by state law, school district policy and end users. The system design was finalized in June. Training on the new system commenced in July 2019 with school principals and will commence with law enforcement personnel beginning August 12, 2019. BCPS and law enforcement continue to be in active communication to ensure that all parties understand the procedures and are involved in all threat assessments. BSO and BCPS have been coordinating with SRDs/SROs to train prior to the start of the 2019/20 school year. (Ex. 48).

B. Code of Student Conduct.

The Initial Report outlined the BCPS Code of Student Conduct.

C. Student Records

Pursuant to the guidelines of the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), BCPS acknowledges the importance of timely access to essential student records by key personnel. All BCPS schools and charter schools are required to enter student data in the school district's data management systems. The data included, but not limited to are, attendance, discipline, health records, emergency contacts, grades, credits earned, volunteer service hours, and special program information. When students transfer schools within the school district and to/from charter schools, all information entered in the data management systems by the sending school is accessible to the receiving school. However, the only records accessible to BCPS for students transferring from private schools are those that are provided by the sending private school. As noted previously, there have been new directives issued by the Florida DOE as it relates student records, including disciplinary records, on transfer.

D. PROMISE and Civil Citation Programs¹⁷

As outlined in the Initial Report, the PROMISE Program (Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Supports & Education) was implemented by BCPS to address the increasing numbers of students who were entering the Juvenile Justice System as a result of arrests for misdemeanor offenses occurring during the school day. The BCPS asserts that PROMISE is meant to address socially unacceptable or illegal behavior, targeting both short and long term academic success, aligning best practice models and Restorative Justice principles, and developing pro-social and resiliency skills. PROMISE, while addressing the behavior specific to the youth, is committed to addressing family and community circumstances that serve as both strengths and challenges for the youth's resiliency.

The facts presented to the Task Force in June 2018, along with the history of PROMISE to that date are contained in the Initial Report. Recommendations were outlined related to the PROMISE program.

The PROMISE program is operationalized through the School Board of Broward County's policies Student Discipline: Suspension and Expulsions and the Student Code of Conduct See, respectively, (<http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/sbbcpolicies/docs/Policy%205006.pdf>) and (<http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/sbbcpolicies/docs/Code%20of%20Student%20Conduct%20Handbook%202017-2020.pdf>).

PROMISE eligible offenses are a subset of the District's Discipline Matrix (<https://www.browardschools.com/discipline-matrix>). The School Board annually reviews and revises these policies for updates.

The BCPS hosted meetings in public School Board Workshops and with the Broward community on PROMISE on several occasions throughout 2018 and 2019. Additionally, School Board staff presented to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission on July 10, 2018 (<http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/July-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/July-10-845am-PROMISE-Program-Follow-Up.aspx>)

Additionally BCPS participated in an MSD PSC update on June 4, 2019. (<http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/2019/June/June-4,-2019-1130am-Promise-Sheriff-Gualtieri.aspx>).

The Initial Report and the Task Force previously raised issues related to the scope and operation of the PROMISE program.

In May 2019, the School Board of Broward County made changes to the governing policies based on statutory changes, public workshops, and law enforcement and educator input. These changes are summarized below:

The following is a bulleted summary of the changes and the maintained practices is below:

- The PROMISE eligible incidents have been revised to align with incidents that are classified as misdemeanors.
- The PROMISE program is now only eligible to students of at least 11 years of age and/or enrolled in a District 6-12 school program. Students in grades K-5 will

¹⁷ The Initial Report has a background section related to District protocols related to discipline and security. A more specific analysis of disciplinary action involving students is presently the topic of the MSD Commission.

receive age appropriate disciplinary consequences as outlined in the primary Discipline Matrices.

- PROMISE incidents for said students shall accrue through 12th grade with a maximum of three (3) referral assignments to the program.
- Pursuant to F.S. 1006.13, Zero Tolerance for Crime and Victimization, any student committing more than one misdemeanor must be referred to the Threat Assessment Team, which includes law enforcement, to determine if the act should be reported to law enforcement for further action.
- PROMISE incidents have always been recorded in the District's Discipline Management System.
- Additionally, a student who has accrued three cumulative PROMISE eligible incidents shall be referred to a community youth support diversion program, and to the District's Behavior Intervention Committee, as appropriate.
- Lastly, the PROMISE program is and was never intended to limit the discretion of law enforcement as clearly outlined in the Collaborative Agreement on School Discipline, and the District has provided and continues to provide notification to the State Attorney's Office when a student refuses to engage in the PROMISE program or does not comply with the program requirements.

The District has indicated it is committed to continuously improving youth serving programs and ensuring strong support for victims in a disciplinary system that provides both consequences and rehabilitation services. Additional information about the PROMISE program can be found at <https://www.browardschools.com/Page/32438>.

PROMISE and Juvenile Civil Citation Program

In addition, the Initial Report recommended the intersection of the PROMISE program and the Juvenile Civil Citation Program, which is an alternative to arresting youth who commit misdemeanor acts outside of school and is intended to ensure that these youth are expeditiously held accountable, supervised, and receive appropriate intervention services. The Task Force previously inquired as to the communication flow between these two programs, which may be providing supports and interventions to the same student.

According to the BCPS, the Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Committee discussed maintaining a separation of processes within the school-based PROMISE intervention program and Florida Juvenile Civil Citation. While both programs seek to identify and address underlying causes of misconduct and provide alternatives to arrest, the interventions offered within each program differ. The committee's intent was to assure youth are afforded the opportunities within the two systems without prejudice, and that PROMISE attendance would not impact eligibility for Civil Citation.

In the Initial Report, the Task Force noted that there should be a level of communication that ensures a coordinated provision of supports and interventions, while ensuring accountability and supervision.

Improved sharing of information between public agencies to promote public safety has been an explicit outcome of work undertaken since June 2018. An area of intense examination has been how to best share data between schools and law enforcement agencies to ensure that patterns of misconduct, and if present criminal behavior, are known to law enforcement and/or school administrators. Such knowledge should result in fully informed decision makers who will exercise their professional discretion at times when policy, procedure, and statute allow. Significant

examination, discussion, and clarification on the relationship between school based PROMISE eligible infractions and the State Prosecutor's Civil Citation program have occurred over the past calendar year.

The design and implementation of the PROMISE program as an Alternative to External Suspension program can also result in non-adjudication of some potential misdemeanor offenses. The Collaborative Agreement on School Discipline, SBBC policies, and BCPS trainings are consistent in stating, "Nothing in this agreement is intended to limit the discretion of law enforcement." The exercise of discretion for when PROMISE was assigned without referral for prosecution for misdemeanor level PROMISE eligible offenses therefore resulted in outcomes similar to statutory definitions for diversion programs. However, PROMISE does not meet the legal definition of a "Diversion Program" as defined by Florida Statute 943.0582. As previously described, BCPS has modified the PROMISE program based on community input.

This input includes the recommendations of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission Interim Report.¹⁸

Based on these specific recommendations for school districts, BCPS began entering PROMISE eligible offenses into the Department of Juvenile Justice Prevention Web.¹⁹ This was subsequently deemed to be an inappropriate action to take due to the manner in which school-based behavior incidents recorded in the DJJ Prevention Web aggregated with formally issued Civil Citations. The inappropriate blending of these distinct incident types in the reporting received by law enforcement officers in the field, and in other reporting processes, necessitated a suspension of school-based PROMISE programs being entered into DJJ Prevention Web. It is anticipated that modification of the manner in which the DJJ Prevention Web software processes school-based infractions entered into the prevention/services portal will enable BCPS to recommence entering student PROMISE participation into the DJJ Prevention Web for the 2019/20 school year.

According to BCPS, a student's failure to comply with terms of a PROMISE assignment has always, and continues to qualify for entry into the DJJ Prevention Web.²⁰

¹⁸ Chapter 10, page 279, <http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf>

¹⁹ <http://www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/jjis-instructional-powerpoints---dios/prevention-web-prevention-programs.pdf?sfvrsn=2>.

²⁰ The complete Cooperative Agreement between the School Board of Broward County and the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Circuit 17, can be found at <http://www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/agreements/circuit-17-broward-county-djj-cooperative-agreement-2017-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=2>

CHAPTER 6: COMMUNITY BASED MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

Summary

Since the Initial Report was released, the community has worked to expand mental health and wellness services. While much of the Post Traumatic Stress services have been offered to those immediately impacted by the MSD tragedy, it is also acknowledged that the tragedy affected the entire county and there are many areas of the county that continue to experience gun violence and other traumas every day. Therefore, this update addresses new trauma related services being offered to support the MSD community. As well, efforts are underway to build community capacity to treat trauma more broadly and an infrastructure for emergency mental health services that will be robust with clear lines of communication and responsibility, which address the deficiencies identified by the initial Task Force Report and the Broward County After-Action Task Force Report prepared by the National Police Foundation.

A. MSDHSPS Act and Mental Health

In 2018, the Legislature adopted three of the task force's recommendations as part of its sweeping legislation in SB 7026, in response to the school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. This included increasing funding to support prevention and early intervention services to address mental health challenges prior to them becoming a crisis,²¹ expanding access to outpatient crisis intervention services and treatment,²² and requiring school resource officers to complete mental health crisis intervention training,²³ including skills training to ensure student and officer safety during incidents involving students with emotional disturbance or mental illness.

The following task force recommendations have not yet been implemented by the Legislature:

- Encourage school districts, through legislative intent language, to adopt a standardized suicide assessment tool that school-based mental health professionals would implement prior to initiation of a Baker Act examination.²⁴

²¹ Using a \$9.3 million appropriation in the bill, DCF was required to contract with managing entities to establish additional community action treatment teams (CAT Teams) throughout the state to complement the services of the 26 teams then currently operating. These CAT Teams are required to provide community-based behavioral health and support services to children from 11 to 13 years of age, adolescents, and young adults from 18 to 21 years of age with serious behavioral health conditions who are at risk of out-of-home placement; use an integrated service delivery approach to comprehensively address the needs of the child, adolescent, or young adult and strengthen his or her family and support system, address therapeutic needs, assist in obtaining services and support, make referrals for specialist treatment providers if necessary, and follow up to ensure services are received; focus on engaging the child, adolescent, or young adult and his or her family as active participants in every phase of the treatment process; and coordinate with other key entities providing services and supports to the child, adolescent, or young adult and his or her family (i.e. through the school, child welfare system, and juvenile justice system). Fla. Stat. . 394.495(6).

²² Using an \$18.3 million appropriation in the bill, DCF was required to competitively procure proposals for additional mobile crisis teams to ensure reasonable access among all counties, taking into consideration the geographic location of existing mobile crisis teams, and select providers to serve areas of greatest need.

²³ CIT training is an effective law enforcement response program designed for first responders who handle crisis situations involving individuals with mental illness or co-occurring disorders. It emphasizes a partnership between law enforcement, the mental health and substance abuse treatment system, mental health advocacy groups, and consumers of mental health services and their families. Additionally, this training offers evidence-informed techniques designed to calm the individual in crisis down, reduces reliance on the Baker Act as a means of handling the crisis, and informs individuals of local resources that are available to people in need of mental health services and supports.

²⁴ Mental Health Professionals on the Task Force outlined that data supports the conclusion that implementation of

- Amend s. 394.463(2)(a), F.S., to increase the number of days, from the next working day to five working days, that the receiving facility has to submit forms to DCF required by s. 394.463(2)(e), F.S., which would allow DCF to capture data on whether the minor was admitted, released, or a petition filed with the court.

B. Overview of Existing Community Mental Health Access and Programs

The existing community based mental health programs and access thereto is often not well understood by the public at large, or even policy makers. The complexities of providers and funders is well understood by those in the field of community mental health. However, when it comes to families and individuals who need to access existing programs, guideposts for the journey are not always clearly marked. As a result, the Task Force set out to provide an overview which can be found in Chapter 6(B) of the Initial Report.

Given the different ways that people respond to trauma there was a recognition that many different treatment modalities needed to be available. Through a variety of partnerships between the Broward County Public Schools, the Broward Behavioral Health Coalition (BBHC), the Children's Services Council (CSC), the United Way of Broward County (UWBC), the Jewish Federation and Professionals United for Parkland (PU4P) hundreds of therapists have been trained in a several new modalities for treating trauma including: Trauma Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, the Center for Mind Body Medicine techniques, the Israeli Trauma Coalition techniques, EMDR and Trauma Focused Emotion Freedom Techniques. This allows more options for people seeking support and will ensure a more robust availability for trauma trained therapists if needed to respond to another crisis.

In March 2019, Eagles' Haven, a long-term wellness and recovery center, funded initially by the Children's Services Council and United Way (both of which should be reimbursed eventually through a federal Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program), opened in Coral Springs and is operated by JAFCO. Eagles' Haven is a warm, welcoming, safe place staffed by licensed clinicians who act as "Navigators" to connect students, families and teachers with the mental health resources available in the community. Most services are offered at no or low cost. They also have a schedule of wellness activities and groups which vary based on the requests of the community. All these activities are at no cost to the participants.

Preliminary data on the effectiveness of the services at Eagles' Haven is very promising. Over 600 community members have taken part in activities in the first four months and over 100 people are receiving Navigator / Case Management services and satisfaction with the services has been high. Navigators act as partners with their clients to ensure they are happy with the therapeutic services they are receiving and if not, they are matched with a different therapist. They also have some flex funds available in order to purchase services that may not be available through other means. Many other communities have been asking for a center like Eagles' Haven therefore, the CSC has set aside \$1.5 million for FY 19/20 to work with other communities to determine if Eagles' Haven can be a model for other centers throughout the county and assist in identifying what aspects might be most effective in that community.

As identified in the Initial Report there is a need to develop a uniform mental health response to a mass tragedy that is not dependent upon the location of the tragedy. Both the Jewish Federation of Broward County and the Israeli Trauma Coalition have provided trainings on trauma response

risk assessment protocols significantly reduced the number of children and youth who received Baker Act initiations in school districts across the state.

and are willing to work with the Coordinating Council of Broward (CCB) to assist in augmenting the current trauma protocols which exist for first responders and hospitals to add the trauma mental health supports. This aspect of the work is still in its infancy but will be joined with the robust work CCB has already done with respect to establishing a Long-Term Recovery Coalition to coordinate recovery after a natural disaster. See the Task Force Analysis section below.

C. Community Mental Health -- Prevention and Intervention Funders

The Primary Funders of Community Mental Health Services along with their website and a summary of their areas of focus can be found in Chapter 6(C) of the Initial Report. While these descriptions remain accurate, it is important to note:

The Broward Behavioral Health Coalition (BBHC) has received some additional State Funding to address trauma and opioid addiction. They are also awaiting word from the federal government about a new grant to expand services for 14-18-year-old children to help them transition into the adult system of care.

While suicide has always been an area of concern, Broward County has been experiencing elevated levels of suicide during the past two years. BBHC identified this as an issue through a review of the Broward County Medical Examiner's Data on death by suicide. There were 264 suicides in 2018, an increase of 19.8% in one year. There is no complete count of suicide attempts throughout Florida. However, in 2018, 2-1-1 Broward responded to 1,898 suicide needs of callers experiencing life threatening situations (thoughts, plans, in progress suicides and third-party requests). These types of calls often are intense as clients are hopeless, overwhelmed and at times in progress of suicide.

Therefore, UWBC, in partnership with BBHC and Children's Services Council (CSC) has created the Zero Suicide Initiative and Coalition. The Zero Suicide Coalition includes BBHC, Broward County Public Schools, Children's Services Council of Broward County, United Way of Broward County, ChildNet, 211-Broward and the BBHC provider network with technical assistance from the American Association of Suicidology. The coalition will conduct a study that will focus on the analysis of local suicides in Broward County through the collection of data in an effort to understand risk factors, guide suicide prevention efforts, and to create a county-wide Suicide Prevention Action Plan as a first step to implement the Zero Suicide framework. The county-wide action plan will align with the 2016-2020 Florida Suicide Prevention Plan published by the Florida Department of Children and Families.

The UWBC has been building supports for First Responders by facilitating monthly Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) trainings for law enforcement. Based on a model developed in Memphis, Tennessee in 1988, Crisis Intervention Team programs bridge the gap between police response and mental health care by forming community partnerships. This alliance stimulates the development and realization of a transformed system where the method in which police respond to behavioral health crises is improved and utilization of behavioral health resources is increased. Crisis Intervention Team training produces officers who, through specialized training, gain insight into behavioral health crises and the system that provides services to individuals with behavioral health disorders. The curriculum requires the expertise of numerous disciplines to educate participants on: Adult Mental Health (Depression, Anxiety, Bi Polar and Schizophrenia), PTSD, Crisis Communication, Crisis Intervention, Youth Mental Health, Suicide Prevention, Personality Disorders, LGBTQ+ issues, Cultural Humility & Sensitivity (addressing intersectionality and unconscious bias in policing, Self-Care and Pharmacology. The inclusion of peer specialist, members of behavioral healthcare network and other related organizations, further enhances the

educational experience of participants. Since its inception in 2016, more than 800 law enforcement officers have been trained in crisis de-escalation. UWBC compiled a resource list of private mental health providers that serve first responders. This resource list is provided to each officer that attends CIT.

UWBC and the Caring Community, Inc. created “Self-Care Stations” for teachers and staff in 20 schools in Broward County. The Self-Care Stations provide trauma and therapy resources, herbal teas and aromatherapy to create an atmosphere of self-care and wellness. In addition to the “Self-Care Stations,” UWBC created a training calendar that is free and open to anyone in the community. The trainings include Mental Health First Aid, Implementing Self-Care, Conflict Resolution and Compassion Fatigue. Each training is offered monthly. Additionally, United Way increased the funding to agencies providing behavioral health programming and substance abuse prevention services.

D. Additional Guides to Mental Health Resources

For those who are looking to find a specific mental health service in the County, the best guides to those services remain:

2-1-1 Broward Helpline: www.211broward.org

Mission – 2-1-1 Broward is the live, 24-hour comprehensive helpline, providing all people with crisis, health and human services support and connecting them to resources in our community. This helpline is the first point of contact for many individuals in seeking assistance for mental health access in Broward. In the last few months 211 has added a text feature. This can be accessed by texting your zip code to 898-211.

Mental Health Association of Southeast Florida (MHASEFL): www.mhasefl.org

Mission – MHASEFL is dedicated to promoting mental health and victory over mental illness and related challenges through education, prevention, advocacy, research and empowerment. In addition to the many services offered, every other year MHASEFL publishes a Connections guide to behavioral health and support services. www.mhasefl.org/connections-guide-book.html

E. Statistics on Mental Health in the United States

Florida continues to rank low on the per-capita spending on Mental Health Services despite additional funding added over the last year. See this section of the initial Task Force Report for more detail.

The Task Force reported statistics related to mental health issues in the United States in the initial report. Below are updated statistics, as reported by the National Alliance of Mental Illness (NAMI), with the most recent changes of data regarding prevalence of mental illness in the U.S. (2019).

Prevalence of Mental Illness - Adults

Approximately 1 in 5 adults in the U.S. (46.6 million) experiences mental illness in a given year (Any Mental Illness (AMI) Among Adults. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml#part_154785)

Approximately 1 in 25 adults in the U.S. (11.2 million) experiences a serious mental illness in a given year that substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities (Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among Adults. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml#part_154788).

Prevalence of Mental Illness in U.S. children

Behavior problems, anxiety, and depression are the most commonly diagnosed mental disorders in children:

- 7.4% of children aged 3-17 years (approximately 4.5 million) have a diagnosed behavior problem.
- 7.1% of children aged 3-17 years (approximately 4.4 million) have diagnosed anxiety.
- 3.2% of children aged 3-17 years (approximately 1.9 million) have diagnosed depression.²⁵

Some of these conditions commonly occur together. For example, having another disorder is most common in children with depression:

- About 3 in 4 children aged 3-17 years with depression also have anxiety (73.8%) and almost 1 in 2 have behavior problems (47.2%).
- For children aged 3-17 years with anxiety, more than 1 in 3 also have behavior problems (37.9%) and about 1 in 3 also have depression (32.3%).
- For children aged 3-17 years with behavior problems, more than 1 in 3 also have anxiety (36.6%) and about 1 in 5 also have depression (20.3%).

Treatment rates vary among different mental disorders:

- Nearly 8 in 10 children (78.1%) aged 3-17 years with depression received treatment.
- 6 in 10 children (59.3%) aged 3-17 years with anxiety received treatment.
- More than 5 in 10 children (53.5%) aged 3-17 years with behavior disorders received treatment.
- Rates of mental disorders such as a diagnosis of depression and anxiety become more common with increased age.

F. Florida Mental Health Act (commonly referred to as “Baker Act”)

In June 2019, The Baker Act – Florida Mental Health Act Annual Report for FY 2017/18 prepared for the Florida Department of Children and Families by the Baker Act Reporting Center at the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute Department of Mental Health Law & Policy was issued. This annual report is required by statute and can be found at https://www.usf.edu/cbcs/baker-act/documents/annual_report_2017_2018.pdf

²⁵ Behavior problems are more common among children aged 6–11 years than children younger or older. Ghandour RM, Sherman LJ, Vladutiu CJ, Ali MM, Lynch SE, Bitsko RH, Blumberg SJ. Prevalence and treatment of depression, anxiety, and conduct problems in U.S. children. The Journal of Pediatrics, 2018. Published online before print October 12, 2018.

The report highlights (at p. 2) are:

- There were 205,781 involuntary (Baker Act) examinations in Fiscal Year 2017/2018(FY17/18).
- Involuntary examinations increased 2.92% from FY16/17 to FY17/18, 16.26% from FY13/14 to FY17/18, and 53.98% from FY08/09 to FY17/18. Involuntary examinations more than doubled (115.31% increase) in the 17 years from FY01/02 to FY17/18.
- From FY13/14 to FY17/18, statewide involuntary examinations increased 18.85% for children, 14.04% for young adults (18-24), and 12.49% for older adults.
- Three-quarters (73.55%) of involuntary examinations in FY17/18 were for adults aged 18 through 64, with 17.53% for children, and 7.41% for people 65 and older. [Age was unknown for 1.51%.]
- 51.67% of involuntary examinations were initiated by law enforcement, with 46.31% initiated by professional certificate, and 2.02% initiated via ex parte order.
- Physicians who are not psychiatrists (68.04%) were the most common health professional to initiate involuntary examinations, followed by psychiatrists (9.28%), licensed mental health counselors (9.29%), licensed clinical social workers (5.33%), psychiatric nurses¹ (2.02%), psychologists (1.27%), Physician Assistants (<1%), and licensed marriage and family therapists (<1%). Children were more likely than other age groups to have their involuntary examinations initiated by licensed mental health counselors and social workers.
- Evidence Type: Over half (56.83%) of involuntary examinations were based on evidence of harm only. Almost one-third (30.47%) were based on both harm and self-neglect. Less than ten percent (9.47%) were based on evidence of self-neglect only. Self-neglect only (no harm) was more common with increased age. [Evidence type was not reported for 3.22%.]
- Harm Type: Harm can be further broken down into harm to self and/or harm to others. More than half (55.84%) of all involuntary examinations were based on evidence of harm to self only. One in five (21.52%) were based on both harm to self and harm to others. Harm to others only was the evidence for 5.55% of all involuntary examinations.
- Suicide and Self-Harm: Three-quarters (77.36%) of involuntary examinations were based evidence of harm to self (either by itself, or in combination with harm to others and/or self-neglect). Self-harm includes suicidal ideation a suicide attempt. However, it is important to understand that self-harm is not synonymous with suicide. Self-harm can also include behaviors such as cutting and bodily harm that does not have suicidal intent.
- Rates per 100,000 population for deaths by suicide and involuntary examinations over a ten-year period were positively and significantly correlated statewide for all ages ($r = .71$, $p < .05$), children ($r = .92$, $p < .01$) and older adults ($r = .78$, $p < .01$). These correlational findings do not imply causation. Further, these significant correlations were not seen in all counties. These relationships will be explored in future years to understand the dynamics related to them, including additional ("third") variables that may be related to the correlations and differences across counties. Rates of suicide are included in this report to provide additional context to readers (see Appendix C).
- More than half (59.53%) of involuntary examinations in FY17/18 were at publicly funded receiving facilities, with 40.47% at privately funded receiving facilities.
- New to the annual report are details about transition-aged young adults (aged 18-24). Figures 1 and 2 present counts for all ages of involuntary examinations year

by year by age group. The percentage of change in the number of involuntary examinations from FY16/17 to FY17/18 is reported at the facility level for all ages (see Table 7).

The Report goes on to state:

Understanding what the data are not is as important as understanding what they are when considering related policy decisions. The Baker Act data analyzed for this report are from examination initiation forms received by the Baker Act Reporting Center. However, some individuals for whom forms were received were never admitted to the receiving facility because an examination by a physician or psychologist performed prior to admission determined they did not meet admission criteria. The data also do not include information on what occurred after the initial examination. For example, the data do not reveal how long individuals stayed at the facility, whether they remained on an involuntary or voluntary basis, or whether the involuntary (Baker Act) examination was converted to a Marchman Act assessment.

G. POST-CRISIS INTERVENTION

The immediate post crisis intervention activities offered by BCPS were outlined in great detail in the initial report.

Over the last eighteen months many other mental health interventions have been introduced to the community.

The Israel Trauma Coalition

The Israel Trauma Coalition (<http://israeltraumacoalition.org>) created in 2002 to harness the collective knowledge, expertise and experience of Israel's leading trauma management NGOs and government organizations. From an initial focus on direct care, they grew and expanded their scope of services to address broader issues in the trauma field including professional training, strengthening community resilience and ensuring national emergency preparedness. They currently manage resiliency centers throughout Israel and also initiated the regional emergency preparedness programs. They also send professional teams all over the world to train local officials and clinicians on managing trauma, promoting rehabilitation and creating resilient, self-sustaining societies.

The Israel Trauma Coalition sent a delegation to Parkland after the shooting and before school opened for an initial mapping and assistance. They returned in May and provided "Train the Trainer" workshops, intervention groups with MSD teachers and parents, participated in the United Way of Broward Behavioral Health Conference and conducted a scenario-based discussion of psycho-social response to emergency incident in Broward. The discussion participants included leaders from Broward Schools, Broward County, the City of Parkland, Jewish Federation of Broward, United Way, Children's Services Council, Broward Health, Broward Sheriff's Office, Coral Springs/Parkland Fire Departments and various NGOs.

The ITA Insights and recommendations are:

- Based on discussions with City of Parkland and Broward County leadership, we identified main areas that need to be addressed to improve the community preparedness and response capacity.

- Development and implementation of response protocols – who leads it, who does what, who can help, which community resources can be used? How to enable a continuity of operation?
- Establishment and exercise of collaboration model that allows best use of the psycho-social resources of the City, County and other potential partners and stakeholders.
- Flow of information in incident and accuracy of information.
- Training (education) on trauma preparedness and response for non-professionals in Mental Health.
- Continuation and expansion of training for professionals in post-incident intervention along trauma time-line, as well as need for more trained clinicians.
- Creation of emergency response teams (including protocols, training).
- Mapping of potential circles of impact in emergencies, especially more vulnerable groups in the community.
- Preparation and coordination of NGO and volunteers.
- Awareness of burn-out, compassion, fatigue among care-providers, need for dissemination and training of model, tools for self-care, and burn-out prevention.

Following the final scenario discussion some of the participating provider organizations in Broward discussed establishing a Broward Trauma Coalition. At this point in time, the Coordinating Council of Broward County has been asked to facilitate and kick off the creation of the Broward Trauma Coalition. The first meeting to kick off the creation of the Broward Trauma Coalition was August 12, 2019.

Coral Springs Model for First Responders

Being an emergency responder, dispatcher or medical professional can be challenging and have lasting effects on one's mental wellness. Many may struggle with or watch colleagues struggle with depression, anxiety, PTSD, dependency issues and maybe even suicide. Knowing how or where to access the right resources can be the difference in quality and longevity of life. An important statement is the right resources, remember that one resource does not fit all, what may help one person may not help another, in fact, it may be counterproductive. It is for that reason agencies should have a variety of programs available to their members and families. We need to change the culture in emergency services, and the stigma that we are weak if we experience mental wellness issues. We need to let all our emergency responders, dispatchers, and medical professionals know it is, "Ok, to not be Ok." It is not uncommon for our emergency responders to have suicidal idealization, a plan, and ultimately, see that plan to completion. We must all work hard to stop our emergency responders, dispatchers or medical professionals from taking their own lives due to mental health-related issues. Emergency responders, dispatchers or medical professionals may experience more traumatic events in a couple of days or shifts than most people will experience in a lifetime.

As leaders and peers, as those responsible, we must work toward comprehensive Behavioral Health Access Programs (BHAP). We need to work toward educating everyone on these BHAP models. Behavioral Health Access Programs are comprehensive, integrated, multicomponent, systematic program for emergency responders, dispatchers, and medical professional's mental health/wellness and crisis intervention. BHAP purpose is to provide education, support, assessment, and intervention for emergency responders, dispatchers or medical professionals personnel who are often exposed to and/or affected by critical incidents. BHAP is recognized by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation and needs to become a standard of care for

emergency responders, dispatchers or medical professionals. BHAP has proven to be effective in providing guidance during the assessment, basic counseling, and stress crisis intervention phase following an incident. The goal when applying any of BHAP components is to assess, educate, and intervene as necessary and return individuals to their work with the tools and support needed to reduce the effects of a critical incident. The benefits of the intervention include a reduction in symptoms of post-traumatic stress, quicker return to normal productive functioning, increased job satisfaction, reduced worker's compensation claims, reduced absenteeism and presentism, reduced errors, enhanced group cohesion, increased personal confidence and extended longevity.

Components of a BHAP program may consist of the following;

- A. CISM
 - 1. Individual intervention.
 - a. One-on-one services with a qualified CISM team member.
 - b. Individual support and follow-up.
 - 2. Small group defusing.
 - a. Recommended within the first 12 hours after a critical incident occurs.
 - b. Best delivered as soon as possible after a critical incident.
 - c. Homogeneous groups.
 - d. Assessment and education with possible referral and follow-up.
 - 3. Small group debriefing.
 - a. 12 -72 hours post-critical incident.
 - b. Prior to demobilization from extended deployment or upon return home from extended deployment.
 - c. Events of significant personal loss (expanded-phase defusing within first 12 hours).
 - 4. Crisis management briefing.
 - a. Appropriate for large incidents, incidents with high media involvement, respite/rehab centers, and demobilizations.
 - b. Best for large groups or mixed groups.
 - c. Primary focus on assessment and information.
- B. Peer Support
 - 1. Family crisis intervention.
 - 2. Organizational consultation.
 - 3. Assessment of organizational needs.
 - 4. Development and recommendation for coordination and delivery of services.
- C. Chaplaincy assistance
 - 1. Pastoral/spiritual crisis intervention.
- D. Clinician response team
 - 1. Referral and follow-up.
- E. Verified and vetted treatment facilities concentrating on emergency responders, dispatchers, and medical professionals.

All the above resources should be identified and typed throughout a respective jurisdiction and made to be deployable for small to major events.

The following are some of the symptoms of depression, anxiety, and other mental health issues, but not necessarily all of them. If any of these symptoms last for two or more weeks, a consultation with a mental health professional is recommended.

- Sadness
- Feelings of extreme guilt
- Suicidal ideas
- Insomnia
- Diminished interest in activities
- Difficulty concentrating
- Anxiety
- Appetite changes
- Weight changes
- Social withdrawal
- Indecisiveness
- Decreased sexual interest
- Mood swings
- Distorted thinking
- Low self-esteem
- Feelings of hopelessness
- Exhaustion
- Feelings of helplessness
- Agitation
- Irritability
- Inability to sleep Talking about wanting to die or to kill oneself;
- Looking for a way to kill oneself;
- Talking about feeling hopeless or having no purpose;
- Talking about feeling trapped or being in unbearable pain;
- Talking about being a burden to others;
- Increasing the use of alcohol or drugs;
- Acting anxious, agitated, or reckless;
- Sleeping too little or too much;
- Withdrawing or feeling isolated;
- Showing rage or talking about seeking revenge; and
- Displaying extreme mood swings.

Some may think or believe these symptoms will get better over time or go away. We need to work collaboratively to educate first responders that they need to get assistance through BHAP models as soon as possible. Not every event has to become long term, resiliency can be gained through some of these experiences. The sooner we get help, the better the outcome will likely be.

Task Force Analysis

As stated in the initial Task Force Report, many communities subjected to the annual threat of hurricanes, tornadoes, and other natural disasters, have an established plan to coordinate response and services. However, with unpredictable events such as mass violence, very few communities have a well-thought-out plan on how to address the psychological needs of the victims, their families and First Responders immediately post crisis and even fewer have plans to manage the long-term effects of the PTSD caused by mass violence.

In the After-Action Report Commissioned by Broward County, The National Police Foundation (NPF), outlined some of the ways the lack of a coordinated, well-rehearsed system to respond to

mass casualties negatively impacted the students and families. For example, because there had not been a designated Family Reunification Center prior to the event, it was hours before one was established; it is reported that the Center that was established was based upon the relationship between the Coral Springs City Manager and the Manager of the Heron Bay Marriott. As a result, this meant that as children were being evacuated they were not clear on where to go, which added to their stress. Also, procedures for notifying parents was not coordinated with a unifying message and direction, leaving parents to fend for themselves when leaving the hotel and having to face the press.

There were also challenges with the mental health services offered at the make-shift Family Support Center that was established in Pine Trails Park and in the schools. The report makes some important recommendations about the need to have professionals trained in Mental Health First Aid available for that initial encounter. Victims should not be asked to repeat their story multiple times. Volunteers, although well-meaning should generally not be providing mental health services since their qualifications are unknown and they are unlikely to be able to maintain the therapeutic relationship.

Responding to a mass casualty of this magnitude is no easy task. Planning and practice are key elements to maximizing the effectiveness of the response along with developing the skills of the mental health professionals in the community.

Two workgroups focused on different aspects of the mental health and trauma have been created over the last year in order to better coordinate services and identify gaps: 1) The Baker Act Workgroup now known as the Behavioral Health Collaborative meets every other month to better coordinate the provider network involved in the Baker Act process including the return of an individual who has been Baker Acted back into the community; and, 2) The Trauma Providers meet monthly to coordinate trauma services among the system of care partners, to identify and resolve system issues, and identify missing resources and training needs.

Due to the many lessons learned as outlined throughout the initial report, in response to the recommendation for a centralized hub for the mental health response that is well coordinated with the First Responders the major mental health and social services providers are forming a **Broward Trauma Coalition** under the auspices of the **Coordinating Council of Broward (CCB)**.

The mission of the Coordinating Council of Broward is to unite government, business and nonprofit leaders in advocacy and coordination of health and human services in Broward County. The CCB is composed of the top executives of state and county entities from the public, private and business sectors, who are responsible for funding and implementing a broad array of health, public safety, educational, economic and human services in Broward County. The Council's goal is to better coordinate services, increase collaboration and promote communication among stakeholders on a variety of issues which include housing, homelessness, disaster recovery, seniors and mental health. An example of this effort is the **Long-Term Recovery Coalition (LTRC)**, which developed in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma.

The LTRC is a humanitarian association of non-profits, governmental agencies, faith-based organizations and businesses with disaster capabilities or resources that respond to a declared disaster locally. It is not a competing or exclusionary organization. It is intended to be a network for organizations active in disaster recovery. Each recovery coalition member will keep its own identity and independence while closely collaborating with other member organizations. It will foster cooperation among its members at all levels and in all phases of disaster. Since its creation

the Long-Term Recovery Coalition of Broward has grown to include over 100 partners and has developed a comprehensive resource website for businesses and residents to prepare for a storm and identify resources in its aftermath.

The CCB will also facilitate the creation of the **Broward Trauma Coalition**. The BTC, based on the model of the Israel Trauma Coalition, will harness the collective knowledge, expertise and experience of Broward's trauma care, mental/behavioral health and supportive service providers. The coalition will work to identify areas of collaboration in professional training, coordinated communication, strengthening community resilience and ensuring emergency preparedness. This effort will support and collaborate with the evolving Suicide Prevention Coalition, among other partners.

These include:

The Florida Crisis Response Team, Inc. (FCRT). Their statewide program trains volunteer team members to respond locally to community wide mass casualties or natural disasters. FCRT follows the National Organization of Victim Assistance (NOVA) based training model based on evidence informed and field-tested practices of crisis management and advanced Crisis Response Team (CRT) training. FCRT's 40-hour training focuses on fundamentals of crisis intervention to victims of trauma. Since 1987, FCRT has sent teams to hundreds of small-scale critical incidents as well as mass casualties.

The overall mission of the **Southeastern Regional Domestic Security Taskforce (SERDSTF)** is to protect Region 7. The primary purpose of their charter is to define the roles and responsibilities of the Health and Medical Functional Work Group (FWG), which include the following:

To support the mission of the SERDSTF, the Health/Medical FWG will develop and promote effective collaboration, planning, training, exercises, response, recovery and mitigation within the health/medical and agricultural communities of Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties.

1. To provide a forum for the health & medical community to integrate with one another and other response agencies, at all levels;
2. To promote health/medical and agricultural emergency preparedness;
3. To foster communication between local, regional, state and federal entities on community-wide emergency planning, response, recovery and mitigation;
4. To support overall readiness through coordination of community-wide training and exercises;
5. To identify issues related to regional planning response matters, propose solutions to identified problem areas and seek to establish interdisciplinary consensus on response practices and procedures;
6. To promote preparedness in the health/medical community through standardized practices and integration with other response partners.

The **Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)** program educates volunteers about disaster preparedness for the hazards that may impact their area and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical operations. CERT offers a consistent, nationwide

approach to volunteer training and organization that professional responders can rely on during disaster situations, which allows them to focus on more complex tasks. Through CERT, the capabilities to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters is built and enhanced. Broward County has CERT programs in 20 municipalities.

The proposed flow chart is designed to enhance collaboration and communication to all stakeholders in the event of a disaster. (Please note that this flow chart is intended to be a guide for future trauma and has not been adopted or vetted by partners and stakeholders).

1. Incident occurs- lead jurisdiction identified
 - a. First responders arrive at scene to ensure public safety (fire, police)
 - b. Identification of communication liaison
 - i. Communication to victims
 - ii. Comm to families of victims
 - iii. Comm to community
 - iv. Briefing for elected officials (unofficial liaison but most likely)
 - c. Physical crisis response occurs
 - i. American Red Cross
 - ii. SERDSTF
 - iii. EMT
 - iv. Communication to public hospital system for all incidents.
 - d. Mental/behavioral health crisis response team engaged and deployed
 - i. Florida Crisis Response Team
 - ii. BBHC/HOPE teams
 - e. Appropriate ESF deployed as needed
 - i. Local resources include CERT
2. Opening of the local jurisdiction resiliency/reunification center
 - a. Broadly communicate to community that all resources/information will be at the RC.
 - b. LTRC and other BTC partners deploy to RC as appropriate
 - i. Clothing
 - ii. Food
 - iii. Furniture
 - iv. Employment
 - v. Financial Assistance
 - vi. Housing
 - vii. Legal Assistance
 - viii. Medical Services
 - ix. Mental Health Services
 - x. Spiritual Care
3. On-going communication between victims and LTRC/BTC regarding available resources
 - i. List of trauma trained clinicians to be disseminated to all appropriate partners (to be created). List will include nonprofit and for-profit service providers.
4. Post incident resource fair scheduled; to be managed by local jurisdiction with support from LTRC/BTC/CCB/community partners as needed.
 - i. Clothing
 - ii. Food
 - iii. Furniture
 - iv. Employment

- v. Financial Assistance
- vi. Housing
- vii. Legal Assistance
- viii. Medical Services
- ix. Mental Health Services
- x. Spiritual Care

H. National Police Foundation Recommendations

As part of the Broward County After-Action Task Force, Broward County retained the National Police Foundation. See Chapter 7(C). In addressing resiliency preparation and after-event deployment mental health trauma resources, the NPF made a number of detailed Recommendations in the section of their report titled “Recovery and Resiliency”.

While the NPF draft report was not provided to this Task Force until August 7, 2019 and the Task Force has not had sufficient time to fully evaluate and come to consensus on the recommendations (or provide further refinement), because many of the NPF Recommendations actually reflect themes and discussions addressed by the Task Force over the past year, those NPF Recommendations which impact Chapter 6 are being restated in full:

Finding 4.1: Broward County, municipal elected and other government officials, businesses, and community-based organizations were able to leverage existing relationships to establish a Family Reunification Center (FRC) and provide other locations for students to be reunited with family members.

4.1.1 Broward County and municipal government officials should work with appropriate facilities to establish memoranda of understanding or more formalized agreements to establish an FRC in accordance with best practices.

Finding 4.2: Increased, regular communication with families awaiting reunification or notification may have helped to ease the chaotic environment at the FRC.

4.2.1 Law enforcement officials or victim advocates should provide regular updates of information to individuals awaiting reunification at the FRC.

Finding 4.3: The initial mental health response to the MSD shooting was uncoordinated.

4.3.1 Broward County and municipal government officials, community-based organizations, and other relevant stakeholders should partner to develop a Community Mental Health Coordination and Preparedness Plan.

4.3.2 Law enforcement and first responder agencies should designate a mental health incident commander as soon as possible and practical following a mass violence event such as the response to the MSD shooting.

4.3.3 Broward County should include post-event victim and witness, first responder, and relevant stakeholder welfare as an integral part of interagency planning, training, and exercises.

Finding 4.4: The short- and long-term actions following a traumatic event can impact recovery, resilience, and mental health outcomes for the individual and community.

4.4.1 Mental health workers deployed immediately following trauma should be trained in psychological first aid to address the immediate needs of the individual and community.

4.4.2 In accordance with psychological first aid principles, immediately following trauma, provide supportive interventions that establish human contact,

provide a safe environment, meet survivors' immediate needs, offer practical assistance, recognize concerning reactions, and refer individuals to social support networks, services, and recovery services as appropriate.

- 4.4.3 Multiple forms of trauma and mental health services and counseling should be available as soon, and for as long, as possible.

Finding 4.5: Some Broward County law enforcement and fire/EMS agencies collaborated to offer mental health debriefings following the response to the MSD shooting.

- 4.5.1 Broward County law enforcement and fire/EMS agencies should consider creating teams trained in CISD (Critical Incident Stress Debriefings), CISM (Critical Incident Stress Management), or peer support.
- 4.5.2 Vetting and special training for clinicians providing specialized counseling services to law enforcement personnel can help to better meet personnel needs.
- 4.5.3 The leadership of any organizations involved in a critical incident should ensure that all personnel feel valued and are provided access to the physical and mental health resources they may need afterwards.

Finding 4.6: Long-term planning is essential to support victim and witness, first responder, and relevant stakeholder welfare following traumatic events.

- 4.6.1 Broward County should consider follow-up counseling for impacted individuals, as it is not unusual for post-traumatic stress to manifest itself several weeks or months after an event.
- 4.6.2 Broward County should have an independent third party conduct an analysis of the current mental health resources being provided to MSD students, staff, and families; first responders; and, relevant stakeholders who were involved in the MSD shooting to identify ways to continue to support the victims and survivors—and the families—of the attack and the entire community.
- 4.6.3 Broward County should develop a collaborative multi-agency/multi-disciplinary community resilience plan
- 4.6.4 Broward County officials should work with the BCPS to identify at-risk populations—those that directly experienced or witnessed the event, lost an individual they cared about, have prior experience with trauma, or a related psychiatric or medical condition—and provide them with special attention for support services.
- 4.6.5 Broward County should encourage support groups for those with common experiences.
- 4.6.6 Law enforcement and fire/EMS agencies in Broward County should develop comprehensive safety and wellness plans that address aspects of physical, mental, and emotional well-being.

Finding 4.7: Law enforcement personnel in Broward County, and most probably other first responders, continue to be challenged by the MSD shooting and request mental health services.

- 4.7.1 The NPF assessment team strongly encourages an independent third-party review and assessment to survey, interview, hold focus groups and gather information about the brain health and well-being of all first responders in Broward County, particularly those impacted by this incident.

Notably, the NPF outlined some of the stakeholders who would need to be involved in development and implementation of the recommendations.

This Task Force gave robust discussion to the idea of a “Mental Health Incident Commander” which could be involved not only at the County Emergency Operations Center, but who would interact with municipalities who initiate their own EOC operations. A coordinated pre-event and post-event deployment of mental health resources is an absolute necessity. How that is best accomplished and in what model will be the subject of additional analysis and discussion.

CHAPTER 7: COMMUNITY BASED SAFETY ISSUES

A wide variety of the areas discussed above obviously impact community based public safety and should be considered beyond the scope of schools.²⁶ Additional areas of public safety were identified:

A. Public Access To Bleeding Control Kits for Schools and Community

As outlined in the Initial Report, the Task Force made recommendations regarding access to “Stop the Bleed” kits. Since the Initial Report, bleeding control kits are in all locations throughout schools in Coral Springs, Parkland, Sunrise and perhaps other cities as required by respective ordinances or through a public safety plan. The “Stop the Bleed” program and training for Broward County Public Schools is on-going. As of now, 12,000 teachers have been trained.

According to BSO, it has purchased 12,000 additional “Stop the Bleed” kits utilizing \$1 million grant funding. BSO will be working with BCPS to install these kits at every AED device throughout all schools. As noted above, in some municipalities all AED kits in schools presently include “Stop the Bleed” kits as well. Further, BSO will collaborate with BCPS to develop a training model to deliver more robust professional development to all staff at schools during the fall. While training is rolled out, BSO has indicated the additional kits will still provide benefit to first responders at schools.

Memorial Regional and Broward Health have developed and are administering a “stop the bleed” coalition to efficiently deploy equipment and training throughout the county and the region. Additionally, they have created the registration website <https://browardcountystopthebleedtraining.as.me/>. This program is being delivered countywide by fire and police departments, Memorial Regional Hospital and Broward Health nurses, and staff countywide. The nurses and ER teams from these hospitals are going to the schools each and every week alongside members from the respective fire department in the schools jurisdiction.

B. E911 and Regional Public Safety Communications

During the MSD massacre, there were reportedly issues related to E911 calls and radio interoperability. The issues surrounding the specifics of that event are the subject of detailed expert analysis being performed by the National Police Foundation as a consultants hired by Broward County for the Broward County After Action Task Force (Ex. 40; 41; and 42) and The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission MSD Commission. Therefore, the Task Force was not in the best position during the Initial Report to address any of the specific concerns. However, from the discussions to date a number of issues were identified and remain relevant today:

- The current radio system for public safety communications is beyond end of life capacity. Upgrades to that radio system have been initiated by Broward County and the municipal partners. However, the necessary upgrades have not come quick enough. Off-loading of non-public safety subscribers has occurred. Siting of towers and purchase of new radios and training must be expedited;

²⁶ Other than the issue of universal background checks (see, Chapter 7(D)), the Task Force did not address other gun safety strategies as this is left to individual advocacy and other groups. The statistics involving gun violence throughout the United States, the deaths and injuries caused by gun violence, suicide with firearms, and the after-effects of gun violence and suicides on the community, including children and families, must receive dedicated attention locally, statewide and nationally.

- The Task Force learned that a phenomenon known as “throttling” occurred at both the Fort Lauderdale Airport Shooting in January 2017 and at MSD on February 14, 2018.²⁷ This occurs when too many radios are attempting to utilize the system at one time. Post-MSD law enforcement has been informed that the act of turning on the radio or switching channels, even if not at the critical incident scene, is the equivalent of a “push to talk”. Additionally, it is believed that the fact that school board busses and local government radios were on the system added to further strain in the morning and afternoons;
- Additionally, the Task Force learned that there are substantial challenges communicating inside schools, as well as other public buildings, as a result of the hardened construction. Radio communications are unable to penetrate. As a result, public safety professionals have difficulty communicating during even routine incidents inside many existing schools and public buildings. Newer buildings must include solutions to provide for adequate radio penetration. Having clear and effective radio communication in each school is essential for all first responders and the inability to communicate can be dangerous to the responder and limit ability to provide care and protection to students in a time of need. The solution is the introduction of “bi-directional antennae” and other technologies. This requires an investment of financial resources and expert analysis;
- Finally, it was noted the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association and the Fire Chiefs of Broward County Association have issued a joint letter requesting that Broward County appoint a Director of Public Safety Communications²⁸ and a permanent Public Safety Communications Advisory Board, comprised of stakeholders, to provide transparency and guidance to the Board of County Commission. The Broward County Consolidated Communications Committee, comprised of stakeholders, was sunset in 2018.

(1) Radio System and Towers

With respect to the radio system and towers, according to Broward County

- The new P25 Public Safety Radio System is nearing completion. All user agencies within Broward have procured their handheld and vehicle radios;
- Construction has been completed on 6 sites. All remaining sites, with one exception, are in various phases of construction and equipment installation;
- As to the remaining site, a third-party consultant is reviewing County-owned West Lake Park (preferred by Broward County) and the top of the CIRC Hotel (preferred by City of Hollywood) for a tower that will fill a gap in coverage for residents in portions of Hollywood, Hallandale Beach and Dania Beach. Site visits and feasibility studies are underway. A binding decision will be rendered in August for this final site.

²⁷ The County Director takes exception to the word “phenomenon”, explaining that when the system throttles, it is a protective mode to stop too much traffic. Either way, according to the public safety personnel in the field, if public safety personnel cannot communicate because of throttling, that event is a failure in so far as the radio is not working.

²⁸ The County would note they hired an experienced professional with background in dispatching and fire operations to be the Director. However, even some time after that hire, both the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association and the Fire Chiefs’ Association of Broward County persisted in requesting structural changes to ORCAT and the relationship with the E911 Regional Communications System. This has been a topic of intense discussion at the MSD Commission.

(2) Local Government Radio System

In the aftermath of the MSD tragedy and based upon information gathered, the Initial Report highlighted a series of recommendations, including the removal of school bus radios and all local government radios from the public safety system immediately, or as rapidly as possible. In essence, the Task Force was calling for an expedited effort to implement what had already begun.

Broward County and the BCPS Board and staff committed to remove the school bus radios and have the local government radio system operational by the start of the 2019/20 school year. On September 5, 2018, the School Board of Broward County approved \$4.5 million in capital funding to initiate a radio system migration and enhancement project. This project included two distinct work streams. The first phase of the project included the migration of the District's bus and other non-emergency radio traffic off of Broward County's existing public safety radio system and on to the newly developed local government radio system. BCPS committed to completing this migration, in accordance with the Task Force's recommendation, by the start of the 2019/20 school year (August 14, 2019). Key milestones in the project included the purchase, programming and installation of new radios for 1,367 school buses, four dispatch control stations, 14 fleet maintenance vehicles, and 314 two-way hand held portable radios.

It was recently announced that migration of roughly 4,000 local government radios off public safety system on to a local government radio system was completed. As outlined by the County, "[t]he migration includes approximately 2,000 School District users (primarily bus operators) and roughly 2,000 users from 17 County agencies including Aviation, Port Everglades, Parks and Recreation and Water & Wastewater Services." The effort included "delivery and programming of the radios, installation of the control station, radio testing, installation and training." The County has also committed "monitor performance in the weeks following August 14, the first day of school, and provide additional testing and modifications, if necessary, to optimize coverage."

While this effort will not guarantee radio system problems will be eliminated during or in the aftermath of future mass events, it is a positive and significant step forward. The implementation of the new county-wide radio system and installation of the new towers is a critical component to ensure better communications because the current system is at "end-of-life". Those efforts continue. In addition, a collaborative training effort intended to better manage radio usage so as to mitigate communication challenges during mass events was implemented amongst all municipalities, first responders and the County.

(3) Radio Penetration in Government Buildings

As outlined in the initial report, there continue to be substantial challenges communicating via public safety radios in many school, government and hospital buildings. Radio penetration remains a costly challenge.

With respect to schools, the BCPS reported that Phase II of their radio project was the purchase and distribution of more than 1,200 additional radios and repeaters to enhance the existing local radio networks at all schools. The additional radios are intended to be utilized to augment the existing intercom communication systems within schools. With the additional radios, staff now has the ability to communicate (specifically in emergency situations) in areas of the school outside the coverage of the intercom system (e.g., bus and student drop-off drives, playgrounds, outside courtyards, etc.)

Local governments continue to struggle with strategies. Some include potential mobile repeaters for site specific emergency responses. As was noted in the Initial Report, the costs associated with finding solutions are extraordinary and mitigation strategies must be implemented.

(4) Text-to-911

There was an identified need to implement a Text-to-911 system for events involving the hearing impaired as well as where communication through traditional emergency 911 calls is impractical or dangerous.

The Task Force received the following update from Broward County related to the rollout of Text-to-911 in the Regional Communications System:

- The Text-to-911 program has been operational since December of 2018 but was not announced to the public as an option to seek assistance until April 2, 2019;
- The time from December until April allowed operators to be trained and the proverbial bugs to be worked out of the system which has led to a very smooth and issue free roll out to the public;
- The Regional Communications System has found no issues that have impeded the success of the initiative and have been very satisfied with it and the results;
- From April 2, 2019 thru June 9, 2019 they have received 608 text contacts to the centers with about 25% of them from individuals that were just “testing” the process to see if it really worked as they were skeptical or from the vendor doing testing and another 45% were people “accidentally” texting 911 and the remaining texts were legitimate;
- The public appears to be utilizing the new process as it was intended and for the most part have refrained from reporting non-emergency incidents and/or calling when they can;
- The Regional Communications System has received texts during true domestic violence situations; from a someone barricaded in a bedroom out of fear of family violence, where law enforcement were able to intervene without incident; and, from a suicidal subject in another state, where the contact was referred to that jurisdiction and the individual was successfully contacted and directed to mental health assistance;
- The current downside associated with cell-phone technology is the inability to geo-locate automatically and precisely. This is an industry-wide problem that has received national and international attention and criticism. The only location a Text-to-911 contact can be narrowed down to is the last tower the signal utilized;
- The marketing campaign to raise awareness of availability and limitations focuses on “Remember: Call If You Can; Text Only if You Can’t.”

Limitations and things to know regarding “Text-to-911”:

- Callers must know their exact location as cell phones do not provide that information to the 911 system;
- Cell phone providers only offer text messaging as a "best efforts service;" delivery of text messages are not guaranteed, can be delayed by the carrier and may not be received in a timely manner;
- Callers can NOT send photos, videos or emojis;
- Callers must keep text messages plain and easy to understand - no slang or abbreviations;
- Texts to 911 have a 160 character limit for a single text;
- The Text-to-911 system currently processes texts in English; language translation is not available at this time;
- Callers must have text messaging included on their wireless phone plan;
- If texting to 911 is not available, the phone carrier will send a message requesting that the caller make a voice call to 911;
- Text-to-911 is not a social media app. It is to be used for EMERGENCIES only;
- Misuse of 911 can result in criminal charges, fines and jail time.

(5) Friction Between Public Safety Agencies and Broward County’s Office of Regional Communications and Technology

As outlined in the Initial Report, there has been a sustained and persistent source of friction between public safety experts and Broward County’s 911 technology division (“ORCAT”). The culmination of this friction was the issuance of a rare joint letter from the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association and Broward County Fire Chiefs’ Association demanding organizational changes. This joint letter was the subject of the Initial Report and recommendations related thereto.

Since then, the MSD Commission has also taken testimony related to this friction and the impact on operations. The MSD Commission continues to take additional testimony in this regard.

Recently, a letter from the County Administrator to the Chiefs set forth relationship and procedural changes being implemented. (Ex. 49). This is a matter worthy of continued attention from the Task Force, the Broward League of Cities and the community.

C. Broward County MSD After Action Task Force

In April 2018, Broward County, under the guidance of the Broward County MSD After-Action Task Force, contracted the National Police Foundation (NPF) to conduct an independent after-action review (AAR) of the MSD incident.²⁹ According to the NPF, “[t]his step provides a critical

²⁹ According to NPF,

[t]he mission of the Police Foundation is to advance policing through innovation and science. It was established in 1970 by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and its work over almost five decades has proven to be a catalyst for significant changes in policing over the years. The Foundation relies on scientific evidence to address some of the most rudimentary and complex issues in the criminal justice system and on innovation to develop effective solutions rooted in its research or that of others. The Police Foundation’s work over the years has enlightened scholars and practitioners alike, serving both as a model for systematic examination of real-world challenges and a stimulus for dialogue among the police, policy makers, scholars, the public, and the media. In large part, that ongoing dialogue has been responsible for the generation of new ideas for

opportunity for public safety agencies in Broward County to learn, collaborate, and improve the emergency communications systems, processes and procedures to best protect their community.” The goal of the AAR was to “examine public safety preparedness and response to the mass shooting incident, school safety and security, mental health services, as well as community and first responder recovery and resiliency following the event.”

As noted by the NPF:

The NPF team is also positioned to offer hands-on technical assistance to Broward County, outside of and beyond the existing contract, to help position them as a leader in initiating and managing the change recommended in these critical areas. Technical assistance may include:

- Developing and/or updating relevant training curricula;
- Developing template interagency protocols, tabletop and traditional exercises;
- Creating and negotiating Memoranda of Understanding/Contract templates;
- Developing new/updated resiliency and recovery plans for manmade and natural disasters;
- Assisting in putting coordination plans in place;
- Recommending enhanced policies and processes for critical incidents;
- Assisting in developing coordinated emergency media strategy.

In January 2019, at the request of Broward County administrators, NPF issued an interim report and recommendations related to emergency communications during and after the MSD event. (Ex.40). Captioned as “Regional Public Safety Communications in Broward County; A National Police Foundation Interim Review of the Impact of Communications Systems and Processes on the Response to the February 14, 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting”, NPF issued a number of recommendations focused on emergency communications.

After the issuance of the Interim Report related to emergency communications, the NPF identified a number of areas which had not been analyzed and which were not part of the budget. These items, referred to as the gap analysis were as follows:

1. Leadership, Coordination, and Command and Control –Various public safety organizations responding to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting were not prepared for or able to cohesively work together during the response to this incident of mass violence. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving leadership relationships, situational and resource awareness, regional joint training and exercises, and use and fidelity to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) practices and protocols.

2. Community Resilience and Recovery –The County and its partners could improve support and response to the community(ies) involved in and affected by the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School both during and following the incident. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for

research and practice. The Police Foundation is non-profit, non-partisan, and independent, and it is not a membership organization.

See, <https://www.policefoundation.org/about/history/>. The Police Foundation has performed after-action analyses involving a number of mass-shooting incidents, including the Pulse Nightclub massacre in Orlando, Florida.

improving preparation and training, communication with students and parents during the incident, and coordination with other governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide services following the incident, as well as other identified themes.

3. Broward County Public Schools and Law Enforcement Relations and Coordination – The interaction, coordination and cooperation of Broward County Public Schools and regional law enforcement and public safety entities, as well as the systems between the two that impact response to incidents of mass violence have not yet been fully reviewed. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving systems, processes and coordination between Broward County schools and local public safety organizations, including the school resource officer/deputy program, to strengthen the safety and response to those school communities.

4. Fire/EMS Response and Coordination with Law Enforcement – The nexus between fire and EMS coordination with law enforcement during the response to the MSDHS shooting has also not yet been fully assessed. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving the systems, protocols, collaboration, coordination, training, and exercises to improve fire, ems and law enforcement joint responses to mass violence and other emergency incidents that cross jurisdictional lines in the Broward County region.

5. First Responder Safety and Wellness – First responder safety and wellness during and after the incident of mass violence must be more fully evaluated. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving systems, policies, procedures and protocols designed to keep first responders safe and prioritizes their well-being during and after an incidence of mass violence.

6. Public Information – No assessment has been completed on the way in which Broward County partner organizational systems worked in tandem to keep the community apprised of accurate, appropriate and timely information throughout and following the incident. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving notification processes and systems, interaction with the Unified Command Post, and use of various media platforms to communicate with the community.

7. School Security, Training, Communications, and Equipment – School security, training, communications, and equipment should be thoroughly evaluated. The NPF Team will deliver a report that includes an assessment of and recommendations for improving the safety and security of Broward County Schools.

(Ex. 41). The County then expanded the scope of NPF's assignment.

This past week, NPF issued their report “Recovering and Moving Forward” in July 2019, and focused on the following areas:

- Broward County Governance and Roles and Responsibilities;
- Command Coordination, Structure, and Leadership;
- Communication and Public Information;
- Recovery and Resilience.

The July 2019 report contains a number of specific recommendations. (Ex. 42). The After-Action Task Force is expected to address the Report at the next meeting.

The Task Force strongly recommends that the NPF recommendations being given widespread attention. A number of NPF recommendations reflect identical concerns raised by the Task Force.

D. Universal and Mandatory Background Checks for All Firearm Sales

Florida law requires a FDLE background check involving the purchase of firearms if being purchased from a licensed firearm dealer. Fla. Stat. 790.065 et. seq. The FDLE background check is intended to capture those individuals who are prohibited from purchasing a firearm, for among reasons, because of the entry of a RPO.

However, Florida law has well-known loophole involving purchase of firearms. If the sale is involving a private sale, there is legal requirement that the seller conduct a FDLE background check prior to the sale.

As outlined in Chapter 2(A)(1), Florida law enacted after the MSD tragedy now allows law enforcement to petition a court for an order prohibiting an individual who is a danger to themselves or others from possessing a firearm. RPOs are entered into the FDLE database as a prohibition against the purchase of firearms within 24 hours of execution by a court. However, even where law enforcement has initiated a detailed investigation, petitioned a court for entry of a RPO, a receiving court conducts a full hearings and subsequently orders that a respondent should be barred from possessing, including the purchase of a firearm, the person prohibited by court order can still evade detection if attempting to purchase the firearm through a private sale.

The Task Force recognizes the great potential benefit of the RPO law. Given the glaring loophole, particularly as it relates to individuals who a court has determined is a danger to themselves or others (perhaps based upon specific threats or being in crisis) and should be prohibited from possessing a firearm, the Task Force members who participated in the drafting of this Updated Report and Recommendation recommend the Florida Legislature adopt universal and mandatory background checks on all firearm sales. There is no other method to ensure that those who have been adjudicated as prohibited from possessing a firearm are barred from purchasing through an otherwise legal process for sale and purchase.³⁰

³⁰ It is acknowledged that a respondent subject to a RPO could still purchase through the illegal market. However, given the prevalence of legal sales through on-line advertising and gun shows which do not require background checks, implementing a mandatory background check for all gun sales would serve as an impediment for most respondents. Admittedly, it will not prevent the outright illegal purchase through criminal networks.

June 4, 2018 CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS UPDATED AUGUST 13, 2019

The Recommendations from the Taskforce are based upon consensus, unless otherwise noted. The Task Force attempted as best as possible to categorize the Recommendations as follows:

- Immediate:** Recommendations that with little resources and time which should be implemented.
- Near Term:** These are Recommendations which, in the opinion of the Task Force, are achievable in 3 months to one year, with a focus on collaboration and/or budgeting.
- Mid-Term:** These are Recommendations which may take longer due to the need for policy and law changes, or more significant funding and advocacy.
- Legislative:** These are Recommendations which are perceived as more difficult either due to current legal impediments and/or very significant funding required from partners outside the local community.

These categorizations do not implicitly diminish or increase the priorities to begin efforts, but rather reflect pragmatic concerns. Where possible, the Task Force has indicated prioritization even if the efforts to implement seem or are more significant than that which can be implemented immediately.

Finally, Recommendations pertaining to new School Board policies or changes to existing policies will require review and ratification by the Broward County School Board. Additionally, some proposed changes to procedures or protocols may require further review by the School Board.

CHAPTER 3: SAFETY OF SCHOOLS BASED UPON INFRASTRUCTURE, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES

At the outset, the Task Force acknowledges that as a place of learning and a community hub it may not be possible to make every school facility “a fortress” or prevent all potential acts of violence. The Task Force was seeking to propose Recommendations to enhance the layers of security that could be employed to maximize safety and the ability to rapidly respond to a crisis.

Immediate Implementation:

1. Enforce existing safety and security policies and procedures must be adhered to, with consequences for failing to comply.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *Annually, the Office of School Performance & Accountability conducts operational meetings with all school-based leadership prior to the start of a new school year. Prior to the start of the 2018/19 and 2019/20, safety and security protocols are an emphasized item on the agenda. School-based leadership are reminded of the strict requirement to comply with all existing and newly implemented safety and security procedures, with applicable accountability in the event of noncompliance. These expectations are further issued in writing to all school-based leaders as part*

of the distribution of meeting highlights. School staff are expected to prioritize enhanced safety and security protocols implemented during the last eighteen months. Disciplinary action for non-compliance occurs when appropriate.

The Task Force notes that this is a recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement.

2. Install windows covering on door to conceal kids in schools
 - * Current protocol in code yellow and code red situations are to cover the window in some fashion. Some schools use construction paper or other covering. It has been recommended to utilize a magnetic covering that requires less time to implement. However, many classroom doors are made of wood and magnets will not work without metal strips introduced.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *it remains protocol to cover door windows during a code lockdown. Schools continue to elicit more effective ways to cover the window (e.g., magnetic coverings); however, there has been no solution systemically implemented throughout the entire District. Schools have been directed to ensure all door windows have an acceptable cover during the week staff returns and prior to the first day of school.*

The Task Force notes that without a systemic solution throughout the district and an audit/enforcement protocol, this Recommendation still needs to be fully implemented and is outstanding.

3. SAFE Team should (a) include Head Facilities person; (b) if schools have other “security” staff (such as campus monitors and security specialists) those staff should also be part of the SAFE Team; (c) ensure First Aid Coordinator has formal first aid training.
 - * BCPS notes that the Head Facilities Service Person serves on most SAFE Teams as the Facility and Material Coordinator.
 - * BCPS believes Security Specialists and Campus Monitors serve on the Team even if they do not have a designated role but should be participating in the process.
 - * However, BCPS agrees with reinforcing both of these recommendations.
 - * BCPS agrees that, while logic would command that the First Aid Coordinator have qualifying training, it is not presently required that a principal designate someone with such training. Therefore, BCPS agrees First Aid Coordinator should have first aid training.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *School SAFE Teams continue to have the Head Facilities person designated as the Facility and Materials Coordinator. In consideration of the additional funding generated from the passing of the recent referendum, all schools will now have Campus Monitors and/or Security Specialists assigned for the 2019/20 school year. These new positions will be added to the SAFE Teams. The First Aid Coordinator on the School SAFE Team is the school nurse (for schools that have a nurse on campus) or the individual designated to coordinate the school clinic. All schools have two staff members on campus identified to participate in various first aid trainings offered. This includes CPR, AED, and “stop the bleed” kits. The*

First Aid Coordinator is tasked with coordinating these trained individuals in an emergency situation to deliver first aid as warranted and serve as a liaison with first responders who may respond to a medical emergency on campus.

4. School safety plans should be updated by the Schools in the first month of school which should be delivered to municipal law enforcement and fire who should acknowledge the review
 - * Currently, each school has until November to update the school safety plan and implement during Winter Break.
 - * The District believes policy adjustments could accomplish this recommendation.
 - * It is noted that municipalities have no authority to recommend changes, nor are they in a position to sign-off on the adequacy. This is a responsibility of the District and SIU. Legal implications of requiring municipal acknowledgement and sign off must be considered.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE AND IN-PROGRESS: *Prior to the start of the 2018/19 school year, the District's procedures were modified to require all updates to the school safety plan be completed by the end of August. BCPS is also looking to procure a new software platform for the purpose of developing school safety plans, risk assessments and emergency drills. The new platform provides "best practice" templates for developing safety plans and centralizes monitoring of these documents/processes for accountability purposes.*

5. All classroom doors must remain locked at all times (as the current doors only lock from the hallway, not from inside of classroom)
 - * Current protocol requires classroom doors to remain locked at all times. There is the possibility to install door hardware where the outside of the door is always locked automatically (to eliminate human error) and the inside is always unlocked to allow occupants to exit. This hardware could be adopted as part of the District's design criteria for new installation, but would require funding to exchange all current door hardware throughout the District.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS: *It remains current protocol that all classroom doors remain locked at all times. This protocol was codified into policy on February 20, 2019, when the School Board adopted its new policy on Safer Spaces. Specifically, Policy 2150 mandates, "All classroom doors must be locked at all times. All staff must refrain from using objects to "prop" doors open during instructional time." Additionally, the District has required all classroom doors that are part of the new capacity replacement projects within the SMART Program include the door hardware where the door is always locked from the outside but is always unlocked from the inside to allow egress. The District is in the process of including the new door hardware specifications within its design criteria, which will ensure any door hardware replacement in the future include this style of hardware. Finally, school-based administration has been directed to ensure all substitutes are provided a key to classrooms, substitutes are oriented to the policy requirement to maintain locked classroom doors, and the school has a process for key "check-out" and "check-in" at the end of the day.*

The Task Force notes that this is a recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement.

6. Consider and implement a policy preventing visitor access to the interior of the campus while students are changing classes.

- * The District indicated this recommendation is worth considering; there is a need to assess impact with principals and District staff.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS NOT IMPLEMENTED:

This recommendation has not been implemented. Finalizing the Single Point of Entry projects at schools, combined with enhancing the protocols associated with visitor access to the campus has been this year's priority.

7. School staff should hold mandatory safety meeting to discuss all critical incidents (codes) within the preplanning (week before school starts)

- * All staff are trained annually on emergency code responses. The District is currently exploring the feasibility to conduct all training within the preplanning period. This will require additional trainers. Additionally, including local law and fire agencies should be implemented.

- * BCPS could provide a powerpoint or Brainshark for administration to show school staff during pre-planning week, as is done for child abuse training.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE:

The Emergency Codes procedures and training documents have been placed on Canvas, the District's electronic learning management system. Principals now have the ability to review this information with staff during the pre-planning week prior to the first day of school.

8. Currently, schools are required to hold two fire drills and one tornado drill with staff and students within the first month; the two fire drills within the first month are required by Fire Code. It is recommended that within the first two weeks of school, schools should instead practice a fire drill, tornado drill, and lockdown drill (with SRO participation).

- * The District agrees. This first lockdown drill may not be able to be supervised by SIU staff, but school administration can oversee the drill, as they do with other drills conducted on campus.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE:

Beginning in 2018/19, BCPS was legislatively mandated to conduct drills for active shooter and hostage situations at least as often as other emergency drills. Recognizing the Fire Code requires two fire drills within the same month, this frequency was also adopted for conducting Code Red drills, because a Code Red lockdown is the District's response to an active shooter on campus. During the 2018/19 school year, schools conducted 2,350 Code Red drills.

9. Schools must hold a critical incident (or Code Red) drill every semester.
- * The District notes that the Fire Code requires a fire drill each month. The Florida Department of Education has provided guidance that a critical incident drill must be conducted each semester. However, SB 7026 requires active shooter as frequent as other drills, which would mean every month. According to BCPS, the Florida Department of Education has been consulted and has provided guidance that active shooter drills should be conducted one time each semester.
 - * The Task Force noted that Active Shooter is designed to include discharge of blank rounds to simulate live rounds (in a different room).
 - * This not performed with students currently and such was not recommended.
 - * It is noted that while the professional recommendations to include the discharge of the blanks to simulate the sounds of live rounds, there are concerns related to impact on some staff. Therefore, support services before and after are strongly recommended.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE AND IN-PROGRESS: *Beginning in 2018/19, BCPS was legislatively mandated to conduct drills for active shooter and hostage situations at least as often as other emergency drills. Recognizing the District's response to an active shooter on campus is a Code Red lockdown, the District required Code Red drills to be conducted as frequently as fire drills. During the 2018/19 school year, schools conducted 2,350 Code Red drills. Additionally, the District introduced the enhanced Active Killer (AK) training to the secondary schools beginning in 2018/19. AK is the 4-hour enhanced active shooter training that was developed and is delivered in collaboration with local law enforcement on teacher planning days. Last year, this training was provided to 55 middle and high schools.*

10. Maintain current practice of having Broward SIU monitor/supervise at least one of these incident drills per school year AND review critical incidents training with staff

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *this remains practice. However, the need to deploy the SIU detectives to serve as Safe-School Officers in the absence of an SRO or guardian has significantly impacted SIU's ability to consistently oversee code drills at schools.*

The Task Force maintains this is as a Recommendation notwithstanding the strain of resources as a result of BCPS' position related to SRO and guardian program.

11. Schools are required to post fire drill/evacuation maps in all classroom, with "safe spaces" or "designated spaces" for lockdown drills, or indicate with tape or sign (some safe harbor spaces are closets/restrooms) that are not cluttered or impassable.
- * Importantly, the Task Force noted there may not be a true "safe spaces" in each classroom. Wall construction/materials do not guarantee impenetrability or full guaranteed "safe space."
 - * However, staff could identify a designated area in some fashion so during an actual emergency students and staff have a visual aid that corresponds to the training. In some cases, that may be a Plan A and a Plan B area, depending on the threat.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NEARLY COMPLETE:

On February 20, 2019, the School Board of Broward County adopted Policy 2150, Safer Spaces. A Safer Space (also referred to as a Hard Corner) is a designated general location where students and staff can more effectively position themselves in a manner where they are not visible from a hallway or outside door or window, in an effort to reduce the risk associated with an active shooter. Safer Spaces are NOT intended to suggest a specific level of security or absolute safety of students, staff and visitors in all emergency situations and are closely associated with the construction of the building. Additionally, Safer Spaces are NOT intended to convey specific levels of ballistic or blast protection. The Policy stipulates the manner with which Safer Spaces will be identified (when permissible) in classrooms, marked with standardized visual designators, mandates the designated spaces will remain free from objects interfering with their use in emergencies, and requires periodic inspections of the spaces to ensure compliance with the policy.

BCPS is implementing the Safer Spaces policy in two phases. The first phase was to have school-based staff identify and mark the Safer Space within all classrooms where there is a single entry point and the absence of windows on the first floor. This phase yielded the identification of nearly 3,000 Safer Spaces within classrooms throughout the District. The second phase involves teams of Special Investigative Unit (SIU) detectives and District fire inspectors visiting each school to assess the remaining classrooms and identifying any additional Safer Spaces within classrooms. This two-phased approach became necessary because additional expertise was needed to evaluate more “complex” classrooms, where there are multiple entry points or first floor windows to determine whether there is an opportunity to identify a Safer Space. At the time of this updated report, these teams had assessed 173 schools, and identified an additional 3,695 classrooms where Safer Spaces could be designated. By August 14, 2019, all schools and classrooms will have been assessed for the purpose of identifying and designating Safer Spaces. All identified Safer Spaces are designated with a standard graphic image.

12. All Drill and Code information must be given to all substitutes, so they know what to do in case of emergency. Additionally, substitute teachers should have the same key access as regular teachers.
 - * The District agrees.
 - * As noted by the District, on any given day more than 10% of the teaching staff may be made up of substitutes.
 - * Adding training for active shooter training for substitute teachers is recommended. This may be developed on line with certification of annual training.
 - * It was noted that some of the training is site specific and substitute teachers could be assigned anywhere in the district. As a result, standardized process for providing site specific cues is necessary.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *The District has developed specific training documents specifically for substitute teachers. These documents are reviewed during new substitute orientation, have been included on Canvas (the District’s electronic learning management system), and abbreviated training aides*

on the District's Emergency Code policy and protocols have been provided to all schools to share with substitutes and visitors. Additionally, school-based administration has been directed to ensure all substitutes are provided a key to classrooms, substitutes are oriented to the policy requirement to maintain locked classroom doors, and the school has a process for key "check-out" and "check-in" at the end of the day.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

13. Ensure Broward Schools Police (SIU) training and meetings for staff are up to date with current school safety practices/procedures and the same message is delivered to all schools. (e.g., when fire alarm goes off, should staff wait for direction from admin on intercom before evacuating?)

- * The District is in the process of retaining an independent security consultant. Part of the scope of work includes reviewing the District's current emergency code training and making recommendations for enhancement.

- * It was recommended that the scope of work should look at technology advancements. For instance, technology exists related to "preemption" fire alarm processes whereby when a fire alarm is initiated, a silent alarm goes to a central monitor to evaluate before the alarm is heard throughout the respective building. Once evaluated, by camera or otherwise, if see smoke is seen or any other reason for evacuation, the sound alarm is initiated. Further technology is available to prevent the entire campus from being evacuated, allowing a focal evacuation.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: IN PROGRESS: *The District's Emergency Code training documents were updated prior to the start of the 2018/19 school year to specifically emphasize two issues: during a Code Red lockdown, do not evacuate in the event the fire alarm goes off unless the threat of fire is imminent; and all staff are expected to initiate a Code red if they determine there is a threat. Additionally, the School Board adopted a new policy on February 20, 2019, to affirm its existing protocols on emergency codes and protocols. Policy 2120: EMERGENCY CODES PREVENTION & PREPAREDNESS specifically mandates:*

"Any staff member must take appropriate action(s), including initiating a Code Red Lockdown, on a school campus should they see, hear, or smell anything that may immediately impact the safety and security of any staff, students, or visitors on campus. Should a staff member initiate a Code Red which does not materialize into an actual threat, there will not be an adverse employment action." Additionally, the policy requires, "All Broward employees, volunteers, and contractors are required to report any expressed threat(s) or behavior(s) that may represent a threat to the community, school, or any individual."

The District is continuing to work with its independent security consultant to enhance the District's Emergency Code procedures and training.

14. All staff and students should wear ID badges.
- * Current practice calls for all students and staff to wear ID badges. The more practical challenge is ensuring there is verification of the badge throughout the day and after hours.
 - * It was noted that students have exchanged ID badges, for whatever reason, without being noted
 - * Additional recommendation was to include important safety information, such as Silence Hurts (BCPS anonymous hotline), suicide hotline and/or 211, on the back of the badges.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *t continues to be current practice that all students and employees wear their ID badges while on campus. On the back of all employee badges is a list of the District's emergency codes and definitions. On the back of student ID badges is the student crisis text line information. In the event a student or staff member does not have an ID badge they are issued a temporary badge for the day.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

15. STAR System Access: All visitors should have to enter front office/single point of entry and scan in to STAR system, including BCPS maintenance. Substitutes and all other visitors should either have badges or STAR stickers worn at all times.
- * This is current policy and should be a uniform practice.
 - * However, the Task Force noted that enforcement of the use of the system on vendors, who routinely have access through deliveries, will require policy and potentially contract changes to ensure access.
 - * It was also strongly recommended that the STAR system should only be administered by trained school staff, not volunteers.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *all BCPS schools will have a functional Single Point of Entry (SPE) at the beginning of the 2019/20 school year. All visitors, including vendors must access schools through the SPE. This has been reiterated to all schools, and stakeholders have been encouraged to report instances where this directive is not being enforced. Additionally, BCPS has initiated the process to seek an enhanced and more robust visitor management system.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

16. Emphasizing current policy that does not preclude any teacher/staff/administrator from initiating or alerting a code red to alert the school and law enforcement.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *On February 20, 2019, BCPS adopted a new policy to affirm its existing protocols on emergency codes and protocols. Policy 2120: EMERGENCY CODES PREVENTION & PREPAREDNESS specifically mandates, "Any staff member must take appropriate action(s), including initiating a Code Red Lockdown, on a school campus should they see, hear, or smell anything that may immediately impact the safety and security of any staff, students, or visitors on campus. Should a staff member initiate a Code Red which does not materialize into an actual threat, there will not be an adverse employment action." Additionally, the policy requires, "All Broward employees, volunteers, and contractors are required to report any expressed threat(s) or behavior(s) that may represent a threat to the community, school, or any individual."*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

17. Communication:

- * Safety and security policies and procedures with everyone on campus as well as law enforcement and fire department.
- * Follow up with the student body and families and community to let them know what security changes/improvements are being made at the school immediately, mid-term and long term.
 - * The District is in the process of retaining an independent security consultant. Part of the scope of work includes conducting public forums to share the short and long term recommendations with the community.
- * Implement meaningful back to school communication now and over the summer to keep all stakeholders informed regarding safety/security improvements.
- * Safety/Security policy sheet to be distributed to parents either before but no later than at the start of school that they can review the expectations and plans, in general.
 - * It is not expected this would include dissemination of operational security details which would compromise the security of the school.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *the District has provided direct communications from the Superintendent to parents regarding security enhancements implemented at all schools. Additionally, principals routinely send ParentLinks to parents focusing on safety and security protocols implemented on campus. Principals have been directed to issue a back-to-school newsletter advising parents of new safety and security protocols for the upcoming school year.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

18. Administrators and microtechs and SRO's should be trained on how to monitor and access video recordings at each school site

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, in conjunction with the completion of Phase I of the video surveillance camera project and the migration of all school camera systems to a digital platform with centralized monitoring, the District and its vendor (Avigilon) have provided professional development to appropriate stakeholders. SROs have been provided access codes to their schools, and the District is in the process of providing access to live feed for municipal law enforcement agencies. The District will continue to provide appropriate training during this implementation.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

19. Initiate "See Something Say Something" protocols for students, teachers and staff.
* District agrees.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, the District entered into an agreement with SaferWatch, LLC on February 5, 2019. The SaferWatch App gives students, parents, teachers or anyone in Broward County the ability to send nonemergency text, photo, video, and audio "tips" from a smartphone. On May 28, 2019, the District held a joint press conference with SaferWatch to announce the SaferWatch app had been enhanced to communicate "tips" directly to the District's Special Investigative Unit in addition to law enforcement agencies and receive real-time safety alerts directly from Broward County Public Schools and local law enforcement. This provides another opportunity, in addition to FortifyFL and the District Silence Hurts anonymous tip line, to report suspicious activities. Awareness campaigns have been launched to promote all three reporting mechanisms, including prominently displaying on the District's website.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

20. It was noted that during opening and closing times of schools, most schools have multiple entrance and exit points onto the campus and into school buildings. During these times, there was consensus that school staff must supervise the ingress/egress points of entry.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, beginning last school year, all schools were required to have all access gates closed and secured unless there was a member of staff monitoring the gate. The only exception to this requirement were select school whose campus configuration and application of the Single Point of Entry restricted access to all parts of campus without first being authorized. This requirement remains in procedure for the 2019/20 school year.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

21. All classrooms should have an intercom button and landline phone to alert school/office of critical incidents in the building. If they do not have these, they should have a radio/walkie-talkie to communicate with school/office.
- * It was noted by the District that it is expected that most classrooms in existing buildings have these features. It was agreed that a complete inventory is necessary.
 - * However, for portable classroom/buildings, it was noted that there is not likely intercom and/or landline. Therefore, it was recommended that radio or walkie-talkie communication be provided.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *The District recently purchased and distributed more than 1,200 additional radios and repeaters to enhance the existing local radio networks at all schools. The additional radios are intended to be utilized to augment the existing intercom communication systems within schools. With the additional radios, staff now has the ability to communicate (specifically in emergency situations) in areas of the school outside the coverage of the intercom system (e.g., bus and student drop-off drives, playgrounds, outside courtyards, etc.).*

22. Fencing. Conduct immediate survey of perimeter fencing and scalability.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NOT IMPLEMENTED: *The District retained the services of an independent security consultant, Safe Havens, to conduct individual risk assessments at all schools and administrative buildings, review the District's safety and security procedures and policies, and review all related training materials and documents. One aspect of the consultant's review specifically included the District's design criteria for perimeter fencing. Ultimately, the consultant did not recommend any immediate action regarding perimeter fencing. The strategic report points out that any action to retrofit existing fencing across the entire District would be extremely expensive and yield minimal enhancement to a school's security. Rather, the consultant strongly felt investments to enhance security could be better spent in other areas and deliver a better return on investment.*

Near Term:

23. Implement the "StudentProtect App", or other similar technology, that facilitates/enables students, parents and school staff to report threats or suspicious activity to administration/school safety team and local law enforcement, with added feature for direct dial to 911 that communicates exact GPS location of the caller.
- * District notes that this implementation is being initiated by the Florida Attorney General's office as part of SB 7026.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *Specifically, BCPS utilizes FortifyFL and SaferWatch as mobile device applications for threat notification and Silence Hurts for phone, text, and email anonymous or sourced reporting. More information on reporting can be found at <https://www.browardschools.com/Page/35294>.*

The District entered into an agreement with SaferWatch, LLC on February 5, 2019. The SaferWatch App gives students, parents, teachers or anyone in Broward

County the ability to send nonemergency text, photo, video, and audio “tips” from a smartphone. On May 28, 2019, the District held a joint press conference with SaferWatch to announce the SaferWatch app had been enhanced to communicate “tips” directly to the District’s Special Investigative Unit in addition to law enforcement agencies and receive real-time safety alerts directly from Broward County Public Schools and local law enforcement. This provides another opportunity, in addition to FortifyFL and the District Silence Hurts anonymous tip line, to report suspicious activities. Awareness campaigns have been launched to promote all three reporting mechanisms, including prominently displaying on the District’s website.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

24. On-Campus After-school, Sports and Summer programs must have a security plan in place, with safety responsibilities assigned to specific supervisory personnel. All responsible supervisory personnel should be required to undergo a live or video security training session.

* The District agrees and believes these obligations should be part of the contract for services.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *The District extended SRO agreements with select municipalities or assigned guardians to cover all District-run academic programs during the summer. All before and aftercare programs are required to develop a security plan, provide for an unarmed security position, and adhere to similar safety and security protocols during operation (e.g., maintaining locked perimeter fencing unless a gate is staffed). Additionally, law enforcement details are secured for select sporting events throughout the District. A plan for securing and monitoring perimeter gates after hours while students and staff are still on campus must be developed by principals, implemented, and communicated to all stakeholder and routinely inspected.*

However, events held on campus after regular school hours continue to be a risk, recognizing there is inadequate funding to extend the full security matrix at schools beyond regular school hours.

25. Encourage District and municipalities to initiate a social media monitoring protocols to identify as early as possible threats and at-risk behaviors for reporting to appropriate personnel.

* Various law enforcement agencies have differing level of intelligence capabilities in this regard.

* The District does not currently have a pro-active system in place for identifying such risks through social media monitoring.

* Municipalities cannot be required to procure this type of system.

* Clearly when identified, whether through systematic review or through human intelligence, potential threats need to be reported and acted upon appropriately. Current changes to Florida law involving Baker Act and Risk Protection Orders provided additional protections.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *In September 2018, the School Board approved \$3.2 million to staff a new Safety, Security, & Emergency Preparedness division to implement an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework across the entire organization. The sourcing of the new division began in February 2019, with the appointment of a new Chief, Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness. Included within the staffing plan are Protective Intelligence Analyst positions who will be directly responsible for the monitoring of social media platforms to identify possible risks. These positions will liaison with the Broward Sheriff's Office Real-Time Crime Center and other law enforcement agencies to investigate potential threats and intervene prior to an incident. It is anticipated these new positions will be sourced and appointed in the fall of 2019.*

26. Establish a security supervision standard for the most vulnerable of arrival/dismissal times of day require an extra layer of security from school staff and local law enforcement.
- * The District is in the process of retaining an independent security consultant. Part of the scope of work includes reviewing the District's current security staffing models and making recommendations for enhancement.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *beginning with the start of the 2018/19 school year, principals were directed that they must assess their campuses to determine the latest time that perimeter gates will be unlocked. Once the school day begins, all perimeter gates must be locked except for one gate to allow for parent and visitor access to the school. This gate must be monitored at all times by school personnel. If personnel are not available to dedicate to this post, the gate must remain locked and visitors to the campus must call the school's office to gain entry to the campus. As schools prepare for dismissal, perimeter gates will have to be opened for the normal flow of traffic. All open gates must be monitored by a staff member. Staff members assigned to gates must have a functioning radio and be trained on the procedures to respond to intruders accessing the campus. This may necessitate providing a non-specific supplement for identified employees. At the conclusion of dismissal and staff departure, all gates must be secured again.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

27. All public areas of schools, such as hallways, external doors, outdoor areas (playgrounds, common areas), parking lots, entrances/exits to campus should be seen in cameras.
- * Currently, not every area listed above has camera coverage.
 - * The District is completing the upgrade of all camera surveillance systems throughout the District in Phase I and Phase II. According to the District, Phase I will be completed by June 30, 2018. Phase 2 is currently not funded.
 - * The District says the new system in Phase I provides central monitoring capabilities on a video wall of existing cameras.

- * Certain alarms can be triggered so that screens automatically bring up impacted cameras.
- * It was recommended the Phase I and Phase II be completed as rapidly as possible.
- * Phase II expanding current camera coverage will require additional resources and is not yet funded. The BCPS must initiate a funding plan.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NEARLY COMPLETE:

The School Board approved \$6.2 million in July 2018 to initiate Phase II of the District's video surveillance camera project. Phase II adds approximately 2,500 additional digital and analytic cameras throughout all BCPS schools. These additional cameras will be placed to ensure all "immediate" priority areas (as identified within the Strategic Report issued by the District's independent security risk assessment consultant, Safe Havens) have camera coverage. Phase II of the project will be completed by September 2019. Once completed, the District will have approximately 12,500 cameras within its inventory.

28. No public area should be left unmonitored by cameras.
- * Presently, there are not sufficient school safety personnel to monitor cameras at all times, before, during and after schools.
 - * Some schools have camera monitors or provide access to front office staff to periodically monitor.
 - * To obtain consistent and uniform monitoring will require significant to financial resources.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NEARLY COMPLETE:

The School Board approved \$6.2 million in July 2018 to initiate Phase II of the District's video surveillance camera project. Phase II adds approximately 2,500 additional digital and analytic cameras throughout all BCPS schools. These additional cameras will be placed to ensure all "immediate" priority areas (as identified within the Strategic Report issued by the District's independent security risk assessment consultant, Safe Havens) have camera coverage. Phase II of the project will be completed by September 2019. Once completed, the District will have approximately 12,500 cameras within its inventory.

29. Proper and thorough threat assessments must be done and include law enforcement and fire department.
- * The SB 7026 legislation includes new requirements for threat assessment team, and composition of that team.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to the BCPS, threat assessments in Broward County Public Schools requires that a comprehensive Behavioral Threat Assessment be done whenever a students is deemed to be a threat to self or others. This procedure has mandatory membership of school administration, a licensed mental health provider and law enforcement. Fire Department personnel are not a standard component of Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams but may be called upon for witness input as appropriate to specific cases. As described in Chapter 5, Part A, new threat assessment policies, cross-sector training, and documentation tools have occurred since the initial report.*

30. There was agreement that all BCPS schools must have a single point entry on to the campus and into the schools during school hours. In fact, the District's SMART program prioritizes implementing single point entry systems at schools expected to be completed the first quarter of 2019.³¹

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NEARLY COMPLETE: BCPS had approved the acceleration of funding to complete the Single Point of Entry (SPE) projects in 2017. It was anticipated all such projects would be completed no later than the first quarter of 2019. At the onset of calendar year 2019, forty-three (43) projects remained open in a variety of stages. Twelve (12) projects were in the process of competitive bidding and award; nine (9) projects were in the design phase, and twenty-two (22) projects were in active construction. Additionally, 195 projects (locations) had already been completed or met BCPS's design standards for SPE. At the time of this updated report, only eleven (11) projects remain open, and all are in active construction. All eleven projects are anticipated to be substantially complete and functional by August 14, 2019, the first day of school for 2019/20.

31. Single point entry should have a "buzzer" system that gives office/staff control of that access

* This is not currently included in the scope of the SMART single point of entry projects. Many schools, through funding of school-allied groups have implemented buzzers at their main entrance point. This recommendation will have financial implications to implement District-wide. While approved, some PTA/PTOs have been funding the purchase.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE

32. If gates and external doors are opened or unlocked, which would compromise single point entry, those gates and doors must be supervised.

* This may require additional resources at schools, particularly at the elementary level where there is limited security staff. However, schools should use other staff to ensure fidelity to supervision of these access points.

* Additional consideration needs to be given to the impact of such recommendations on the timelines associated with staff and students (primarily at the high school level) accessing and leaving the campus; as well as whether this includes visitor access throughout the day. If so, this recommendation would necessitate staff at the visitor gate throughout the entire school day.

* However, schools are responsible for student supervision for school-sponsored events.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, beginning with the start of the 2018/19 school year, principals were directed that they must assess their campuses to determine the latest time that perimeter gates will be unlocked. Once

31 At the outset, it is important to distinguish single-point entry through the perimeter of the campus of a school and single-point entry into the school buildings.

the school day begins, all perimeter gates must be locked except for one gate to allow for parent and visitor access to the school. This gate must be monitored at all times by school personnel. If personnel are not available to dedicate to this post, the gate must remain locked and visitors to the campus must call the school's office to gain entry to the campus. As schools prepare for dismissal, perimeter gates will have to be opened for the normal flow of traffic. All open gates must be monitored by a staff member. Staff members assigned to gates must have a functioning radio and be trained on the procedures to respond to intruders accessing the campus. This may necessitate providing a non-specific supplement for identified employees. At the conclusion of dismissal and staff departure, all gates must be secured again, except for those that are necessary for any after school activities and/or after school care programs. A plan for securing and monitoring perimeter gates after hours while students and staff are still on campus must be developed, implemented, and communicated to all stakeholder and routinely inspected.

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

33. The Task Force strongly recommends the BCPS evaluate and consider metal detector deployments in schools. There was consensus that such a program does add value, but a number of feasibility considerations were raised:
- * The physical deployment of these must be uniform across the District;
 - * The development of such a program should first consider where such programs have been deployed in other large districts or districts with large campus populations;
 - * Implications for ingress flow must be considered through multiple points of entry, which alters the single-point entry protocols, in an effort to ensure students and visitors are processed timely. It was noted that virtually every student may set off the alarms with normal school supplies and or cell-phones not removed from their bags, which slows the ingress;
 - * Policies and procedures for "alarm resolution" must be clear and uniform, with due concerns for searches of genders and belongings, as well as parental engagements;
 - * Random searches with wands raised a number of efficacy and fairness concerns;
 - * Personnel and hardware costs will need to be considered.
 - * Pre-school and after-school deployment would need to be considered as well.
 - * The BCPS announced on June 1, 2018 the introduction of a pilot project at MSDHS involving portable metal detectors for the new school year. See Exhibit 38.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *BCPS has held a number of strategic conversations regarding entry point metal detection. The District has been cautioned by its independent security consultant about implementing static entry point metal detection, expressing concerns over its effectiveness and indicating there are more effective opportunities for investment that will have greater impact on enhancing security. The District continues to review the possibility of random metal detection to be deployed through a systematic and centralized process. This will provide an opportunity to deploy*

resources with greater expertise and ensure greater fidelity of implementation. The School Board has requested more feedback be gathered to understand potential concerns from parents before proceeding.

34. All schools need to analyze their emergency notification system. Need effective way to communicate to all students/teachers a life threatening emergency is taking place.

* District is currently working with several community-led groups who are reviewing single-action lockdown response systems that address many of the items identified in the recommendation. Implementation of such systems will require significant additional resources.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *In September 2018, the School Board approved allocating \$17 million to upgrade the intercom systems at all high schools, technical colleges, centers, and secondary combination schools. This project will improve the emergency communications within schools. It will upgrade the intercom system to a digital platform, allowing school administration to pre-record emergency messages and initiate them remotely; and incorporate additional speakers throughout the campuses, particularly in common areas outside of buildings. The District identified a business partner to accomplish this work in April 2019, and initial roll-out of the upgrades has begun. Additionally, the District purchased and distributed more than 1,200 additional radios and repeaters last year to enhance the existing local radio networks at all schools. The additional radios are intended to be utilized to augment the existing intercom communication systems within schools. With the additional radios, staff now has the ability to communicate (specifically in emergency situations) in areas of the school outside the coverage of the intercom system (e.g., bus and student drop-off drives, playgrounds, outside courtyards, etc.)*

35. After contacting the Knox Company about a solution for Broward school security, The Knox "Blue Box" system is the most affordable of the current Knox options. This system is similar to the current fire department Knox Box installed in many schools and buildings in Broward County. This box is painted blue, to represent to responding police officers that this box is specific for their use. It should be placed somewhere other than in the same location as the current FD Knox Box, so to allow separation between points of entry and to ensure access to the box if one side or area of a building is inaccessible. The price is \$318.00 per box. The manual keys are free of charge from Knox.

* This requires additional resources, and during a significant emergency response like MSD, not sure of the utilization. Particularly in an event with multi-agency response.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, IN PROGRESS: *While there has yet to be a Knox Box solution implemented Districtwide, the District's Special Investigative Unit (SIU) has communicated with local law enforcement to extend the opportunity to be provided duplicate keys to access the gates at schools within their jurisdiction. This process is still ongoing.*

36. Need to reconsider placement and size for the purposes of both Fire and SWAT/Police access, particularly as outbuilding move closer to always being locked. Consider impact of key code vs. keys.
- * This requires additional resources, and during a significant emergency response like MSD, not sure of the utilization. Particularly in an event with multi-agency response.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, No Update. See recommendation #37. *This remains an outstanding Recommendation to be implemented.*

Mid-Term:

37. For Middle and High School, the Task Force was told by the District that maintaining single point entry into buildings is made more challenging after hours by the nature of the extra-curricular activities. The free flow of students to and from activities throughout the campus is challenging and not seen as realistic.
- * As a result, prioritizing single point entry onto the campus before and after school was recommended by the Task Force. This will require supervision at access points and change in culture of students and parents;
 - * Supervising access to events with specific clearance of each vehicle, patron, such as for sports, is not seen as realistic.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE AND ONGOING: *All BCPS schools will have a functional Single Point of Entry (SPE) at the beginning of the 2019/20 school year. All visitors, including vendors must access schools through the SPE. The District extended SRO agreements with select municipalities or assigned guardians to cover all District-run academic programs during the summer. All before and aftercare programs are required to develop a security plan, provide for an unarmed security position, and adhere to similar safety and security protocols during operation (e.g., maintaining locked perimeter fencing unless a gate is staffed). A plan for securing and monitoring perimeter gates after hours while students and staff are still on campus must be developed by principals, implemented, and communicated to all stakeholder and routinely inspected. However, events held on campus after regular school hours continue to be a risk, recognizing there is inadequate funding to extend the full security matrix at schools beyond regular school hours.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

38. Man Trap Containment. All doors leading from that "single point entry" area (usually front office) to the main school should have a preventative measure in place to deter an intruder from gaining access to the rest of the school - such as buzzers, swipes, etc.

* Some schools have implemented such "man-trap containment" for entry during school hours. Providing such design throughout the district for all schools would require infrastructure changes

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, All BCPS schools will have a functional Single Point of Entry (SPE) at the beginning of the 2019/20 school year. Many of the SPE projects included within the SMART bond program did feature the "man trap containment" within its design.

However, schools that already had a functional SPE or the SMART project did not include this feature in the design are not currently planned to be retrofitted. This would require a significant funding source that does not currently exist and would take significant time to complete.

This remains an outstanding Recommendation that has not been implemented.

39. Fencing: Increase height of fencing with recommended rake within limits of code.

* The District notes it has nearly 750,000 linear feet of perimeter fencing. This recommendation would require significant resources and time to implement.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NOT IMPLEMENTED: The District retained the services of an independent security consultant, Safe Havens, to conduct individual risk assessments at all schools and administrative buildings, review the District's safety and security procedures and policies, and review all related training materials and documents. One aspect of the consultant's review specifically included the District's design criteria for perimeter fencing. Ultimately, the consultant did not recommend any immediate action regarding perimeter fencing. The strategic report points out that any action to retrofit existing fencing across the entire District would be extremely expensive and yield minimal enhancement to a school's security. Rather, the consultant strongly felt investments to enhance security could be better spent in other areas and deliver a better return on investment.

40. Evaluate protecting classroom door windows from ballistic breach.

* Increasing ballistic strength of the windows on these doors does not implicate Fire Code.

* Retrofitting each classroom door to be attack resistant, or with hurricane code class to prevent shattering, require significant resources to implement.

* BCPS estimates the total number of rooms in the schools of about 25,241. This does not include some common rooms like PE, cafeteria, etc. Therefore, not including administrative rooms in the school, there are about 17,084 doors.

* Retrofitting to hurricane glass may still allow penetration, but will prevent shattering.

- * Consideration should be given to utilization of ballistic curtain/mesh which could be utilized when necessary to cover windows.
- * However, it must be noted that other building materials (i.e. the door) are not bullet proof.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

41. Evaluate if all external windows (windows facing outside) are hurricane proof in all schools and retrofit to protect.
- * According to the BCPS Chief Building Official, the Florida Building Code changed in 2010, requiring external windows to have 180 mph wind loading. The code went into effect on March 15, 2012. Accordingly, any construction after March 15, 2012 where the scope included external windows would have had to meet this requirement.
 - * It is presently unknown how many buildings and windows were constructed prior to the change in the hurricane standard building codes. If not hurricane standard windows, protection of windows through other ballistic proof strategies should be considered.
 - * There would be significant costs associated with retro-fitting all windows that were installed prior to the code requirement.
 - * Additionally, retrofitting for all portables is not seen as realistic.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

42. Increase school safety personnel staffing.
- * The District is in the process of retaining an independent security consultant. Part of the scope of work includes reviewing the District's current security staffing models and making recommendations for enhancement.
 - * Such enhancements could include increased numbers of campus monitors and security specialists.
 - * Although this would require additional resources, the District is seeking the approval of a referendum to increase the current school millage by ½ mills. Even if this passes, the availability of additional funding streams to support this recommendation will not occur until 2019/20 school year.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE:
Recognizing state funding was insufficient to address multiple priorities, including the enhancement of safety and security, BCPS authorized the placement of the Secure the Next Generation referendum on the primary ballot in August 2018. On August 28, 2018, Broward County residents voted to approve this initiative. The Secure the Next Generation referendum provides a ½ mill in additional local funding that is being used to secure school resource officers, recruit and retain high-quality teachers and staff, secure important programs in District schools, and expand educational opportunities for our students. This referendum supports BCPS's continued commitment to secure a high-quality education and safe learning environment for our students, teachers and staff. Twenty (20) percent of the new proceeds are designated for additional security staffing (school resource officers and security staff).

The additional funding from the referendum and the Safe School Allocation for the 2019/20 school year is being utilized to provide additional security resources throughout all schools. This includes additional School Resource Officers and guardians to allow for a 1:1,000 ratio of safe school officers to students, an increase in the District's reimbursement figure to municipalities and BSO for School Resource Officers, the hiring of additional security specialists and campus monitors for schools, and additional oversight of these new positions. In total, the additional Safe School Allocation and referendum funding will provide for an additional 504 security personnel throughout the District. When combined with existing resources, there will be 1,249 security positions deployed throughout the District for the 2019/20 school year. This represents approximately \$53 million of personnel resources dedicated to enhancing the safety and security at all schools.

43. Consider secondary perimeter fencing with a single gate around the portable/modular areas. Special security protocols and construction standards/upgrades for portable/modular classrooms.
- * Additional perimeter fencing meant to "harden" portables will require significant resources and time.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

44. The Task Force discussed the availability of ballistic resistant material in "safe spaces"
- * While there have been various vendors who have proposed such, any deployment District-wide would require overwhelming financial costs and infrastructure changes to uniformly cover all classrooms and areas utilized for gathering of students.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: NOT TO BE IMPLEMENTED: *The District retained the services of an independent security consultant, Safe Havens, to conduct individual risk assessments at all schools and administrative buildings, review the District's safety and security procedures and policies, and review all related training materials and documents. One aspect of the consultant's review specifically included the installation of ballistic resistant materials in classrooms. Ultimately, the consultant recommended against such a strategy. The strategic report points out that any action to install ballistic protection in classrooms across the entire District would be extremely expensive. Rather, the consultant strongly felt investments to enhance security could be better spent in other areas and deliver a better return on investment.*

45. Use of bollard or other blocking device to prevent vehicular manslaughter on school campuses.
- * This recommendation will require significant resources

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

46. To alleviate communication link problems between schools and E911, consider providing a direct connect to local dispatch (e.g. Indiana schools)
- * It was noted this would require additional resources to implement across the District, including financial and training. Additionally, depending on the

access points directly to dispatch, this could require additional resources and security measures.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

47. The vulnerability of Portable buildings must be addressed, including the easy access to the buildings, the construction materials which offer no protection.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, NO UPDATE.

The Task Force notes this remains an outstanding Recommendation and vulnerability.

Legislative:

48. Advocate that the Florida Dept. of Education establish mandatory security standards and audits for charter schools.

* Many charters are small, with limited know-how and resources, there has to be a regularly verified statewide charter school security standard with guidance documents for physical security, safety processes, priorities for safe schools allocation spending, etc., empowering local law enforcement to spot check any charter school.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE: *This year, the Department of Education has mandated greater accountability of charter schools in relation to compliance with the MSDHSPS Act, particularly regarding the requirement to assign an SSO to every school. On August 1, 2019, the Commissioner of Education issued correspondence to all school superintendents stating in part, "In the letter to school district superintendents dated May 31, 2019, I outlined several critical policies and procedures to enhance safety and security of Florida's public school campuses and keep students safe. One of which was the implementation of a Safe-School Officer (SSO) physically present on each campus while school is in session. An SSO is a police officer, deputy sheriff or Guardian. Another letter was sent to all Charter School Directors dated July 9, 2019 outlining the opportunity for charter schools that are in need of SSO coverage, in a school district in which the Guardian Program is not offered by the local sheriff's office, to contact staff in our Office of Safe Schools to obtain additional information...There is absolutely no flexibility with regard to this provision because a gap in coverage could have catastrophic results for our schools' children and staff. Therefore, charter schools must expeditiously secure local law enforcement to meet the requirement for having and SSO on every campus."*

The correspondence further provided a mechanism for school districts to document and certify the districts' (including charter schools) level of SSO coverage. This information was requested by the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission in anticipation of the upcoming meeting in August 2019.

CHAPTER 4: BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM

Immediate

49. When practical, SRO training should be held on days when students are not in session.
- * When SRO's are off campus, a replacement should be sent, campus should not be without a police presence during school hours when practical.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *The SRO Agreements require the SRO to be on campus during regular school hours. Recognizing the MSDHSPS Act requires a Safe-School Officer to be on campus at all times, The District's SIU works with local law enforcement to provide a "back-up" to cover situations where the SRO is not on campus. This may involve the deployment of an armed guardian or SIU detective to a school. BCPS is currently working to expand its armed guardian pool to provide ample resources to address daily absenteeism and specific situations where the SRO has to leave campus.*

50. SRO and/or law enforcement and all administrators should be part of the school safety team. Head Facilities person should also be on the safety team. If schools have other "security" staff (such as campus monitors and security specialists), they should be on the safety team also.
- * District agrees and notes they are already members of the SAFE Team.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *These individuals are already part of the SAFE Team at schools.*

51. SRO and all administrators should be supervising/holding those critical incident drills. An "after action report" must be completed in BCPS database
- * As noted by the District, SIU currently monitors the emergency code drills. SB 7026 now requires the active shooter training to be conducted by the law agency responding to such incidents. Inclusion of SROs in the drill action is necessary.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *This is part of the standard protocol. The District's database (Gateway) currently provides for the school administration to outline "lessons learned" from each drill conducted.*

The Task Force notes that this is a Recommendation which must be enforced consistently, persistently, vigorously and with vigilance. That is, there is never a mission accomplished moment. Instead, this is a daily requirement

52. School site security assessments should be conducted annually with the school's SAFE team members, all school level administrators, and municipal/agency law enforcement. Input and recommendations from these security assessments will be provided to BCPS SIU for recommendations and approval.
- * BCPS notes that the new FSSAT calls for an annual school site risk assessment, and the requirements of SB 7026 now require local law enforcement agencies to actively participate in a site assessment every 3 years.

- * However, the Task Force does notes a survey completed by school staff is enough of an assessment. A physical risk assessment should be done annually.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, COMPLETE: *The new requirements of the MSDHSPS Act require each school to conduct a risk assessment utilizing the DOE's online tool (FSSAT) each year. This process seeks the participation of local law and fire agencies to provide input into the process.*

53. Improve communication between our SROs and local school officials where necessary and Implement a formal-districtwide policy instructing principals on cooperation with local law enforcement. This cannot be left to personal discretion

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE: *The Superintendent and the new Chief, Safety, Security & Emergency Preparedness Officer have been working through the Broward Chiefs of Police Association in an effort to improve the relationship and collaboration between BCPS and local law enforcement. This has created new opportunities to develop a standard SRO agreement that meets the needs of all agencies, solicit input of changes needed for the District's PROMISE Program, and provide joint professional development opportunities.*

According to BCPS, BCPS, Broward Sheriff, and the Broward Police Chiefs of Police Association are all committed to deepening the partnership between law enforcement and local school officials through regular meetings at all levels, cross-training of personnel, and establishing after-action review protocols. All BCPS principals have received formal notification and been trained in cooperation expectations and protocols with law enforcement.

The Task Force notes this is a Recommendation that requires consistent and persistent effort to overcome, at times, poor communication amongst all the stakeholders

54. It was encouraged that, when possible and consistent with competing operational needs, there should be visible presence of law enforcement vehicles at schools.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: A Recommendation to the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association and Individual Municipalities.

Near-Term

55. All schools should have at least one full time SRO - exception might be schools that share campuses, then 1 SRO per school "campus"

- * This is required by SB 7026.

- * Resources to initiate full coverage by the start of the 2018/19 school year impair the ability to likely comply without adjustments.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, Florida Law now requires a Safe-School Officer (SSO) to be assigned to every school campus. The law defines three ways to accomplish this mandate: establish school resource officer

programs through a cooperative agreement with law enforcement agencies; commission one or more school safety officers; or at the school district's discretion, participate in the school marshal program. Beginning in 2019/20, school districts can also avail themselves of a contracted security guard who has completed the legislatively mandated guardian training to serve as an SSO.

BCPS has leveraged the SRO Program to increase the number of SROs in schools. In 2018/19 there were 197 school resource officers assigned to 179 schools. BCPS availed itself of the Guardian Program and overtime details of certified law enforcement officers to comply with the requirements of the MSDHSPS Act.

The Task Force notes this is not the same as having a full-time SRO in every school. The financial realities and police vacancies locally and nationwide present as significant challenges to achieving a full-time SRO in every school.

56. School district must increase the amount it participates in the cost of SRO's. Actual costs are well above the current participation amount.

* The District notes that it is proposing an additional Levy to address some of the funding issues associated with SROs.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE: The SRO Program was initially piloted in 1985 at six middle schools, and has expanded over the past 30+ years to now include fourteen (14) formal SRO Agreements with individual municipalities and the Broward Sheriff's Office, to place 197 school resource officers at 179 schools within our community. The SRO Program continues to be a jointly funded initiative to place certified law enforcement officers in schools, primarily for the purposes of serving as an educator, mentor, and liaison for local law enforcement on the school campus. The Agreements outline BCPS will provide a fixed reimbursement for consideration of each SRO placement at a school. This reimbursement was \$12,000 per SRO in the 2007/08 school year, and systematically increased each year for the next four years, until reaching \$46,252 in school year 2011/12. Last year, BCPS increased its reimbursement to \$52,000 per SRO.

This year, BCPS has worked with the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association (Chiefs Association) in an effort to develop a standard SRO Agreement that could be authorized for the next three years. This would serve to provide equity to all partnering municipalities and eliminate the administrative burden of having to execute new agreements each year. In consideration of a three year commitment, BCPS is again proposing to systematically increase its reimbursement each of the three years to reach \$60,000 for school year 2021/22. Although this reimbursement doesn't represent the full costs associated with the placement of a school resource officer; hopefully, the 30% increase over a four-year period demonstrates the District's commitment to the SRO Program being a true partnership. Particularly, given the Safe School Allocation provided by the Florida Department of Education to fund safe-school officers at each campus is inadequate to cover current costs. Additionally, BCPS has offered other concessions in the Agreement language to acknowledge the requests of the Chiefs Association. This includes proposing creative opportunities to address unfunded SRO supervision issues expressed by the police chiefs, the District funding training

mandated by BCPS outside of regular school hours, and codifying the sharing of threat assessment information between parties.

However, the Task Force notes there is significant resistance to three-year contracts with municipalities. In addition, both the Broward County Chiefs of Police Association and municipalities continue to request greater financial contribution to the SRO program; municipalities continue to bear too great a financial burden to place full-time SROs in every school, resulting in some municipalities unable or unwilling to achieve that goal.

57. There must a permanent, stable and dedicated funding stream to ensure uniform SRO program in all BCPS and Charter Schools.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: NO PROGRESS: *There remains no dedicated sustainable funding stream to cover the full SRO costs to place an SRO at every school. This remains an outstanding Recommendation.*

State of Florida funding for safety continues to fall far short of what is necessary to provide an SRO in all public district and charter schools. The State Legislature and Governor's Office are requested to provide sufficient funding to law enforcement and/or school governing bodies to provide an SRO at every public school.

58. Install gun lockers in local schools so that patrol rifles can be maintained on campus instead of in vehicles. This will also eliminate the need for an exhibition of these weapons on a daily basis.

* The District is currently incorporating language within the 2018/19 SRO Agreements to allow the provision of gun safes on campuses.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, PROGRESS MADE: *Last year, BCPS amended the SRO Agreement to permit the placement of gun safes in schools. Many law enforcement agencies have since installed gun lockers in schools where they provide SRO services.*

Legislative

59. Require State to meet its obligation to make adequate provision for safe and secure schools pursuant to Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Increase categorical funding for SROs.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: REMAINS OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATION. *State of Florida funding for safety continues to fall far short of what is necessary to provide an SRO in all public district and charter schools. The State Legislature and Governor's Office are requested to provide sufficient funding to law enforcement and/or school governing bodies to provide an SRO at every public school.*

60. Seek from the State adequate funding to full comply with MSDHSPS Act as it relates to SROs.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: REMAINS OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATION.

State of Florida funding for safety continues to fall far short of what is necessary to provide an SRO in all public district and charter schools. The State Legislature and Governor's Office are requested to provide sufficient funding to law enforcement and/or school governing bodies to provide an SRO at every public school.

61. Seek legislative exception to allow agencies to re-hire retired certified law enforcement officers, preempting the pension provisions which prohibit re-hiring during separation period without penalty.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: REMAINS OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATION.

CHAPTER 5: BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS AND PROCEDURES

Immediate:

62. All current administrators, school counselors, SSW and School Psychologists must complete a level 1 Threat Assessment training annually.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *school-level administrators have been trained on behavioral threat assessment procedures. These trainings consisted of training prior to the 2018/19 school year, a three-hour training using a behavioral threat assessment case study during the school year guided by the new School Board Policy, and training on the new digital, centralized Behavioral Threat Assessment tool in August 2019.*

School Psychologists, School Social Workers, Family Counselors, and other mental health providers are engaged in on-going threat assessment training throughout the school year with internal training, trainings offered by Florida Department of Education, and trainings offered by professional associations.

As discussed in herein, School Board of Broward County Policy 2130 establishes an annual auditing requirement of compliance with training and implementation

63. School administration and SRO's should hold annual School Discipline trainings before school starts to ensure better coordination and expectations related to at-risk students and what is recommended as part of the discipline matrix.
 - * Note, the SRO is not a BCPS employee and is not included in the application of discipline policy. The District has already announced its plan to audit school discipline to ensure compliance to policy.
 - * SROs should be aware of what infractions and/or offenses involve potential law enforcement response.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *schools and law enforcement agencies have collaborated to provide training on Behavioral Threat Assessment procedures. Training of SROs from the BSO and municipalities providing SRO occurred during the 2018-19 school year. Additionally, training provided for the 2019-20 school year by BCPS Office of Psychological Services for SROs commenced on August 12, 2019. Schools with a Guardian, rather than*

an SRO, will be calling for the local municipality to provide a law enforcement officer for the Behavioral Threat Assessment process. Local school teams of school administration, SROs/Guardians, and additional school security personnel are expected to review district policy and law enforcement procedures for for school discipline, threat assessments, and criminal law enforcement.

64. An external audit should be done annually on each school's discipline infractions and consequences to determine if discipline and reporting into the DMS/BASIS system used by the District were handled appropriately.
- * Non-compliance must receive counseling and/or consequences. Also, flag schools and administrators who are not entering infractions.
 - * The District has announced its plan to audit school discipline to ensure compliance to policy.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, the BCPS Office of the Auditor has commenced review of discipline records for school campuses from the 2018-19 school year. This review has pulled records from a representative cross-section of the district records. Documentation is being audited for procedural compliance, completeness, and follow-up. Additionally, school discipline profiles are being examined for high and/or low numbers of overall incidents and the types of incidents occurring on the campus. This audit will inform changes to trainings, and when appropriate, changes to practices and policies.

65. PROMISE: This is a program that was intended to be evaluated and refined. To that end, there must be timely analysis and disclosure of historic recidivism not just during an existing school year, but also across school years and across types of qualifying offenses. The purpose of this analysis is to ensure that interventions are best aligned with the supports necessary for the student and that the program is properly identifying the scope of at-risk students.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *significant review of the PROMISE program, School Board discipline policies, and the Collaborative Agreement on School Discipline resulted in updated policies and procedures. These changes are further discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. In short, the number of PROMISE eligible offenses have been reduced, the count of PROMISE participation is not cumulative across school years, and disciplinary infractions that are below the level of an equivalent misdemeanor offense have been removed.*

66. PROMISE and Civil Citation: The Task Force agreed that there should be disclosure amongst these programs to ensure all available services are being considered in light of the conditions leading to qualifying offenses. Procedures for communication flow and coordination between Promise and Civil Citation should be developed to ensure effectiveness of interventions overall and for specific individuals.
- * The BCPS indicated this recommendation were brought forward to the Board for discussion on June 19, 2018. This recommendation will also be placed on the agenda for discussion at all district discipline committees and advisories. The BCPS notes that existing data sharing agreements may need to be expanded or new agreements may need to be drafted, in consultation with BCPS General Counsel.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As discussed in Chapter 5, there has been significant effort to improve the relationship between PROMISE and the Civil Citation program as recommended.*

Legislative

67. Seek legislative changes to ensure that disciplinary records for students transferring from private schools are transferred to the public schools.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Legislative action is still required to ensure that disciplinary, mental health, and record sharing protocols that have been established for publicly funded schools are appropriately adapted for private, parochial, and home-school students. Public Safety is a concern that transcends all types of school governance.*

CHAPTER 6: COMMUNITY BASED MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

Immediate

68. 211 must verify that service provider's information is accurate and routinely updated.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *2-1-1 Broward began the process in March 2018 of ensuring that ALL Broward County Mental Health Providers' information is accurate and any changes in information are updated on a regular basis.*

69. More expansive marketing effort regarding community mental health programs available to residents in Broward County.

- * The demand for Mental Health Services is great; however, the supply is limited by barriers including financial resources and waiting lists.
- * There are many large funders in the community that provide many nonprofit agencies with money to provide the services. However, some of the programs provided have income eligibility restrictions that does not allow tax payers to access services. These individuals try to seek private services in mental health and are faced with high premiums within their own insurance which deters them from receiving services long enough to address needs. More people are likely to pay for medical support before they put themselves into debt for mental health services.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Following two suicides of individuals connected to MSD in March of 2019, a concerted effort was made to disseminate information on the Columbia Lighthouse Project, which identifies signs of suicide/suicidal ideation and encourages families to engage in asking each other the six questions. As well, all were encouraged to call 911 or 211, if they, or their loved one was at risk. This campaign received a great deal of local and national media attention, resulting in a spike in crisis calls and Baker Act interventions.*

Public Funders have loosened or removed entirely, eligibility restrictions, which may have prevented MSD families from accessing services. Providers were also instructed to serve these families as long as necessary rather in accordance with previous protocols.

Private funders like Parkland Cares have also stepped in to augment the public funding of therapeutic services.

The desire to see private therapists continues to be a challenge for some. Professionals United 4 Parkland – a new collaborative of private therapists, which was formed in the wake of the tragedy, has harnessed the skills of trauma trained private therapists who are willing to provide pro bono or discounted services to a certain number of patients each year. They have also increased the capacity of private therapists to treat trauma through a variety of trainings.

70. Continued development of and increased funding for the Integrated Data System through Broward Data Collaborative.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to the BCPS, The Broward Data Collaborative continues to convene, advocate, and develop improved protocols for legally enabled sharing of appropriate data among education, health, and community organizations. An updated data sharing protocol between Children's Services Counsel and Broward County Public Schools was agreed to in June 2019. The technology portion of the Broward Data Collaborative is complete and several data sharing agreements are in place. A Data Use agreement for research is close to completion. Many legal and philosophical barriers still need to be overcome to achieve individual level data sharing in real time.*

71. Promote the integration of primary care and behavioral healthcare.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As indicated in the initial report, BBHC has hosted a Primary Care / Behavioral Health Integration Workgroup that is focused on enhancing the system of care by integrating primary and behavioral health care services. BBHC, together with the two tax-assisted hospitals, two Federally Qualified Health Care Centers (FQHCC) Broward County and BBHC network providers comprise the committee.*

72. Promote cultural and linguistic competency regarding mental health.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As indicated in the initial report, as part of the Cultural and Linguistic Competency (CLC) Initiative: BBHC had received all final CSC plans from providers. BBHC staff reviewed to ensure compliance with CLAS Standards and request training of all agency staff based on new plans. Community Mental Health efforts to improve cultural and linguistic competency are underway.*

In July 2019 the Florida State Board of Education established a new requirement for all students in grades 6-12 to have required instruction in Mental and Emotional Education. (Rule 6A-1.094121).

The SBOE explicitly states, "Mental health literacy components that are key to well-being include understanding how to optimize and maintain good mental health; decreasing stigmas related to mental health; enhancing help-seeking efficacy; and understanding mental disorders and treatments. Mental and emotional health education can positively impact areas including, but not limited to, teen suicide, bullying and cyberbullying, and opioid and alcohol addictions."

Broward County Public Schools will be designing the curriculum to both be appropriate to particular developmental age at a specific grade level and to build skills year-to-year across secondary level instruction.

73. Improve communication and coordination between all the stakeholders (e.g., teachers, parents, guardians, mental health care team, law enforcement) involved with the student to the extent allowed by law.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Enhanced collaboration of care givers, health care providers, and public service agencies continues to improve. Statutory changes include a parental mandate to share mental health history at time of registration, mandatory coordination with primary care physicians for mental health services, and better integration of all relevant agencies for follow-up intervention and monitoring plans for discipline, threat assessment, and other incidents. A significant future area of work includes establishing appropriate data sharing protocols which protect individual privacy and enable efficient data exchange between agencies in an integrated or distributed data repository.*

74. Ensure fidelity to the response to intervention/behavior protocols and a more comprehensive evaluation of the child's medical history, both mental and physical, as well as a composite of their home/school life.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Broward County Public Schools continues to improve the integration of response systems that engages with students to promote comprehensive wellness and appropriate interventions when necessary. These response systems for all students include Coordinated Health, Psychological Services, Social Work Services, Response-to-Intervention for Academics, Response-to-Intervention for Behavior, and School Counseling. These are part of an overall Multi-Tier System of Supports (MTSS) model that responds to students who are facing challenges within a Universal Design for Learning (UDL) system. While MTSS/Rtl have been present in BCPS for several years the establishment of UDL as the overarching approach for system design, contract provisions, and partnerships is more recent and at an earlier stage of implementation. The intent of this work, improved MTSS/Rtl and UDL, is to anticipate student needs in the design of initial delivery and response systems through integrated, multi-agency case management for maximal academic, health, and emotional development.*

Additional training of school based Collaborative Problem Solving Teams will continue to occur to ensure that the professionals directly serving students are aware of all external resources available to address student needs, appropriate protocols for referral and obtaining school based services, and requirements for documentation and collaboration.

75. A School Threat Hotline where students, parents, teachers, et cetera can call to report (A safe place to encourage See Something, Say Something!).

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Broward County Public Schools provides numerous methods for students, staff, and the community to report concerning events or observations. These include, Silence Hurts – See*

Something, Say Something, FortifyFL, SaferWatch, and Broward211. More information can be found at <https://www.browardschools.com/safetyfirst>.

Near-Term:

76. Use social workers to help foster an environment of support with a mix of counselors, case managers, and others for day-to-day operations in response to students' needs; they can serve to establish and strengthen the relationships between schools and parents to facilitate trust, which leads to improved information sharing.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Additional Social Workers, Family Counselors, School Counselors, nurses and other positions are being expanded to provide more capacity for service delivery and case management. Broward County Public Schools anticipates adding approximately 200 such positions in the 2019-20 school year.*

77. Limit the use of school counselors in the involvement of academic testing. Emphasis should be on counseling services.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *The Broward County Public Schools' Office of School Counseling and BRACE Advisement, Office of Academics, and Office of School Performance and Accountability continue to implement improvements that maximize the time that counselors, social workers, and other licensed support staff are providing direct services in their jobs. This includes minimizing time for supervision for bus duty, lunch duty, academic testing, and other non-direct service functions. Unfortunately, limited funding for additional staff and increased supervisory expectations prevent the complete elimination of these responsibilities from licensed support professionals and other instructional staff.*

78. Recommend that the district request a discharge plan for students returning from a Baker Act facility or residential treatment facility, which includes recommendations or requiring a note recommending their return to school (i.e., similar to a child needing clearance to return to school due to measles).

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to the BCPS, Students returning to school from an institutional setting, including a treatment facility, are to have a re-entry plan developed by the releasing institution which is to be reviewed and updated by the Collaborative Problem Solving Team at the receiving school. Each student's plan should include a monitoring protocol and a date for review of either plan completion or updating.*

79. Recommend establishing transition teams made up of a teacher, social worker, case manager, administrator, parent(s)/guardian, and community service provider that serve the child to transition from Baker Act facilities. This will assure that children, who have been Baker Acted, will have a safe and successful transition back to the school environment. Establish mental health liaison positions assigned to each of the district areas to coordinate the transition teams.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Students returning from a Baker Act Placement, or other institutional placement or residential treatment facility, are referred to the campus Collaborative Problem-Solving Team (CPST) for the development of a support and monitoring plan. The CPST team is supported by District staff who coordinates outreach with external agencies. Mental and physical health liaison positions will be created during the 2019-20 school year.*

80. Licensed psychologist (i.e., PhD, PsyD), social workers (i.e., LCSW), mental health counselors (i.e., LMHC), as well as bachelor/masters level and unlicensed practitioners, should be available to ALL schools in Broward County.

* This staff MUST be trained in assessment, intervention, and provide quality consultation to teachers. They can also take the lead on helping to select and implement school-wide prevention programs, conduct threat and suicide assessments, help with data collection to make informed programming decisions, collaborate with community service providers, exhibit leadership regarding crisis prevention and intervention, and work with families.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to BCPS, State of Florida funding for district and charter schools remains insufficient to provide a nurse, psychologist, social worker or licensed mental health counselor for each school campus. While some campuses in the BCPS portfolio or charter sector have individuals assigned to one campus, usually these responsibilities are led by individuals who serve multiple campuses.*

81. Increase resources required to initiate and complete the special education evaluation and eligibility process, culminating in effective Individual Education Plans and Behavior Intervention Plans for children who need related services to be safely educated in the least restrictive environment possible.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to BCPS, BCPS continues to refine its protocols for identifying those students who should be screened for a qualifying condition for exceptional student education services. High levels of compliance with timeframes for completion of evaluation, development of plans, and monitoring are present for BCPS campuses.*

82. Recommend all mental health databases are operating off the same system so that ALL stakeholders that provide direct care know if a student has been previously served.

* Obtaining a signed Release of Information for all those involved (i.e., stakeholders), as this will be critical in determining areas of concern that need to be addressed. The protections afforded by HIPAA are designed to eliminate the fear of disclosure and thereby encourage people to seek treatment. However, it does also create barriers to sharing information across agencies. This can be overcome through consent of the person being treated. As previously discussed, there are efforts underway in Broward County to develop an Integrated Data System, known as the Broward Data Collaborative. Consent forms that will allow broader data sharing but client permission is key. There are also exceptions for

disclosure to law enforcement as required by law. (Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, www.HHS.gov).

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *The State of Florida continues to pursue the development of an integrated safety, health, and educational data exchange system. As previously discussed, there are efforts underway in Broward County to develop an Integrated Data System, known as the Broward Data Collaborative. Consent forms that will allow broader data-sharing but client permission is key. There are also exceptions for disclosure to law enforcement as required by law. (Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, www.HHS.gov). Obtaining a signed Release of Information for all those involved (i.e., stakeholders), as this will be critical in determining areas of concern that need to be addressed. The protections afforded by HIPAA are designed to eliminate the fear of disclosure and thereby encourage people to seek treatment. However, it does also create barriers to sharing information across agencies. It is more likely that interoperability of data systems for real-time data exchange is established rather than moving to a single, central data base system.*

83. Provide more intensive training on 'how' to identify children who are at risk and need significant intervention, in addition to programs currently in place. While it should not be expected that teachers act as therapist, it would be advisable that they are aware of signs/behaviors students with suicidal ideation are experiencing/exhibiting.

- * According to Dr. Kelly Posner Gerstenhaber, from Columbia University, 80-90% of school shooters have suicidal issues. She developed a system that has been successful at identifying people with suicidal issues and at lowering the suicide rates. Everyone in the community can be taught to look for the signs.
- * The Columbia Lighthouse Project – this program has been successful in lowering suicide rates. <http://cssrs.columbia.edu/>
- * Sandy Hook Promise is already a BCPS approved program - Know the Signs https://www.sandyhookpromise.org/prevention_programs

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to BCPS, Florida SB 7030 requires families to disclose mental health services referral or treatment at the time of registration.*

84. Specialized teams such as the START (School Threat Assessment Response Team) should be developed here in Broward County. (Develop the team, training, provide on-going education for assessment, and follow up)
<https://www.elac.edu/currentstudents/studentresources/emergencyalert/docs/start.pdf>

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Broward County Public Schools recognizes that intervention is most effective and efficient when done prior to an individual reaching a crisis point and having a disciplinary, criminal or threatening event. The intensifying use of Collaborative Problem Solving Teams, deepening inter-agency collaboration, and improved data gathering and sharing are all necessary components. BCPS and Broward County agencies are exploring how these existing efforts compare with the approach of Los Angeles County with*

85. Identify programs that are reporting successful outcomes in reducing violence and promoting healthy learning environments. We need programs that emphasize empathy, coping skills, communication, conflict resolution, anger management, et cetera. Programs that promote social emotional learning and provide positive reinforcement should be implemented.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: ACCORDING TO BCPS, *social service, law enforcement, and public education agencies continue to evaluate current programs effectiveness in reducing violence and promoting comprehensive wellness. Due to separate governance, funding, and approval procedures there are a large portfolio of programs offered within Broward County to address common issues. Additionally, after the tragedy at Marjory Stoneman Douglas a large volume of vendors approached multiple agencies and advocates to establish a presence in the County.*

Agencies, in conjunction with funding entities, have begun to compare their programmatic offering to reduce duplicity, identify gaps, and improve coherence. Additionally, conversations have begun to establish a common framework for analyzing the impact of programs, their cost effectiveness and ability to operate at scale. It is anticipated that these collaborative efforts will result in a reduced portfolio of program offerings with improved effectiveness and cost savings.

In addition, according to mental health professionals on the Task Force, extensive research has been done to identify programs that are reporting successful outcomes in reducing violence and promoting healthy learning environments. Evidence Based practices including, but not limited to: the Center for Mind Body Medicine skills training, Sandy Hook Promise initiatives, the PATHS curriculum are being integrated into the school day and infused into after school programming.

86. The Taskforce recommends the immediate post crisis response be coordinated by relevant parties in the Broward County Emergency Operations Center, such as Human Services, Broward Behavioral Health Coalition, the American Red Cross, the United Way of Broward County, the Broward County School Board, and the Department of Health.
- * Identify and establish a standing committee - **Mental Healthcare Response Team.**
 - * Establish protocols and procedures that are to be enacted immediately upon the report of mass violence/casualty event.
 - * Activate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Mental Health Emergency Response Team triage. The Broward Behavioral Health Coalition should be integrated to any activation of the EOC.
 - * Have and maintain lists of qualified mental health professionals and support services for short and long-term recovery efforts.
 - * An agency/group should be designated to act as the "clearing house" for offers of mental health support from outside the county.
 - * These recommendations are in line with the expectations of MSDHSPS Act.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *The Broward Behavioral Health Coalition (BBHC) will now have a seat at the EOC during an activation and will be fully integrated into the Human Services ESF.*

Lists of qualified mental health professionals, as well as support services has been created for both short-/long- term recovery needs of residents.

Broward Trauma Coalition is being formed to address all of these issues. The first meeting was conducted August 12, 2019

87. Recommend employing strategies similar to those as outlined in the National Center for Crisis Management, American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, A Practical Guide for Crisis Response in our Schools, (5th ed.), Mark D. Lerner.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *The Broward Trauma Coalition will determine the best protocols to adopt when they meet on August 12, 2019. However, it is critical that the success of that process is dependent on all stakeholders are involved and that there is critical thought and analysis given to the different models and methods based upon evidence based data and experience.*

88. Recommend researching information on Trauma-Informed Schools, which the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN) defines as, “one in which all parties involved recognize and respond to the impact of traumatic stress on those who have contact with the system including children, caregivers, staff, and service providers.

* Programs and agencies within such as system infuse and sustain trauma awareness, knowledge, and skills into their organizational cultures, practices, and policies. They act in collaboration with all those who are involved with the child, using the best available science, to maximize physical and psychological safety, facilitate the recovery or adjustment of the child and family and support their ability to thrive.”

* Trauma Assessment Pathway (TAP) is a treatment model that incorporates assessment triage and essential components of trauma treatment into clinical pathways. TAP incorporates a multifaceted assessment process to enable clinicians to gain an in-depth understanding of the child, their developmental level, their traumatic experience, and the family, community and cultural system in which the child lives. It is a manualized treatment addressing all forms of childhood trauma.
<https://www.nctsn.org/interventions/assessment-based-treatment-traumatized-children-trauma-assessment-pathway>

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Trauma Providers are meeting on a bi-monthly basis to coordinate trauma services among the system of care, to become aware of system issues and resolve them, identify missing resources and additional trainings required to meet the needs of the population.*

89. Recommend NCTSNs Psychological First Aid (PFA) and Skills for Psychological Recovery (SPR) are promising practices for disaster behavioral health response and recovery. Both PFA and SPR were developed by the National Center for PTSD and the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, as well as other individuals

involved in coordinating and participating in disaster response and recovery. PFA and SPR intervention strategies are intended for use with children, adolescents, parents and caretakers, families, and adults who are survivors or witnesses exposed to disaster or terrorism. PFA and SPR can also be provided to first responders and other disaster relief workers.

- * While grounded in the same foundations of disaster response and recovery, there are several differences between PFA and SPR. PFA is a supportive intervention for use in the immediate aftermath of disasters and terrorism. SPR is used in the weeks and months following disaster and trauma, after the period where PFA has been utilized or when more intensive intervention is needed. The delivery of PFA is defined in terms of days or weeks after a disaster (timing will depend on the circumstance of the post-disaster setting). SPR is intended to assist disaster survivors after safety, security, and other vital and immediate needs have been met and when the community is rebuilding. In some cases, SPR may be delivered one week after a disaster, as a follow up to the initial PFA response, and in other cases it may be appropriate to provide this assistance weeks, months, or even years after a major event. The timing will be partially dependent on how devastating the disaster was to community resources and infrastructure.
- * SPR places greater emphasis on teaching specific skills to meet survivor needs, as well as on follow-up to reinforce the use of these skills. PFA, in contrast, is often delivered in temporary settings where follow-up may not be possible. <https://www.nctsn.org/treatments-and-practices/psychological-first-aid-and-skills-for-psychological-recovery/about-pfa>; <https://www.nctsn.org/treatments-and-practices/psychological-first-aid-and-skills-for-psychological-recovery/nctsn-resources>

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Both the United Way and 211-Broward have certified trainers in Mental Health First Aid. They have been conducting regular trainings throughout the community and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.*

90. Post MSD Specific Recommendation

- * Recommend activities that address the wide range of emotional and physiological signs that manifest themselves in the days, weeks, and months following a traumatic event. There is a great deal of rapport that is involved in seeking therapeutic care. Namely, trust. In situations that are far less traumatic, it takes a great deal of time for a child, most especially of high school age, to be able to trust. Reportedly, some students thought it was “weird” to have adult counselors walking around school and asking them if they wanted to talk, resulting in some students avoiding counseling or rejecting the idea all together.
- * Students did respond positively to therapy dogs, reporting that it was comforting and they did not feel pressured to “tell them their story” or necessarily talk. While this is not a long-term solution to recovery, it is advisable to include this more frequently in the immediate days that follow and make it an aspect of the therapeutic process.
- * Recommend a pre-determined number of clients that a counselor is assigned upon intake and will provide services for the duration. Students that reported benefitting from counseling services, reported that they would return to the media center only to find another counselor.
- * Recommend identifying areas within the school/institution that provide for greater privacy in disclosure. Some students complained about not having privacy to meet with counselors, sometimes meeting with them in the cafeteria, multipurpose room, or even in the hallways.
- * Recommend every effort should be made to communicate with the student and the parents about the intervention – briefing, assessing, and debriefing. In the weeks and months that followed MSD, mental healthcare providers conducted a number of interventions, which were well intentioned but left many of the students confused about the results. While interventions are an accepted practice, given the unusual circumstances of a crisis.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *The community has responded by creating Eagles’ Haven as a safe place for wellness and healing in the community. Easily accessible to MSD families, it is a warm and welcoming place where students, family members and teachers gather for wellness activities in a non-threatening environment. As trust is built with the staff of licensed clinicians, families are encouraged to take advantage of the Navigators who can connect them with local trauma trained therapists. They work with the families to select a trauma treatment modality that is most comfortable and appropriate for the client. Those Navigator services are offered at Eagles’ Haven or in home at the preference of the client. They have also provided crisis intervention services.*

ACCORDING TO BCPS, *Broward County continues to move from a response to a recovery mode and has begun to establish new collaborative efforts to foster resiliency. A significant amount of effort has gone into providing direct services to victims, the impacted communities at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, and the cities of Parkland and Coral Springs.*


Since the initial BLOC report, the Broward County Resiliency Center (BCRC) continued operation at Pine Trails Park serving over 1500 consultations. The BCRC continues to serve the impacted communities in locations in Parkland and

Coral Springs. More information on receiving these services is available at <https://www.browardschools.com/page/38911>.

Additionally, the community has responded by creating Eagles' Haven (<https://www.eagleshaven.org>) as a safe place for wellness and healing in the community. Easily accessible to MSD families, it is a warm and welcoming place where students, family members and teachers gather for wellness activities in a non-threatening environment. As trust is built with the staff of licensed clinicians, families are encouraged to take advantage of the Navigators who can connect them with local trauma trained therapists. They work with the families to select a trauma treatment modality that is most comfortable and appropriate for the client. Those Navigator services are offered at Eagles' Haven or in home at the preference of the client. They have also provided crisis intervention services.

At Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School there is a Wellness Center which attends to the unique needs of the students and staff. The Wellness Center provides both direct and referral services. The Wellness Center provided over 3500 consultations during the 2018-19 school year.


The Broward County Public Schools conducted an Accountability Session in May 2019 to examine the effectiveness of interventions provided and identify lessons learned thus far. The presentation from that session is Exhibit 52.



There were significant rises in a number of indicators after the shooting on February 14, 2019. There was a rise in reported discipline incidents, a significant increase in behavioral threat assessments, a rise in Baker Act referrals, an increase in requests for 504 services, increases in Rtl referrals, and an increasing trend in referrals for third party mental health services. In totality, these trends strongly support the need for more resources, improved collaboration, and public

awareness of promoting positive mental health services and how to obtain mental health interventions for those in need or in crisis.

Support: District Support Counselor Interventions Provided in the MSD Zone




EXECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY SESSION:
RECOVERY

Source: School Counseling Department

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Referrals for Support have Increased Substantially District-wide



EXECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY SESSION:
RECOVERY

*2019 data is partial year data

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Students, teachers, staff, and school administrators were consulted for best practices and lessons learned in the 15 months following the tragedy. Among their observations and recommendations are:

- The stigma of receiving mental health services is real and must be addressed with on-going education.

- *Returning to the challenges of grades and standardized testing resulted in increased anxiety.*
- *Individual responses to the tragedy vary widely and some community members have a difficult time understanding the variation within the community.*
- *Community members initially had a difficult time accepting assistance from sources outside of their immediate community. Some school community members resisted available assistance from the School District and community organizations.*
- *The continued presence of the “1200 Building” is a source of anxiety for many community members. This decision is connected with the prosecution of the shooter and is beyond the control of the School District, municipalities, or County government.*
- *The extensive media coverage, and the promotion of non-factual narratives by outlets and individuals, resulted in increased anxiety and frustration in efforts to correct the record through official channels and investigations.*
- *The commemoration of the one-year anniversary was challenging for the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, Parkland/Coral Springs, and entire Broward County community. It will be important to find ways continue to acknowledge loss and build resiliency moving forward.*
- *Periods of transition, such as the start and end of the school year, and extended breaks, such as winter and spring break, require planning to ensure continuity of therapeutic relationships and successful coping patterns.*
- *The integration of national partners, especially the Center for School Crisis and Bereavement and the Center for Mind-Body Medicine, brought expertise and was important for many members of the community.*

Additional observations and recommendations from beyond the MSD HS community include:


- *Activities that address the wide range of emotional and physiological signs that manifest themselves in the days, weeks, and months following a traumatic event. There is a great deal of rapport that is involved in seeking therapeutic care. Namely, trust. In situations that are far less traumatic, it takes a great deal of time for a child, most especially of high school age, to be able to trust. Reportedly, some students thought it was “weird” to have adult counselors walking around school and asking them if they wanted to talk, resulting in some students avoiding counseling or rejecting the idea all together.*
- *Students did respond positively to therapy dogs, reporting that it was comforting and they did not feel pressured to “tell them their story” or necessarily talk. While this is not a long-term solution to recovery, it is advisable to include this more frequently in the immediate days that follow and make it an aspect of the therapeutic process.*
- *The establishment of a pre-determined number of clients that a counselor is assigned upon intake and will provide services for the duration. Students that reported benefitting from counseling services, reported that they would return to the media center only to*

find another counselor. The continuity of the patient–counselor relationship is critical to long-term success.

- Identifying areas within the school/institution that provide for greater privacy in disclosure. Some students complained about not having privacy to meet with counselors, sometimes meeting with them in the cafeteria, multipurpose room, or even in the hallways.
- Every effort should be made to communicate with the student and the parents about the intervention – briefing, assessing, and debriefing. In the weeks and months that followed MSD, mental healthcare providers conducted a number of interventions, which were well intentioned but left many of the students confused about the results. Interventions are an accepted practice given the unusual circumstances of a crisis.

A coalition of Broward County agencies, community leaders, and individuals convened in March 2019 to respond to the death by suicide of one currently enrolled student and one alumnus of Stoneman Douglas within days of each other. This has resulted in increased collaboration on suicide awareness collaboration and education efforts in the County. A variety of providers presented to the student body in small groups in April and May of 2019,

Suicide Prevention at BCPS



BCPS Curriculum developed from "The Youth Suicide Prevention School-Based Guide" by the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute of South Florida

Prevention training focuses on: Warning Signs, Risk Factors, and How to Respond

Provided to all schools; Three trainings to Marjory Stoneman Douglas staff in July 2018

Youth Mental Health First Aid training includes a suicide component

Provided to all schools; several trainings at Marjory Stoneman Douglas since January 2019

State funding leveraged to hire 50 additional Counselors, Social Workers and Specialists

Referendum funding (~\$8 million) will be used to hire more across the District



EXECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY SESSION:
RECOVERY

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The coming years will be challenging and efforts for continuous improvement are required. Differentiated support for the Stoneman Douglas graduating classes of 2020 and 2021 and staff who were present during the tragedy must continue during the efforts to build resiliency countywide.

Legislative:

91. ADVOCATE for the State of Florida its' per capital spending on mental health;
- Short-term and long-term residential beds;
 - Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams;
 - FIT teams;
 - YES teams;
 - Training;
 - Peer Support;
 - Afterschool and summer programs that have a behavioral health overlay;
 - Increase Mental Health Categorical Funding;
 - Increased availability and reduced caseloads for case managers;
 - Increased funding for school psychologists, counselors and social workers;

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *ACCORDING TO BCPS, Local contributions to improved mental health occurred when Broward County citizens supported the Broward County Public Schools millage increase to allow for additional mental health services, support for teachers, and safety expenditures.*

Federal funds for additional school funds for social emotional development are included in the House budget and efforts are underway to convince the Senate to agree. A request for \$260 million for a Social-Emotional Learning (SEL) Initiative to support SEL and “whole child” approaches to education. Within this amount, the bill provides:

- *\$170 million within the Education Innovation and Research program for grants for evidence-based, field-initiated innovations that address student social, emotional, and cognitive needs;*
- *\$25 million within the Supporting Effective Educator Development (SEED) grant program for teacher professional development and pathways into teaching that provide a strong foundation in child development and learning, including skills for implementing SEL strategies;*
- *\$25 million within the School Safety National Activities program to make schools safer through a new competition that will help local educational agencies (LEAs) directly increase the number of mental health and child development experts in schools; and*
- *\$40 million for Full-Service Community Schools to provide comprehensive services and expand evidence-based models that meet the holistic needs of children, families, and communities.*

While additional state funds were made available for mental health services more needs to be done and advocacy efforts continue.

Broward County Public Schools, Children’s Services Council, United Way, and many agencies continue to pursue grant funding to support response, recovery, and resiliency development work. Agencies are waiting for the submitted application funds to be awarded and disbursed. These funds will support a wide variety of functions including direct trauma services to victims, support for Eagles’ Haven, therapy for future years, the continued engagement of the Center for

School Crisis and Bereavement, and the continued engagement of the Center for Mind-Body Medicine.

It is imperative that all municipalities and public institutions collaborate to align and support a broad legislative agenda at the local, state and national level that increases resource availability, long-term sustainability, and resources to better serve the residents of Broward County.

CHAPTER 7: COMMUNITY BASED SAFETY ISSUES

Near-Term

92. Individual Public Access Bleeding Control Kits are recommended to be installed in all classrooms.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As noted, BSO has committed to the purchase of 12,000 “Stop the Bleed” Kits for BCPS. Additionally, in certain municipalities, they have supplied “Stop the Bleed” kits in every AED kit at the schools within their municipal boundaries.*

93. Wall-mounted Public Access Bleeding Control Kits are recommended to be installed in places of assembly, such as the cafeteria, auditorium, theater, etc.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to BCPS, each kit contains 8 treatment packs. The kits are in a cabinet that is mounted on the wall. Installation will commence in Fall 2019.any municipalities are moving towards ensuring that all municipal AED kits include “Stop the Bleed” Kits. The community is encouraged to purchase for “Stop the Bleed” kits for their AED kits. Additionally, current CPR training includes training for “Stop the Bleed” kits at the same time.*

94. It is recommended that all bleeding control kits are housed in a cabinet or container to protect the contents.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Many municipalities are moving towards ensuring that all municipal AED kits include “Stop the Bleed” Kits. The community is encouraged to purchase for “Stop the Bleed” kits for their AED kits. Additionally, current CPR training includes training for “Stop the Bleed” kits at the same time.*

95. It is recommended that the school board partners with the local Fire Department and Police Department to train the teachers and faculty during the Teachers’ Planning week at the end of the summer break, before students return one week later.

- * The Power Point and training announcement would be sent to staff via e-mail in advance, (this part of the program is already done) and then each school would schedule the hands-on practical training with the fire department and police department.
- * After this, each principal will be left with the option to call the fire and police department and schedule additional training on an as-needed basis for anyone that missed the primary session, for substitute teachers, and any other faculty member that should be trained.

- * Going forward, the school board should consider having this training completed during on-boarding and hiring for teachers. It is a 2 hour class that is a vital component for all teachers, and should continue with new hires, so there are no training gaps due to attrition.
- * The school board should also put out a standard on the types of equipment in the schools.
- * BCPS noted District Staff is currently working with District partners to provide these kits in select schools. Additional resources, financial and training, will be needed to implement this recommendation across the entire District.
 - * It was noted by the District that collective bargaining may prevent implementing mandatory training.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *According to BSO and BCPS, 12,000 teachers have been trained on “Stop the Bleed” kits. Additionally, BSO has committed to the purchase of 12,000 “Stop the Bleed” kits for BCPS. Current CPR training includes training for “Stop the Bleed” kits at the same time.*

96. Similarly, municipal based deployment in current AED locations should be initiated. Existing programs have been demonstrated to be effectively deployed.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Many municipalities are moving towards ensuring that all municipal AED kits include “Stop the Bleed” Kits. The community is encouraged to purchase for “Stop the Bleed” kits for their AED kits. Additionally, current CPR training includes training for “Stop the Bleed” kits at the same time.*

97. Community based bystander CPR trainings should include a training module for “stop the bleed”.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *This has been adopted by municipalities as a standard for CPR training and should continue to be implemented.*

98. The results of expert analysis being performed by Broward County consultants and the MSD Commission related to cell phone calls to E911 and distribution thereto, any recommendations should be considered by the Task Force.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As noted, Broward County retained the National Police Foundation to provide recommendations to the Broward County After-Action Task Force regarding, among other matters, the E911 system and response in mass incidents. Additionally, the MSC Commission continues to work on gathering evidence and providing recommendations.*

99. All possible efforts must be made to expedite the upgrade of the Public Safety Radio System.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *As noted herein, the County and municipalities continue to resolve the issues surrounding radio tower deployment and installation. Once that is resolved, it is expected that the new P25 radio system will be implemented. This remains an outstanding Recommendation.*

100. While waiting for the upgrade of the Public Safety Radio System, immediate steps must be taken by BCPS and the County to remove school board radios from the current system.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: *Broward County and the BCPS Board and staff committed to remove the school bus radios and have the local government radio system operational by the start of the 2019/20 school year. It was recently announced that migration of roughly 4,000 local government radios off public safety system on to a local government radio system was completed. As outlined by the County, “[t]he migration includes approximately 2,000 School District users (primarily bus operators) and roughly 2,000 users from 17 County agencies including Aviation, Port Everglades, Parks and Recreation and Water & Wastewater Services.” The effort included “delivery and programming of the radios, installation of the control station, radio testing, installation and training.” The County has also committed “monitor performance in the weeks following August 14, the first day of school, and provide additional testing and modifications, if necessary, to optimize coverage.”*

It is noted this effort will not guarantee radio system problems will be eliminated during or in the aftermath of future mass events, it is a positive and significant step forward. The implementation of the new county-wide radio system and installation of the new towers is a critical component to ensure better communications because the current system is at “end-of-life”. Those efforts continue. In addition, a collaborative training effort amongst all municipalities, first responders and the County was implemented intended to better manage radio usage so as to mitigate communication challenges during mass events.

101. Radio Penetration in Schools, Hospitals and Public Buildings: It is recommended that a complete analysis is conducted in all Broward Schools to determine the effectiveness of radio communications for all emergency first responders. Following the analysis, any school that shows areas of poor and/or an inability for effective radio communications should have an engineered plan to install a public safety signal booster system (BDA, Bidirectional Antenna). Additional funding and efforts are necessary for legacy hospitals and public buildings.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: THIS REMAINS OUTSTANDING. *It was noted that the new P25 may provide some better penetration in some areas. However, this will not resolve the well-identified lack of penetration in schools and government buildings. The financial impact of solutions is extraordinary. Mitigation strategies are being explored by various stakeholders including the Police and Fire Chief Associations.*

Legislative:

102. Must advocate for funding to support the execution of the Risk Protection Orders and clarify responsibilities of the Judiciary, clerk's office and law enforcement. . When utilized effectively, there will be substantial increased strain on law enforcement and the Court system. Greater clarity and refinement by legislature is necessary to better identify respective responsibilities for the judiciary, clerk's office and law enforcement for such matters as mandatory reporting by court related to expiration of RPOs, background checks on voluntary transfers, how

juveniles and confidentiality are to be handled, responsibility for court reporters and translators in a civil proceeding.

UPDATE AUGUST 13, 2019: THIS REMAINS OUTSTANDING. *It is noted the resource demands on law enforcement, the courts, and the Clerk's office has been absorbed to date in an effort to ensure the new law is fully effectuated.*

AUGUST 13, 2019 CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS³²

CHAPTER 2: MSDHSPS ACT

103. The Task Force, based upon issues identified by the courts, suggests the Florida legislature address certain questions involving the Risk Protection Statutes, including the procedures surrounding the order and funding of mental health exam/alcohol/drug exams at the final hearing and confidentiality as it pertains to juveniles.
104. The Task Force recommends the Florida Legislature consider amending the Risk Protection Order law to permit family members to seek Risk Protection Orders.
105. It is recommended that local law enforcement develop a central repository of Risk Protection Order data, including the evaluation of efficacy, prevalence and methods for violation, and demographics. Such a repository should be expanded statewide.

CHAPTER 6: COMMUNITY BASED MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

106. Provision of and delivery mental health trauma care must be timely, sustained, aligned with the characteristic of trauma, and demonstrate continuity of care. In order to best ensure these principles are attained, a coordinated preparation and ultimate deployment that integrates the interests, viewpoints and resources of all providers and potentially affected constituencies, including local and county government, police, fire, schools, mental health providers, hospitals and others.
107. All stakeholders should review evaluate and implement, where appropriate the Recommendations of the National Police Foundation as it relates Recovery and Resiliency. #
108. The community as a whole must improve post-event response to ensure coordination and communication. While there may be different models, the suggestion of Mental Health Incident Commander involved in pre-event planning, acute response and long term deployment of resources. The system established must institutionalize integration and continuity and not be dependent upon the particular individuals or personalities who may drive better or more coordination.
109. Post-event mental health trauma response may be dependent on many different characteristics such that a single pre-planned process may not meet the demands of all type of trauma. As a result, the deployment of resources must adapt to circumstances but do so in a coordinated fashion. For instance, how resources are deployed may be very different if all the victims and those experiencing trauma have a pre-existing relationship (e.g., school, place of worship) versus where the relationship of those experiencing trauma is based upon fortuitous circumstances (e.g, mall, festival, park). Both acute and long term mental health trauma response will be different in terms of outreach and other factors.

³² These additional recommendations are offered in addition to the need to continue sustained efforts to implement the Recommendations from the Initial Report.

110. The Task Force noted in the aftermath of recent mass shootings, those initially negatively impacted by MSD were re-traumatized, even though the event was 18 months later. As a result, the mental health trauma community must be prepared to deploy resources even when distant events occur and may re-open wounds or re-traumatize. This should also be coordinated as part of the centralized coordination, through a Mental Health Incident Commander or otherwise.
111. The Task Force reiterates the need for additional, meaningful and sustained funding for mental health and trauma care throughout the community.
112. Since the initial Task Force Report was released, a great need for Trauma Tele-Mental Health services has been identified. This need has become more apparent as MSD students have left the area for college or other reasons. Understandably, their trauma moves with them. Tele-Mental Health would allow for continuity of care with their respective mental health care provider. This need will only grow more acute as more of the students graduate or move away.
113. Require change in the criteria for compensation under the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA). Currently, MSD victims that were not physically harmed but may have witnessed their peers 'bleed out' in front of them have been classified as "Mental Health Minor Witnesses" rather than a "Mental Health Injured Minor;" thereby, limiting the compensation they received to purchase mental health and other needed services. According to VOCA, as of 2.18.2018, injured minors are eligible to receive \$10,000 until age 18, while witnesses are only eligible for \$5,000 for one year following the date of the crime. There is no explicit definition of injured and/or witness within the Florida law or rule 2A-2.002.
114. Increase amount of compensation and length of time for reimbursement under VOCA, as these amounts are inadequate compensation given the magnitude of the trauma, as well as the extent of treatment required. Children who were exposed to this type of trauma may age out prior to completing the necessary prescribed treatment.
115. Request state to provide increase in funding dedicated to early intervention, prevention, and on-going care for mental health programs in Broward County schools and the community.
116. Develop school and community programs that foster Resiliency. The ability to adapt well and recover quickly after stress, adversity, trauma or tragedy will allow for the individual to maintain a healthy level of physical and psychological wellness in the face of life's challenges. Individuals that are less resilient, are more likely to dwell on problems, feel overwhelmed, use unhealthy coping tactics to handle stress, and develop anxiety and depression. Resiliency training focusing on areas, including emotional, cognitive and mental, and physical resilience can improve resiliency, enhance quality of life, and decrease stress and anxiety.

CHAPTER 7: COMMUNITY BASED SAFETY ISSUES

117. The Task Force members who participated in the drafting of this Updated Report and Recommendation recommend the Florida Legislature implement universal background checks for all firearm sales, including private sales. The Task Force identified a glaring loophole involving Risk Protection Orders prohibiting an individual who is a danger to themselves or others from possessing a firearm. While those RPOs are to be entered timely in the FDLE database necessary for proper background checks prior to the purchase of firearms, only purchases from licensed firearm dealers require a mandatory background check. The Task Force recognizes the great potential benefit of the RPO law. Given the glaring loophole, particularly as it relates to individuals who a court has determined is a danger to themselves or others (perhaps based upon specific threats or being in crisis) and should be prohibited from possessing a firearm, the Task Force members who participated in the drafting of this Updated Report and Recommendation recommend the Florida Legislature adopt universal and mandatory background checks on all firearm sales.
- 118.. All stakeholders should review evaluate and implement, where appropriate the Recommendations of the National Police Foundation as it relates “Broward County Governance” (Emergency 911 Communications); “Command Coordination, Structure and Leadership”; “Communication and Public Information.”
119. The BCPS has developed a draft of 2020 Legislative Objectives. Many of those objectives are positively related to Recommendations contained in the Initial and Update Reports. BCPS should coordinate directly with other interested stakeholders to develop a coalition of support, including the Broward League of Cities, public safety community, city and county managers and mental health advocates and providers.

August 13, 2019 Update Report and Recommendations: Appendix

39. [Broward League of Cities' School & Community Public Safety Task Force Meeting Agendas Compilation of meeting Agendas](#)
40. [National Police Foundation, January 2019, "Regional Public Safety Communications in Broward County: A National Police Foundation Interim Review of the Impact of Communications Systems and Processes on the Response to the February 14, 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting", Chart of Recommendations](#)
41. [National Police Foundation, January 2019, "NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION GAP ANALYSIS FOR THE MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT"](#)
42. [National Police Foundation, August 2019, "Recovering and Moving Forward Lessons Learned and Recommendations Following the Shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School", Draft Chart of Recommendations](#)
43. [BCPS Policy 2150: Safer Spaces](#)
44. [BCPS Policy 2120: Emergency Protocols](#)
45. [BCPS Policy 213: Threat Assessment](#)
46. [BCPS/Superintendent Runcie May 6, 2019 Letter to Broward County Chiefs of Police Association Regarding School Resource Officers](#)
47. [Behavioral Assessment Team Training for School Resource Officers Flyer](#)
48. [August 7, 2019 Sun Sentinel Article Regarding Mental Health Counseling App: "Nothing But Advice"](#)
49. [July 26, 2019 Correspondence From Bertha Henry \(County Manager\) to Broward Chiefs of Police Association Regarding E911 Communication System](#)
50. [BCPS DRAFT 2020 Legislative Priorities](#)
51. [BCPS June 25, 2019 Cumulative Disciplinary Incident Data and Report.](#)
52. [BCPS Accountability Session Presentation on Recovery Post-MSD](#)

June 4, 2018 Report and Recommendations: Appendix

1. [Broward League of Cities' School & Community Public Safety Task Force Meeting Agendas](#)
2. [Summaries of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act](#)
3. [April 9, 2018 BCPS PowerPoint to Task Force](#)
4. [BCPS Forum on School Safety PowerPoint](#)
5. [BCPS PROMISE Program PowerPoints and Slides](#)
6. [Indiana School Safety Guidelines for Emergency Response Systems](#)
7. [February 26, 2018 BCPS Memo re: Safety In, Before, and After Care](#)
8. [March 5, 2018 BCPS Memo re: Campus Safety Reminders](#)
9. [May 9, 2018 BCPS Memo re: Student Discipline and Critical Incident Reporting Reminders](#)
10. [BCPS PowerPoint re: Multi-Tiered System of Support/Interventions](#)
11. [BCPS Collaborative Problem-Solving Team Composition: School Psychologists, Counselors, Social Workers](#)
12. [April 16, 2018 Florida TaxWatch Email re: SMART program](#)
13. [BCPS SAFE Team charts/members](#)
14. [MSD High School Public Safety Act Excerpt re: Drills](#)
15. [NFPA Guidelines on Fire Drills](#)
16. [BCPS Inventory of Classrooms District wide](#)

17. [Composite BCPS Memos/Materials re: Fencing](#)
18. [BCPS Charter School Process/Considerations Memo for Taskforce Re: Safety etc.](#)
19. [Composite Broward County Inventory of Charter Schools](#)
20. [Max Schachter's Draft School Safety Guidelines](#)
21. [Composite Materials re: BCPS Proposed Referendum Increased Levy](#)
22. [March 2018 17th Judicial Circuit PowerPoint re: Risk Protection Orders](#)
23. [2004 Article re: Hollywood PD Youth Referral Program](#)
24. [Newtown Foundation Letter re: Mental Health Trauma Specialist](#)
25. [April 30, 2018 Article re: Therapists for Parkland](#)
26. [CHC/CSC Aftercare Program Security Action Plan](#)
27. [January 30, 2013 BLOC SRO Taskforce Report and Recommendation](#)
28. [2018 Broward County SRO Survey](#)
29. [BCPS SRO PowerPoint](#)
30. [March 26, 2018 Letter from Davie Mayor re: SROs](#)
31. [BCPS SRO Funding post- SB 7026](#)
32. [May 2, 2018 Florida Sheriffs Association re: SRO Funding](#)
33. [Family Educational Rights to Privacy \(FEPR\) Memo for SROs](#)
34. [June 15, 2017 Police and Fire Chiefs Associations' Joint Statement re: 911 Communications](#)
35. [May 8, 2018 Police and Fire Chiefs Associations' Joint Statement re: Countywide Communications](#)
36. [Coral Springs Fire Department PowerPoint re: CPR/AED/Bleeding Control Training](#)
37. [Radio System Sun Sentinel Article](#)
38. [June 1, 2018 BCPS Safety and Security Letter MSDHS and West Glades Middle School](#)